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ii. Abstract 
Organizational corruption is known to be a systemic issue in both developing countries and more 
developed countries, yet the theoretical knowledge of organizational corruption is insufficient in 
comparison to the severity of its consequences. Due to its keen focus on organizations, 
management has significant potential to develop insights on organizational corruption but has 
thus far been limited in doing so due to a) a lack of integration with other disciplines (e.g. 
economics, sociology, psychology) in the study of corruption and b) a lack of focus on the 
interactions of variables across levels of analysis that give rise organizational corruption. My 
dissertation contributes to the literature by offering three papers that each examine a different 
aspect of organizational corruption (antecedents, wide-spread consequences, and strategic 
implications), making a specific contribution to the literature each is positioned in. Paper 1 sheds 
light on the ability of organizational practices to maintain a law-abiding organizational climate in 
a firm when it is faced with institutional obstacles that create pressure to be unlawful, Paper 2 
develops a new theoretical model that better explains how the spread of negative reputational 
evaluations to a population of firms occurs after a scandal is committed by a single firm, and 
Paper 3 explains how firms adapt their innovation approach when faced with the threat of 
corruption by reducing product innovation but increasing marketing innovation. Each paper is 
able to make a significant contribution by integrating management research with knowledge 
from other disciplines as well as focusing on the interactions of variables across levels of 
analysis to reveal the processes that underlie the causes and consequences of organizational 
corruption.  
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Introduction 
 In my dissertation, I examine organizational corruption in hopes of extending the current 
understanding of the issue in the management literature. Corruption is commonly defined as the 
misuse of a position of authority for private or personal benefit (Misangyi, Weaver and Elms, 
2008), where misuse typically constitutes a breach of legal norms (Johnston, 1986; Kaufmann, 
1997). The position of authority in question often refers to public power, but this definition also 
encompasses exchanges that occur strictly between private parties (Svensson, 2005). Since it is 
rooted in unethical behaviour of organizations or actors in their field, corruption is related to 
ancillary concepts in the management literature that explain how decision-makers decide to 
engage in unethical behaviour, such as ethical decision-making (e.g. Cohen, Pant, and Sharp, 
2001) and moral reasoning (e.g Husted, McMahon, and Kattan,1996), as well as concepts that 
represent specific forms of unethical behaviour such as corporate social irresponsibility (e.g 
Surroca,  Tribó, and Zahra, 2013) and scandals (e.g, Kang, 2008). However, corruption is 
distinguishable from the plethora of concepts with which it is related because of its focus on 
explaining unethical behaviour as a systemic issue. Corruption reflects the general tendency of 
unethical behaviour to exist and proliferate in a group, industry, or national context, such that a 
given corrupt act is symptomatic of a more deep-rooted issue and can be connected to a broader 
trend of behaviour. 
  The systemic nature of corruption is explained through a relational structure than creates 
opportunities for it to occur and an incentive structure that allows actors to benefit from it. 
Corruption can be expected to occur when (1) there is control over economic benefits and costs 
in an exchange between parties, and thus, the potential for economic rents to be generated, and 
(2) when an actor in a position of authority possesses discretionary power in the allocation of 
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such costs and benefits (Misangyi et al., 2008). The actor in question uses their discretionary 
power to appropriate economic benefit for themselves or direct favorable allocations to other 
actors in return for payment (Rose-Ackerman, 1975). Corruption becomes pervasive in society 
when such relational and incentive structures are commonplace and come to define interactions 
between organizations and actors in their environment. This is indeed the case globally (Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2016), such that corruption is a pervasive problem in both developing and developed 
countries.  
 Systemic corruption and its severe consequences have been well documented in the 
developing country context. Typically involving government actors that provide a firm with 
favorable regulation or the removal of bureaucratic obstacles that block economic activity, 
corruption in the developing country context is widely considered to be a key cause of 
underdevelopment, crippling economic progress by creating inefficiencies related to excessive 
bureaucracy and economic uncertainty for firms, reducing foreign direct investment, as well as 
misdirecting entrepreneurial talent and skilled labour (Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & 
Eden, 2003; Mauro, 1996). Beyond just its economic consequences, corruption contributes to 
societal problems such as poverty, inequality, inadequate social services and infrastructure, and 
political instability (Kauffman, 1997; Moran, 2001). While there is no shortage of examples to 
present to illustrate corruption in the developing country context, a recent example is the scandal 
involving former Pakstani President Nawaz Sharif and his daughter who were found guilty (and 
ordered to serve prison terms) for the channeling of illegitimate funds and purchase of foreign 
assets through offshore companies (BBC, 2018). Unfortunately, this is not a far cry for a country 
that has historically suffered from a corruption problem. Another former president, Asif Ali 
Zardari, earned the infamous nickname of "Mr 10 percent", alluding to his alleged personal 
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commissions on government contracts, which according to the Pakistan's state anti-corruption 
body, have allowed him to amass a global property empire worth nearly £1 billion (The 
Telegraph, 2010). 
 While it does not contribute to economic and social strife to nearly the same degree as it 
does in the developing country context, corruption in the developed country context is 
nonetheless commonplace and not just bound to the unethical behaviour of a specific 
organization or industry. Since the late 2000's, the financial collapse has become the poster child 
for corporate greed and corruption in both academic research and conventional wisdom. The 
discretionary power given to large U.S banks as a result of deregulation and a lack of monitoring 
and sanctions incentivized actions that profited organizations at the expense of society, leading to 
billions of dollars in corporate bailouts by government, record losses in the securities markets 
globally, and catastrophic consequences to the U.S housing market. With a similar corporate-
regulatory dynamic enabling Volkswagen to deceive its consumers by falsely reporting 
automobile emissions level, a discovery made only a few years ago, corruption continues to be 
pervasive even in the developed world. This is the case in Canada as well, as demonstrated by 
the scandals involving SNC-Lavalin in which it was revealed that the Canadian company paid 
bribes to secure construction contracts both domestically and overseas (Globe and Mail, 2018). 
 The persistence of the corruption problem should come as no surprise as policies to 
combat the problem have been inadequate, failing to eliminate the opportunity and business case 
for corruption. The severity of the corruption problem has garnered it attention and effort from 
actors in the position to push for reforms. For example, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), which consists primarily of developed countries, makes 
anti-corruption and bribery efforts on a continual basis, as does the United Nations through its 
4 
 
convention against corruption which focuses on the issue in developing countries. The increasing 
frequency of organizational corruption observable on a daily basis, along with academic research 
(Getz,2006), tells us that these efforts have not been effective at countering the problem. 
 In light of the pervasiveness of organizational corruption and the severity of its 
consequences, it is an area of study deserving of considerable attention. Yet, the contributions 
made by academia in understanding the causes and consequences of organizational corruption 
have been inadequate relative to the scope and depth of the problem (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, 
and Treviño, 2008). Much of the fault must be placed on management research due to its keen 
focus on organizations and their interactions with the external environment that makes it best 
suited amongst the social sciences for examining organizational corruption (Rodriguez, Siegel, 
Hillman, and Eden , 2006). It is imperative that management research further examine corruption 
from the perspective of the organization to compliment the knowledge generated by the relative 
success of economic research in understanding the problem at the more aggregated, country level 
of analysis. It is only then that a sufficient body of knowledge on organizational corruption can 
be formed that can shed light on how organizations become corrupt and the span of its 
consequences to both organizations and society at large.  
 A more robust body of knowledge of organizational corruption can better inform 
practical solutions for addressing the problem. A better understanding of what causes 
organizations to be corrupt can help inform managers on the organizational practices and 
governance measures that can be adopted to disincentive corruption and eliminate situations that 
allow organizational members to use their discretionary power for illegal purposes. A 
consideration of salient differences between the developing and developed country context is 
important, since differences in their institutional environments create different incentives and 
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opportunities for corruption which have implications for the effectiveness of potential anti-
corruption measures. A more robust body of knowledge on organizational corruption can also 
help inform policy creation at the government level aimed at eliminating corruption between 
public actors and organizations. A greater appreciation of the situations that enable public-
private corruption , including the circumstances that make organizations dependent on public 
actors and vice versa, can help guide the attention of policy makers on which types of exchanges 
require the most oversight. A better understanding  of the incentives for government actors and 
organizations to engage in corruption can help clarify in which circumstances is corruption likely 
to be coerced on an actor or  a collaborative exchange to better formulate solutions on how to 
prevent actors from participating in corruption. 
 Next, I explain some theoretical directions for the study of organizational corruption that 
can help to broaden the understanding of the issue as it exists in the extant literature, which I also 
took in writing my dissertation. 
Theoretical directions for better understanding organizational corruption 
Interdisciplinary approach 
 Organizational corruption necessarily involves multiple actors, can be initiated by 
multiple causes, and has consequences contingent on various factors for both actors involved and 
not involved in corrupt acts. In light of its complex and multi-faceted nature, a toolkit of 
theoretical frameworks that spans management research and outside disciplines can help tackle 
the study of organizational corruption. While management research and outside disciplines 
including, but not limited to, psychology, sociology, economics, and political science have made 
their own contributions to the study of corruption, scholars working from their respective 
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disciplines have done little to account for one another's efforts. This has resulted in a set of 
theories on organizational corruption that are partially overlapping but mostly sporadic and often 
times conflicting (Ashforth et al., 2008). Accordingly, interdisciplinary research that combines 
what we know about organizations from management research with insights from other 
disciplines has been called for by scholars in order to achieve a deeper understanding of 
organizational corruption (Getz, 2006; Galang, 2012). The importance of taking an 
interdisciplinary approach for the study of corruption echoes that of its ancillary area of business 
ethics, which suffers from the same issue where much of the knowledge outside of management 
research has not been integrated with the insights the discipline has produced on unethical 
organizational behaviour (Moore and Gino, 2015). I take an inter-disciplinary approach in my 
dissertation by using theoretical perspectives from management, sociology, and social 
psychology to better understand organizational corruption. 
Interaction across levels of analysis 
 While the extant literature does examine variables that affect or are affected by 
organizational corruption across different levels of analysis, including the firm, industry, and 
national environment, the interaction and dynamics between levels of analysis have been 
neglected to a great extent (Ashforth et al., 2008). As a result, the processes that underlie both 
the causes and consequences of organizational corruption have been under examined. Given the 
systemic nature of corruption, it is vitally important to take into consideration the broader system 
of variables and actors across levels and how they interact to understand the processes that cause 
corruption to emerge and be sustained. Furthermore, such a perspective would better 
acknowledge the embededness of organizations within their wider environment, something that 
research on organizational corruption tends to ignore (Misangyi et al., 2008). Organizations face 
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both formal and informal pressures due to dependency with their environment, stemming from 
relationships with environmental actors and the need for scarce resources, which influences 
whether an organization engages in corruption and the nature of its consequences. In my 
dissertation, I take into consideration the interaction between variables across different levels of 
analysis to better explain the processes underlying organizational corruption, as well as the 
implications that the embededness of organizations within the environment has on the causes and 
consequences of organizational corruption. 
 An example of research that made a significant contribution to the literature on 
organizational corruption by employing an interdisciplinary approach and taking into account 
interactions between levels of analysis is Misangyi et al. (2008). The authors are able to shed 
light on how corruption is engrained as a systemic problem by identifying interactions between 
individual, organizational, and institutional variables. Furthermore, by drawing from 
organizational behaviour that taken-for-granted roles and routines can facilitate organizational 
corruption, and taking into account from macro organization theory the challenge of breaking 
such roles and routines in light of the influence of the institutional environment, the authors are 
able to develop a novel theory for eliminating corruption that is based on adopting an anti-
corruption institutional logic alongside practices that prevent corruption.  
 Taking inspiration from Misangyi et al. (2008), I follow these theoretical approaches in 
similar manner but also extend them in directions not taken by the authors. Firstly, I incorporate 
the meso level of analysis by examining the consequences of organizational corruption to a 
broader scope of firms, and furthermore, how these consequences relate to factors at other levels 
of analysis. Given that factors at varying levels of analysis and the dynamics between them cause 
corruption to emerge and persist, the consideration of group level consequences allows for 
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providing a deeper understanding of corruption's systemic nature. Secondly, I integrate various 
other theories from within and outside management literature relevant for understanding the 
multiple dimensions of organizational corruption considered in this dissertation - its antecedents, 
wide-spread consequences, and strategic implications. Such an approach is necessary for 
capturing these distinct dimensions of organizational corruption in which differing actors, 
variables, and situational contexts are relevant. My hope is that by similarly following these 
theoretical directions, my dissertation is able to make significant contributions to the study of 
organizational corruption. 
Overview of dissertation papers 
 My dissertation consists of three papers that each explore a different aspect of 
organizational corruption. Paper 1 examines the antecedents of corruption, Paper 2 explores the 
wide-spread consequences that an act of corruption by a single organization has on the reputation 
of a broader scope of organizations, and Paper 3 investigates the strategic implications of 
corruption on an organization's innovation activities. The inadequacy of the amount of scholarly 
work done by management researchers on organizational corruption can in part be attributed to a 
lack of suitable data. The illegal nature of corruption which causes firms to be hesitant to report 
on or answer questions regarding their involvement with corruption makes firm-level data 
difficult to measure and thus rare (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). While country-level data on 
corruption is more prevalent than firm-level data, it is unable to answer the strategic questions of 
interest to management researchers (Rodriguez et al., 2006). In my dissertation work I overcame 
this issue by collecting primary, firm-level data for Paper 1 and consolidating two distinct 
datasets for Paper 3 to form a rich data set with information on firm-level corruption and a 
plethora of other firm-level measures. Across the three papers, I incorporate variables and the 
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role of actors at different levels of analysis, as well as employ different theoretical frameworks to 
answer each paper's specific research question. Along with contributing to the specific body of 
literature that it is positioned in, each paper takes the theoretical directions outlined above to 
broaden the understanding of organizational corruption by questioning assumptions or adding 
depth to general, oversimplified ideas. Below is an overview of each paper. 
Paper 1:Law-Abiding Organizational Climates in Developing Countries: The Role of 
Institutional Factors and Socially Responsible Organizational Practices 
  While considerable attention has been devoted to establishing the association between 
institutional environment of developing countries and corruption, little scholarly insight has been 
produced in regards to how some firms avoid corruption and conduct themselves within the 
confines of the law. Given that a firm's conduct is a product of the nature of the institutional 
context and its own characteristics (Martin, Cullen, Johnson, and Parboteeah, 2007), a keen focus 
on organizational characteristics can help shed light on the variability across firms to engage in 
corruption within an institutional context. 
 This paper examines some institutional factors typical of developing countries that drive 
firms to be unlawful, and the ability of socially responsible organizational practices to maintain a 
firm's adherence to the law when faced with these institutional factors. I use anomie, a theory 
from sociology, as the theoretical lens to explain the process by which both institutional factors 
and socially responsible organizational practices influence a firm's "law-abiding climate". A key 
obstacle in conducting firm-level research on organizational corruption is the sensitive nature of 
the topic which causes firms to be reluctant to answer honestly about their direct involvement in 
corruption. For this reason, law-abiding climate is examined as the outcome of interest. Law-
abiding climate serves as an indirect measure of corruption because it is indicative of how 
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conducive a firm’s norms regarding compliance are to engaging in corrupt acts. The use of law-
abiding climate as the dependent variable as opposed to a direct measure of corruption has the 
benefit of reducing the risk of socially desirable response and ensuring an adequate response 
rate, but comes at the cost of sacrificing some external validity as it pertains to inferences that 
can be made in regards to corruption. Nonetheless, given the dearth of firm-level research 
attempting to investigate organizational corruption and the severity and importance of the issue, 
especially in the developing country context, this trade-off is justified and the examination of 
law-abiding climate is nonetheless worthwhile. I draw on the lens of anomie theory for its ability 
to conceptualize a context relevant to developing countries in which elements of the 
environmental context render legitimate and law-abiding means to achieve desired ends 
infeasible. The primary contribution of this paper is that it provides insight on the efficacy of 
socially responsible organizational practices in the developing country context for fulfilling their 
intended purpose of ensuring that firms adhere to the law. Primary data collected on 118 
Mexican firms was used to empirically test the hypotheses of this study. 
 By situating developing country firms amidst their adverse institutional context, this 
paper questions the conventional wisdom in the literature that actions are considered obviously 
to be misconduct or not based on a set of consistently applied norms (Greve, Palmer, and Pozner, 
2010). Rather, it acknowledges that the situation a firm perceives itself to be in determines the 
normative framework by which it evaluates potential actions (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Krowe, 
2008). It does so by recognizing that institutional factors common in developing country 
environments can compromise the ability of firms to achieve performance goals while remaining 
lawful, which can cause norms and ethical decision criteria consistent with a normative legal 
framework to be perceived as impractical. By drawing insights from anomie theory and 
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connecting them with the study of ethical climate, my paper uncovers a decision process in 
which developing country firms perceive unlawful conduct to be justified as a means of doing 
business in light of the realities of their context. 
Paper 2:Theorizing Reputational Spillover: Contingent Organizational Categorization and the 
Spread of Scandals  
 While the reputational consequences for firms that commit scandals have been 
thoroughly explored in the extant literature, relatively little attention has been devoted in 
exploring how and why the reputation of other firms not involved in the particular scandal are 
negatively affected. This widespread reputational consequence to firms underlies corruption's 
crippling effect of reducing foreign direct investment into a country, which can be thought of as 
an adverse selection problem in which the broader scope of firms in a country become grouped 
together with those that engage in corruption. Furthermore, it contributes to the systemic nature 
of corruption by incentivizing firms to engage in corruption and experience its benefits to the 
extent that they will be labelled as corrupt and suffer reputational consequences independent of 
their actual behaviour.   
 In this paper, I explore "reputational spillover", when a scandal by a firm affects the 
reputation of other firms that were not involved in the original incident. Categorization, a theory 
from social psychology which acknowledges the cognitive tendency of the public to simplify the 
world around them into categories, is used as a basis to advance theory on the phenomenon. 
Specifically, I build an overarching theoretical framework rooted in a contingency view of 
categorization that contributes in two main ways. Firstly, the framework explains spillover in 
terms of two distinct phases of spillover origin and spillover spread which provides new insight 
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on the antecedents of spillover. Secondly, it presents a more accurate perspective on how 
categorization operates in reputational spillover by explaining that the category used by the 
public is dependent on the scandal's level of moral intensity, on the basis that moral intensity 
determines the effort and attention that the public devotes to understanding the causes and 
consequences of a scandal. Given that a scandal can often times take the form of corruption, my 
paper is able to provide insight into the wide-spread reputational consequences that a single act 
of corruption can have on a population of firms.  
 Given the relatively little theoretical knowledge of reputational spillover in the extant 
literature, scandals more generally were examined as opposed to corruption, which can be 
thought of as particular type of scandal. While this results in a theoretical model that provides 
less insight on corruption's widespread reputational consequences than would one that focuses 
specifically on corruption, a more open-ended independent variable was appropriate so that the 
focus could be on the theoretical development of dependent variable of interest, the phenomenon 
of reputational spillover. Future research can follow a deductive approach in applying the 
theoretical insights on reputational spillover produced by this paper as a basis to better 
understand the wide-spread reputational consequences of corruption scandals more specifically, 
incorporating the relevant contingencies and variables that make corruption scandals unique.
 Multiple levels of analysis are considered in this paper, specifically, the micro-level 
through the examination of members of the public and their cognitive tendencies, as well as the 
meso-level through consideration of the population of firms that are affected by reputational 
spillover. The interaction between these levels of analysis puts into question the commonsense 
assumptions in the literature that misconduct harms the reputation of the responsible organization 
without affecting the reputation of others (Greve et al., 2010). The role of the public in rendering 
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reputational evaluations after observing a scandal and their cognitive tendency to engage in 
categorization as a sense-making shortcut reveals that the fate of firms are intertwined by a 
reputational commons, which causes firms to be dependent on one another's actions. 
Furthermore, by using categorization theory to explain the effect of scandals on reputation, I take 
into account that the processes underlying ethical decisions are not strictly reason-based but can 
be biased by the use of subconscious processes and intuition (Tenbrunsel and Smith-Krowe, 
2008), a point acknowledged in the literature but not often incorporated in extant theorizing. 
Paper 3: How Firms Adapt Their Innovation Approach When Faced With the Threat of 
Corruption: An Examination of the Effect of Corruption on Product and Marketing Innovation 
 While innovation has been considered to be synonymous with the economic development 
of developing country firms, the consequences that corruption has on firm innovation has been 
significantly understudied. A particular issue is that a broader conception of innovation that 
consists of both technological and non-technological innovation has typically not been 
considered, with the literature maintaining a focus on the former. As a result, potential insights 
pertaining to the effect of corruption on a firm's broader innovation strategy have been 
overlooked, limiting our understanding of how firms react to the threat of corruption. 
Taking a broad perspective on innovation beyond its typical, technology-based conceptualization 
in management research, this paper examines the effect of corruption on firm innovation in 
developing countries. Through a cross-national, quantitative study of African and South-Asian 
firms using data on over 6000 firms from the World Bank, I test the prediction that corruption 
causes firms to shift their efforts away from product innovation towards marketing innovation. I 
reason that corruption results in firms adopting a short-term and risk averse strategic orientation 
that favors the proximal and assured returns of marketing innovation over the longer-term and 
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uncertain returns of product innovation. I also examine how the application for IP rights in the 
form of patents and trademarks influence the effect that corruption has on product and marketing 
innovation, respectively. Based on differences in the susceptibility of patenting and trademarking 
to corruption, I reason that patent applications mediate the negative relationship between 
corruption and product innovation while trademark applications strengthen the positive 
relationship between corruption and marketing innovation. This paper contributes to the 
literature by conceptualizing a wider scope of innovation in a manner that allows for 
understanding not only how firms are affected by corruption, but how they adapt to it by 
allocating their efforts across types of innovation to reduce their level of risk. In doing so, it 
sheds light on how firms manage when faced with government corruption, a question that has 
received surprisingly little consideration in the literature (Rodiguez et al., 2006; Galang, 2012). 
  I integrate multiple theoretical perspectives in this paper by using the exploration-
exploitation framework to conceptualize product and marketing innovation, and using threat 
rigidity to understand how corruption, as an environmental threat, affects the balance of 
exploration and exploitation at a firm. Through this integration of theories I am able to develop 
an insight that adds depth to the common-sense understanding in the literature that corruption 
deters economic activities such as innovation by imposing additional costs on a firm. 
Specifically, I use threat rigidity theory to explain that rather than reducing a firm's innovation in 
general, corruption causes firms to adopt a risk-averse and short-term strategic focus that is 
conducive to engaging in certain types of innovation but not others. 
 My dissertation proceeds with the presentation of each paper. Following the three papers 
is a discussion of overall findings that focuses on how the insights from each paper inform and 
complement one another. Figure 1 below is a conceptual depiction of my dissertation. 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual depiction of dissertation 
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Law-abiding organizational climates in developing countries: 
The role of institutional factors and socially responsible 
organizational practices 
 
Abstract: Law-abiding organizational climates can help explain how the 
institutional context of developing countries results in unlawful conduct of firms. 
Using the theoretical lens of anomie theory, we investigate: a) the negative effect 
of two aspects of the institutional context – regulatory burden and lack of industry 
munificence – on a law-abiding climate, and b) the role of socially responsible 
organizational practices in combating these negative effects. Hypotheses were 
tested using survey data collected from Mexican firms. Our results indicate that a 
manager's perceptions of regulatory burden and lack of industry munificence are 
negatively related to the extent to which the firm has a law-abiding climate. 
Furthermore, our findings shed light on the ability of socially responsible 
practices to countervail this effect. While the negative effect of perceived 
regulatory burden on law-abiding climate weakens when codes of ethics are used 
more extensively by a firm, it strengthens when firms hold a CSR certification. 
The latter finding may be due to the lack of enforcement associated with the 
specific certification considered in our study. Implications of our findings for 
policy makers and firms are discussed. 
Key words: developing countries, law-abiding climate, regulatory burden, CSR 
certification, code of ethics  
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INTRODUCTION 
 The institutional context in which firms operate has a decisive influence on the likelihood 
that firms will develop law-abiding behavior (Galang, 2012; Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & 
Trevino, 2008). The conventional wisdom holds that institutional contexts characterized by 
resource scarcity tend to foster unlawful conduct (Simpson, 1986; Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975), 
which refers to breaking the law. In addition, we argue that institutional contexts characterized 
by regulatory burden also foment unlawful conduct. Yet these basic propositions do not explain 
how firms sometimes behave in lawful ways despite such institutional conditions. The reaction 
of firms to their institutional context is not solely determined by institutional conditions. Rather, 
it is a product of the nature of the institutional context and the characteristics of firms that 
respond to it (Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007). Therefore, the variability in 
lawfulness of firms operating in such contexts can be better understood by taking into account 
the characteristics of firms and their interaction with the prevailing institutional conditions. In 
this article, we re-examine the basic relationship between institutional context and what we call 
“a law-abiding ethical climate". However, our main purpose in this article is to further explore 
the impacts of ethics codes and certifications as organizational practices that attenuate the impact 
of the institutional context on a law-abiding climate. 
In this paper we appeal to anomie theory and ethical climate theory to explain the basic 
relationship between institutional context and law-abiding ethical climate as well as the 
moderating effects of organizational practice in attenuating this relationship. We use the term 
“law-abiding climate” to denote the “law and code" ethical climate postulated by ethical climate 
theory. These climates are characterized by the belief among managers that ethical decisions 
should be made on the basis of externally imposed societal rules, such as the law and 
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professional codes of conduct (Martin & Cullen, 2006). Accordingly, a law-abiding climate in 
our study acts as the moral compass that inhibits transgressions of the law by firms, such that 
firms devoid of a law-abiding climate are more likely to engage in unlawful conduct. Law-
abiding climates are thus telling of a firm's propensity to behave unlawfully, making Ethical 
Climate Theory, and in particular, it's concept of law-abiding climate, relevant for ascertaining 
the extent to which firms adhere to the law. 
Unlawful conduct is widely prevalent in firms in developing countries and often justified 
as a normal business practice. For instance, 40% of Mexican entrepreneurs agree that the most 
effective way to gain a competitive advantage is through bribes and connections (Mexican 
Institute for Competitiveness, 2015). These conditions prevail widely, with recent decades 
witnessing an acceleration of unlawful firm conduct in emerging-market countries (Zheng & 
Chun, 2017). Abiding by the law is an often unmet prerequisite for the transition of a country to 
a modern, developed society (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2013). Hence it is vitally important to 
determine whether organizational practices, such as ethics codes and certifications, can attenuate 
the relationship between negative aspects of the institutional context of developing countries, 
such as regulatory burden and industry munificence, and law-abiding climate.  
 The literature on ethical climates has thus far overlooked the role that organizational 
practices have in producing desired ethical climates (Newman, Round, Bhattacharya, & Roy, 
2017), including their role in cultivating law-abiding ethical climates (Simha & Cullen, 2012). 
As a result, whether organizational practices can attenuate the negative effect of some 
institutional contexts on law-abiding climate has not been explored. This represents a significant 
gap in knowledge since organizational practices are implemented by firms and thus under their 
direct control. As such, amidst the pressures imposed on them by their institutional context, 
19 
 
which they cannot control, organizational practices are a potential means by which firms can 
promote adherence to the law. A particularly relevant omission is the examination of socially 
responsible organizational practices which are intended to foster an ethical orientation within 
firms, prompting a call to clarify the consequences of practices, such as codes of ethics, on 
ethical climates (Martin and Cullen, 2006). Managers employ such measures under the 
assumption that they will ensure their firms adherence to the law, making it important to test 
their effectiveness for fulfilling their intended purpose. 
To investigate whether organizational practices can attenuate the effect of certain 
institutional contexts on law-abiding climate, we pose the following research question: how can 
some organizational practices attenuate the effect of certain aspects of institutional contexts in 
developing countries that prevent companies from adhering to law-abiding climates? It is 
important to first understand how the institutional context of developing countries leads to the 
unlawful conduct of firms before examining how organizational practices can combat this 
influence. Accordingly, we take explicit consideration of two factors that are characteristic of the 
institutional context of developing-countries and explain how they diminish a law-abiding 
climate and lead firms to engage in unlawful conduct. The first is regulatory burden, which refers 
to government regulation that is considered by firms to be inconsistent and lacking in 
transparency (Jalalian, Kirkpatrick, & Parker, 2007), and the second is industry munificence, 
which is the extent to which a firm's industry is unable to provide it opportunities for growth 
(Dess & Beard, 1984).  
To explore whether socially responsible practices can cultivate lawful conduct in light of 
an adverse institutional context (regulatory burden and lack of industry munificence), we define 
such practices as organizational practices that are intended to foster ethical conduct within a 
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firm. We focus specifically on two socially responsible organizational practices: CSR (corporate 
social responsibility) certification and code-of-ethics use. Our approach allows us to examine 
CSR against the backdrop of the idiosyncrasies of the institutional context in which it occurs, 
which is required for ascertaining whether CSR initiatives are effective in achieving their desired 
consequences in developing countries (Jamali & Neville, 2011; Jamali & Carroll, 2017). 
Our study contributes to the ethical climate literature by showing that firms that face 
regulatory burden and lack of industry munificence have weaker law-abiding climates, as well as 
shedding light on the ability of socially responsible organizational practices to combat this 
influence. Codes of ethics that are used more extensively are found to weaken the negative effect 
of regulatory burden on law-abiding climate, while CSR certification is found to strengthen it. 
The latter, surprising finding may be due to the lack of explicit sanctions of the certification 
system applicable to our study. Our work is important because it sheds light on the causes and 
potential firm-level deterrents of wide-spread corruption prevalent in developing countries which 
is a key cause of underdevelopment (Doh et al., 2003; Kaufmann, 1997). 
Following the recommendation in the literature, we use anomie theory as the theoretical 
mechanism to explain the impact of contextual factors on prevailing ethical climates (Martin and 
Cullen, 2006). Anomie theory is well suited to help answer our research question due to its 
explicit consideration of external context, and moreover, its ability to conceptualize a context 
relevant to developing countries in which elements of the environmental context render 
legitimate and law-abiding means to achieve desired ends unfeasible (Merton, 1968). Appendix 
1a depicts the theoretical model. We tested the theoretical model using primary, firm-level 
survey data collected on 118 Mexican firms across various industries using ordinary-least 
squares (OLS) moderated regression. 
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Our paper is structured as follows. First, we provide the theoretical basis for our 
arguments and then formally develop our hypotheses. Next, we explain our data collection 
methods and survey sample. We then present our findings. Lastly, we provide implications and 
limitations of our work, as well as future research directions. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 In this section, we develop the theory and hypotheses for this paper. First, we examine 
the presence of a law-abiding climate at the firm level. We then explore how two aspects of 
institutional context – regulatory burden and industry munificence – influence law-abiding 
climate. We then develop the theory that relates two organizational practices, CSR certification 
and ethics-code use, to the base relationship between institutional context and law-abiding 
climate. 
Law-abiding climate 
Ethical climates are conceptualized as norms and ethical decision criteria that underlie the 
decision-making and subsequent behaviours of firms in response to ethical dilemmas (Victor & 
Cullen, 1988). They determine the issues that are considered ethically pertinent for a firm and the 
moral criteria organizational members use to understand, weigh and resolve such issues (Cullen, 
Victor, & Stephens, 1989). By exerting significant influence on the behaviour of organizational 
members (Schminke, Arnaud, & Kuenzi, 2007), ethical climates underlie the unlawful conduct 
of firms. For example, accountants that perceive pressures to act unethically, indicative of the 
ethical norms at the firm, tend to be more lenient in judging the ethics of earnings management 
(Tian & Peterson, 2016). Due to their influence on behaviour, scandals like insider trading and 
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fraud involving prominent organizations such as Enron and Lehman Brothers are traceable back 
to their ethical climates (Arnaud, 2010).  
Ethical climate theory (ECT) was first conceptualized by Victor and Cullen (1987, 1988) 
as an analytical tool for understanding the different normative systems that can exist within 
organizations. While there are five possible ethical climates (Martin and Cullen, 2006), we 
narrow our focus to law-abiding climate for three reasons. First, a law-abiding climate for firms 
indicates how conducive a firm’s norms regarding compliance are to engaging in illegal and 
corrupt acts, which may be especially true for firms in developing countries given the 
considerable pressure placed on their governments by inter-governmental organizations in the 
late 1990s through the mid-2000s to adopt anti-corruption policies (Davis, 2009). Second, law-
abiding climates are considered amongst the most desirable ethical climates due to their positive 
consequences across a range of organizational outcomes, including a positive association with 
ethical behaviour (Fritzsche, 2000) and negative association with unethical behaviour (Wimbush, 
Shepard, & Markham, 1997). Third, law-abiding climates are also particularly likely to exist at 
firms despite the presence of other ethical climates (Victor & Cullen, 1987). The law-abiding 
climate is distinct in that it is exogenously motivated, based on external societal rules that are 
mandated on firms. Thus, even when a law-abiding climate is not the dominant ethical climate of 
a firm, it is likely to exist in a firm to a greater extent relative to the other climate types (Victor & 
Cullen, 1988). 
Institutional Context 
In uncovering the determinants of the prevailing ethical climates of firms, the literature 
has focused on internal organizational factors centered around organizational form (Liu, Fellow, 
& Ng, 2004; Malloy & Agarwal, 2010) and strategic and managerial orientations (Morris, 1997; 
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Schminke, Ambrose, & Neubaum, 2005). The influence of institutional context on ethical 
climates, on the other hand, has been understudied (Simha & Cullen, 2012; O'Fallon & 
Butterfield, 2005). Accordingly, the influence of prevailing contextual factors on the ethical 
climates of organizations operating within specific environments has been suggested as a future 
research direction (Newman et al., 2017). 
Given the distinct operating environment that responsible firms in developing countries 
face compared to those in developed countries (Jamali, Karam, Yin, & Soundararajan, 2017; 
Jamali & Mirshak, 2007), the next step is to examine more closely the influence of a developing 
country context on unlawful conduct. Institutional logics in developing countries are 
significantly different from those of developed countries. Among these differences are the role of 
the family and religion in CSR (Jamali et al., 2017). As a result of these differences, 
multinational CSR initiatives need to be translated and adapted to the local context, if they are to 
be implemented successfully (Jamali et al., 2017, Forcadell & Aracil, 2017).  
In order to incorporate context into the analysis of ethical climates (Martin & Cullen, 
2006), we employ anomie theory, which posits that structural conditions faced by an actor within 
its environment, coupled with the societal values that emphasize traditional, monetary notions of 
success create strain and contradiction in the social system (Merton, 1995, Durkheim, 1966). The 
result of this tension is anomie, a state in which actors accept the breaking of societal rules as a 
normalized practice in response to the environmental conditions they face (Bernard, 1987). The 
failure to abide by societal rules, is itself an institutional logic, in the language of Jamali, et al. 
(2017), and a characteristic found commonly in developing countries (North et al., 2013), which 
makes the translation and adaptation of CSR to the local context so vital.  
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The concern of anomie theory with the underlying determinants of moral decisions 
(Rosenfeld & Messner, 1997) allows it broad applicability across all societal domains in which 
decisions have ethical considerations, including business (Cullen, Parboteeah, & Hoegl, 2004). 
Anomie theory acknowledges the relativity underlying moral reasoning that exists across 
national contexts (Martin et al., 2007) by taking into account how a firm's perception of 
externally imposed rules, such as those defined by the law, are influenced by their environment. 
Specifically, we use anomie theory to explore the consequences for a law-abiding climate where 
members perceive legitimate access to goal achievement to be blocked by contextual forces in 
the environment (Martin & Cullen, 2006). Faced with contextual factors that compromise their 
ability to achieve performance goals, managers feel justified in taking any means to achieve 
desired ends regardless of their acceptability or legitimacy (Martin et al., 2007), which may 
entail breaking the law. As a result, firms stray away from the norms and ethical decision criteria 
characteristic of a law-abiding climate in making ethical decisions and guiding behaviour, 
negatively affecting the extent to which such an ethical climate exists at the firm. 
We argue that regulatory burden and lack of industry munificence cause firms to perceive 
lawful and ethical means of goal achievement to be impractical. We focus specifically on these 
contextual factors for two reasons. Firstly, they are salient characteristics of the institutional 
context of developing countries, as we explain later in the paper. While previous studies using 
anomie have incorporated environmental factors that drive firms towards being unethical (Martin 
et al., 2007; Johnson, Martin, & Saini, 2011), the factors considered have not been relevant for a 
developing-country context. Secondly, both contextual factors are associated with unlawful firm 
behaviour, making them appropriate for use in our study in order test the efficacy of socially 
responsible organizational practices in maintaining a firm's adherence to a law-abiding climate. 
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Overregulation and unrestrained bureaucracy, factors that would cause regulation to be perceived 
as burdensome, have been shown to increase national corruption levels (Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann & Zoido-Lobaton, 2000; Ali and Isse, 2003). Similarly, empirical evidence points to a 
negative relationship between industry munificence, in the form of product market (Simpson, 
1986) and industry (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975) profitability, and antitrust illegality. We 
consider managers' perceptions of institutional factors rather than conceptualize them as 
exogenous factors in order to capture the differences in the ability of firms within a given context 
to address the challenges they pose. Managers of firms for which institutional factors are 
especially burdensome are more likely to feel that lawful and ethical means of goal achievement 
are impractical, reflecting their experience of anomie, which will have negative consequences on 
the extent to which a law-abiding climate may prevail in firms. Characterizing a common 
experience across all firms in a given context can fail to capture this variability. For instance, 
cross-national studies have measured the existence of environmental conditions that are 
conducive to an unethical orientation but failed to consider whether managers’ perceptions of 
these factors result in such a mindset being fostered in firms; a lack of consideration of manager-
level perceptions may be the cause of surprising findings in which firm-level effects of some 
cultural and social-institutional factors ran contrary to hypotheses (Cullen et al., 2004). 
Perceived regulatory burden. Compared to developed countries, governments in 
developing countries often intervene more extensively in business operations, establishing 
requirements for a greater range of decisions made by firms (Krueger, 1990). Extensive public 
regulation is justified to compensate for underdeveloped market-supporting institutions in 
developing countries which make market failure more likely (Stiglitz, 1998). While greater 
regulation is intended to increase economic activity, it often inhibits the economic activity of 
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firms in developing countries due to the discretionary power given to regulatory actors in 
applying rules, causing their actions to be unpredictable (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Regulatory 
burden is experienced by firms when they face regulation that is inconsistent and lacking in 
transparency (Jalalian et al., 2007). The added uncertainty associated with economic activities 
for firms that face such regulatory requirements create disincentives for investment and 
expansion (Parker, 1999). Regulatory burden is related to excessive bureaucracy that delays or 
altogether blocks transactions, or can cause firms to incur added costs in the form of time and 
resources that can make economic activities prohibitively expensive. Firms for which these 
consequences are severe enough to prevent their accomplishment of goals will likely experience 
anomie because relevant regulation may be perceived as impractical. In response, firms that 
experience anomie find ways to work around regulatory rules. For instance, corrupt practices 
such as bribes may become part of working with the bureaucracy (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), with 
illegal payments being made to regulatory actors to ease or by-pass regulatory requirements 
(Leff, 1964; Lien, 1990). The ability of illegal payments to facilitate economic exchanges in 
developing countries is evidenced by empirical findings of its positive association with foreign 
investment (Egger & Winner, 2005) and productivity (Méon & Weill, 2010).  
Firms can differ in the extent to which they are regulated as well as their effectiveness in 
managing regulations, both of which influence managers’ perceptions of the burdensomeness of 
regulation. The extent of regulation can differ according to a firm’s industry or its size and legal 
status, while the political connectedness of a firm determines its ability to receive inside 
information pertaining to regulation or receive favorable regulatory decisions. Given that norms 
and ethical decision criteria of law-abiding climates are contrary to undermining or breaking the 
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rules of the regulatory process, we hypothesize a negative relationship between perceived 
regulatory burden and the extent to which a firm has a law-abiding climate.  
Hypothesis 1: Perceptions of regulatory burden by a firm’s managers decrease the extent to 
which the firm has a law-abiding climate. 
Perceived lack of industry munificence. In anomie theory, an unequal distribution of 
opportunities within a social system explains why some actors are more likely than others to 
undermine societal rules and behave in a deviant way. Those whose environment affords them 
fewer legitimate opportunities resort to means outside of what is considered appropriate to 
maintain their aspirations to cultural prescriptions of success. For instance, the overemphasis on 
monetary success prescribed by the American Dream, a broad cultural ethos that entails 
commitment by everyone in society to the goal of material success (Mesner & Rosenfeld, 2012), 
coupled with an unequal distribution of access to legitimate means for attaining success, is said 
to be responsible for high rates of crime and deviance characteristic of the United States (Merton, 
1968). 
A common cultural prescription for firm success is growth. Firms are awarded favorable 
valuations by investors based on their growth projections, while the notion of sustained 
competitive advantage that is widely considered the definition of success to which firms should 
aspire requires consistent growth to maintain superior profitability over competitors. Despite the 
pressure to grow, firms differ in the extent to which they perceive their environment to be 
munificent, or able to support sustained growth (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Dess & Beard, 1984). 
A munificent environment is one in which a firm is able to identify adequate growth 
opportunities (Jambulingam, Kathuria, & Doucette, 2005), and thus, offers a firm the promise of 
growth.  
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Munificence is a particularly salient issue for firms in developing countries, where 
growth opportunities vary widely across firms. Despite developing countries often having high 
overall rates of economic growth, few firms are afforded opportunities for substantial growth. 
This is made apparent by the skewed distribution of firms in developing countries in which there 
are a large number of small firms and a small number of large firms, which mainly drive the 
economic growth in a country (Nichter & Goldmark, 1999; Sleuwaegen & Goedhuys, 2002). 
This size disparity is especially pronounced in developing countries due to the lack of an 
adequate supporting institutional system for smaller firms (Tybout, 2000), resulting in limited 
growth opportunities for firms that do not start off large.  
Opportunities for growth depend largely on a firm’s experience operating in its industry. 
Anomie theory would predict that if a firm’s managers perceive their industry environment to be 
lacking in munificence, the firm will experience anomie. A lack of munificence reduces 
opportunities to invest and expand, limiting the ability of firms to achieve growth targets. As a 
result of anomie, firms feel a disconnect with the legal rules and guidelines that would normally 
govern behaviour and perceive that illegitimate means are acceptable to achieve desired growth. 
Such a mindset requires firms to steer away from norms and ethical decision criteria 
centered on the rule of law since illegitimate means are likely to involve the breaking of legal 
rules. Accordingly, we hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 2: The perception of firm managers of a lack of munificence in its industry 
environment decreases the extent to which the firm has a law-abiding climate. 
The moderating role of socially responsible organizational practices  
In this section, we examine the effectiveness of socially responsible organizational 
practices in maintaining a law-abiding climate in firms that experience anomie. Socially 
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responsible organizational practices are of particular relevance to our study because they require 
firms to embody characteristics and exhibit behaviour consistent with a law-abiding climate. By 
delineating permissible actions from those considered impermissible, according to the norms and 
ethical decision criteria of a law-abiding climate, we reason that socially responsible 
organizational practices place bounds on a firm and combat the negative effect that regulatory 
burden and lack of industry munificence have on a law-abiding climate.  
The socially responsible organizational practices we consider are 1) possession of a 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) certification, and 2) code-of-ethics use, a measure of the 
influence of ethics in guiding strategic decisions. We take these practices into consideration 
because legal compliance is a key component for both CSR certifications and ethics codes. 
Typically, CSR certifications require firms to adhere to legal standards such as maintaining 
transparent corporate governance and providing safe working conditions. Adherence to the law 
therefore underlies much of the mandate of CSR certifications. Similarly, codes of ethics to a 
great extent are centered on legal compliance, explicitly stating a company's stance on unlawful 
conduct and outlining the repercussions for organizational members that break the law. Given 
that anomie causes legal rules to lose their legitimacy, and consequently, the strength of their 
regulatory force (Mesner & Rosenfeld, 2012), CSR certification and codes of ethics should 
therefore instill in a firm a stronger law-abiding climate that is more resistant to the adverse 
effects of the institutional context. Neither of these practices has yet been explored in the context 
of anomie theory (Martin and Cullen, 2006), which we now examine more closely. 
CSR Certification. Certification to private management standards can be obtained by 
firms to signal desired, unobservable characteristics to external stakeholders (King, Lenox, & 
Terlaak, 2005). These standards require firms to adhere to specific requirements that are 
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typically verified by third-parties. Private certifications are especially valuable signals of 
unobservable firm characteristics in contexts where external stakeholders likely do not perceive 
formal compliance with government regulations as accurate signals of firm conduct (Montiel et 
al., 2012). Such is the case in developing countries where governments have often failed to 
effectively regulate domestic firms (Vogel,2008). The regulatory process is plagued by weak 
reporting standards, a lack of transparency, and corruption that allows firms to obtain permits 
and licenses without meeting mandatory requirements. Therefore, firms in developing contexts 
can use private certification as a stronger signal of their desirable characteristics (Montiel et al., 
2012).  
  Since abiding by the law is fundamental to much of what is mandated by CSR 
certifications, adhering to the standards required of a CSR certification is at odds with not 
adhering to the norms and ethical decision criteria of a law-abiding climate. This tension would 
cause firms to weigh the disadvantages of following the law, induced by feelings of anomie that 
result from rules of a regulatory process that is perceived as inconsistent and lacking in 
transparency, against the signalling benefits associated with a CSR certification. As a result, CSR 
certification serves as a means of upholding a firm's alignment with a normative legal framework 
amid the pressure to break the law created by perceived regulatory burden, such that firms that 
possess a CSR certification reinforce a law-abiding climate. Therefore, CSR certification should 
attenuate the negative effect of perceived regulatory burden on a law abiding climate, making it 
less likely that firms act on the pressure to break the law. 
 Hypothesis 3a: The negative relationship between perceived regulatory burden and the extent to 
which a firm has a law-abiding climate is weakened for firms that are certified to a CSR 
standard. 
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 CSR certification would similarly come into play when firms deliberate their actions 
upon facing limited prospects for growth and experiencing the resulting feeling of anomie. The 
decision of whether to reap the benefits from breaking the law, stemming from the opportunities 
that a firm is able to exploit by being unlawful, such as reducing costs related to environmental 
compliance, would be weighed against the benefits of certifying to a CSR standard, such as 
attracting customers concerned about the environment, that would be forgone since its 
requirements obligate a firm to conduct itself lawfully. When faced with pressure to break the 
law in light of an industry environment that lacks munificence, firms would be more likely to 
follow the norms and ethical decision criteria of a law-abiding climate to ensure adherence to the 
mandate of a CSR certification. Therefore, CSR certification should attenuate the negative effect 
of perceived lack of industry munificence on law abiding climate. 
Hypothesis 3b: The negative relationship between perceived lack of industry munificence and the 
extent to which a firm has a law-abiding climate is weakened for firms that are certified to a CSR 
standard. 
Code-of-ethics use. While it is known that the overwhelming majority of firms adopt a 
code of ethics since it is a de facto standard in governance (Stevens, Steensma, Harrison, & 
Cochran, 2005; Weaver, Trevino, & Cochran, 1999), not all codes of ethics serve the purpose of 
aligning the decisions of the firm to an ethical framework. The actual use of such codes by 
executives is highly variable (Carroll & Buchholtz, 2003), given the possibility that management 
adopts policies such as a code of ethics without applying them in practice (Westphal & Zajac, 
1995). Rather than ensuring the adherence of a firm to ethical conduct, a firm’s code of ethics 
may exist to serve the instrumental purpose of promoting a positive image of the firm to gain the 
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favor of stakeholders or assuring regulators of the firm’s ability to police itself to reduce the legal 
and regulatory actions taken against it (Stevens et al., 2005).  
 While research in ECT has incorporated the presence of a code of ethics as a cause of 
differences in ethical climate (Agarwal & Malloy, 1999; Peterson, 2002), a distinction based on 
their actual use by firms has not been made in the ECT literature even though it speculates that 
differences in prevailing ethical climates may exist on this basis (Martin & Cullen, 2006). For 
firms in which a code of ethics is used extensively for strategic decision-making, the policies and 
procedures of which it is constituted will be more effective in promoting an ethical value system 
and deterring unethical behaviours in a firm, the common goal across ethics codes (Weaver et al., 
1999). The ability of codes of ethics to provide guidance for dealing with the ‘gray areas’ of 
business decisions (Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999; Quinn & Jones, 1995) becomes 
relevant when firms are faced with institutional factors that cause them to experience anomie. 
Anomie results in the decision to adhere to norms and ethical decision criteria of a law-abiding 
climate to be morally relative, where the benefits of doing so are weighed against its practicality. 
Codes of ethics provide rules and guidelines pertaining to legal matters such as fraud, bribery, 
and accuracy of company records to ensure that a firm's conduct is aligned to a normative legal 
framework (O'Dwyer and Madden, 2006). As a result, firms that use a code of ethics more 
extensively are more likely to defer to the norms and decision-making criteria that conform to 
the rule of law when making decisions in which adherence to the law is evaluated against its 
ability to allow firms to accomplishment their goals. The extensive use of a code of ethics would 
therefore counter the temptations of firms to break the law that is induced by the prospect of by-
passing or easing regulatory requirements that are perceived as inconsistent and lacking in 
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transparency. Accordingly, we hypothesize that greater use of code of ethics attenuates the 
negative effect of perceived regulatory burden on law-abiding climate.  
Hypothesis 4a: The negative relationship between perceived regulatory burden and the extent to 
which a firm has a law-abiding climate is weakened for firms that make greater use of their code 
of ethics for strategic decision-making. 
 The extensive use of a code of ethics would have a similar effect when firms are 
pressured to break the law as a result of experiencing anomie due to limited growth prospects. 
Firms would be less likely to conduct themselves unlawfully despite opportunities for investment 
and expansion that would be available to them by breaking the law when decisions in a firm are 
routinely made based on a code of ethics and the ethical value system it fosters. The rigorous use 
of legal norms and decision criteria in evaluating the appropriateness of decisions at a firm that 
extensively uses its code of ethics would cause the firm to be more likely to remain lawful 
despite the foregone benefits of these decisions. Therefore, we hypothesize that greater use of a 
code of ethics attenuates the negative effect of perceived lack of industry munificence on law-
abiding climate.  
Hypothesis 4b: The negative relationship between perceived lack of industry munificence and the 
extent to which a firm has a law-abiding climate is weakened for firms that make greater use of 
their code of ethics for strategic decision-making. 
DATA 
Research setting 
Mexico is a relevant context for our study given the pervasive acceptance of unlawful 
conduct by firms. Corruption is estimated to cost the country five percent of its GDP and is 
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considered a key contributing factor to the lack of competitiveness of Mexican firms (Mexican 
Institute for Competitiveness, 2015).  
Data collection 
Our survey sample was obtained from a directory of firms in the American Chamber of 
Commerce of Mexico (Amcham), a non-profit organization whose aim is to represent the 
interests of its members by promoting policies that positively impact trade and investment 
between the United States and Mexico. The chamber’s members typically consist of small to 
medium size firms that have a trade relationship with the United States or are the Mexican 
subsidiaries of U.S firms. Surveys were sent to firms primarily to Mexico’s three major industrial 
centers: Monterrey, Guadalajara, and Mexico City. The survey was directed to a single 
executive, senior manager, or manager at each firm who was asked to answer Likert-scale 
questions regarding the experience of the firm. Priority was given to those with the highest-
ranking position when selecting among multiple respondents. Potential respondents were offered 
a chance to win a monetary prize through inclusion in a draw to win one of three gift cards to a 
popular department store valued at 2500 Mexican pesos (about US$125.00). The fact that the 
majority of firms that belong to Amcham are small to medium size businesses justifies our 
single-respondent approach. While it can be preferable to have multiple survey responses to 
gauge the overall perception across a firm, a single respondent in a relatively small firm with an 
influential position within the organizational hierarchy is able to provide opinions and 
perceptions that are reflective of other key decision-makers (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002; 
Phillips, 1981). Although 220 responses were obtained by email and regular mail, out of a total 
of 1330 firms (a response rate of about 17%), we limited our sample to the 188 responses from 
managers who indicated their firm has a code of ethics. We did so because the measurement of 
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one of our variables, the use of code of ethics at a firm, presumes that a firm has a code of ethics 
to begin with. We feel this approach is justified since the mere presence of a code of ethics alone 
is not very indicative of whether it has been used extensively by a firm (Carroll & Buchholtz, 
2003), which would be required for codes of ethics to be an effective influence on the law-
abiding climate of firms. Out of these 188 responses, 118 were useable for the purpose of this 
study after taking into account missing information. Our response rate is comparable to other 
studies in the Latin American context (Carneiro, da Silva, & da Rocha, 2011; Ramos-Garza, 
2009) and the relative number of useable responses compared to total responses is reflective of 
the tendency in Mexico for surveys to be returned incomplete (Merino & Vargas, 2013). The 
survey consists of items drawn from existing constructs that have been adapted to fit the 
Mexican context. The adaptation process consisted of translating items from English to Spanish, 
while maintaining their intended meaning. In a few cases, minor changes were made to increase 
their relevance for the Mexican context. An extensive pre-testing process ensured the survey’s 
external validity through in-depth interviews with experts in the Mexican context, including two 
executives, four business professors, and four executive MBA students currently working as 
managers. Final face validity testing was conducted with a panel of Mexican PhD students. A 
back translation of the Spanish language survey instrument to English was conducted and 
differences were reconciled by the research team.  
A number of steps were taken to reduce the risk of socially desirable responses, a risk 
associated with doing ethics related research (Randall & Fernandes, 1991). Online distribution 
allowed for the self-administration of the survey and the instrument contained a strongly worded 
guarantee of anonymity, both of which are recommended for surveys dealing with sensitive 
information (Reinikka & Svensson, 2006). Partnership with a Mexican business school and 
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formal sponsorship by the American Chamber of Commerce provided the survey with credibility 
and helped to establish trust as the respondents are likely familiar with both organizations. 
Furthermore, social desirability is a severe problem when it is random in nature and biases the 
results in an unpredictable manner. To the extent that social desirability causes a shift in the 
distribution of responses that can be predicted, concerns regarding the validity of results can be 
reduced by interpreting them in light of the possible bias. Since firms would have the tendency to 
exaggerate the extent to which they base their decisions on the rule of law to give the best 
impression of themselves, the correlations presented in this study are likely to be underestimated, 
and as such, can be considered conservative estimates. 
Measures 
The measures used in this study are primarily perceptual and have been adapted from the 
existing literature. Since managers’ perceptions and interpretations of their environment 
influences their decision-making (Boyd et al., 1993), perceptual measures are well suited for this 
study to understand how regulatory burden and lack of industry munificence affects a firm’s 
adoption of a law-abiding climate. 
Our measure of law-abiding climate was obtained from the original law and code scale 
from Victor & Cullen (1988), consisting of four items that capture the extent to which laws and 
professional standards are taken into consideration when making decisions. The regulatory 
burden measure consists of four items from a previous firm-level survey administered by a 
Mexican university that gathered data on business perceptions of corruption in Mexico, the 
“Governance and Business Development Survey” (EDGE, 2001), which has been used in prior 
management studies (Montiel et al., 2012). The items corresponding to the measure evaluate the 
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clarity and predictability of regulation facing firms; accordingly, items were reverse coded to 
gauge the burdensomeness of regulation facing a firm.  
Industry munificence is a four-item measure adapted from Jambulingam et al. (2005) who 
originally used it to measure the perception of pharmacy managers with regard to the 
opportunities for growth that exist in their “business environment”. To accommodate the use of 
the measure in our study, we adapted it to reflect the perception of managers more generally of 
their industry. Since the items inquire about the opportunities afforded to a firm for growth, 
items were reverse coded to gauge the perceived lack of industry munificence.  
CSR certification is a binary variable measured according to whether a firm possesses 
Empresa Socialmente Responsible (ESR), a prominent CSR certification in Mexico, awarded by 
Cemefi, the Mexican Centre for Philanthropy. Data corresponding to this variable were obtained 
from the listing of companies awarded ESR on the Cemefi website. ESR is a voluntary standard 
to which firms across industries can adhere and is based on a firm’s commitment to 
environmental preservation, community involvement and development, quality of life of its 
employees, and ethics and corporate governance.  
We measured code-of-ethics use using a scale from Stevens et al. (2005), consisting of 
five items which evaluates the extent that a code of ethics is used in guiding the firm’s strategic 
decisions. 
Control variables included organizational size, ownership type, and endowment of slack 
resources, which are thought to determine ethical climate perceptions (Martin & Cullen, 2006). 
To incorporate these factors, we included the number of employees, foreign ownership, and 
sales, respectively, as control variables. Data on sales and number of employees were both 
obtained from the AMCHAM directory. Firm age is also included as a control.  
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We also controlled for industry-specific effects using a set of dummy variables based on 
SCIAN (Sistema de Clasificación Industrial de América del Norte), the Mexican counter-part to 
NAICS (North American Industry Classification System). The dummy variables, derived from 
two digit SCIAN codes, consist of professional service, wholesale and retail, three sub-
classifications of manufacturing and a category for all other industries. Our categorization 
approach is appropriate given that a substantial number of firms each fall within the industries 
represented by the first four mentioned categories while all other possible two-digit industry 
categories include either no firms from our sample or very few. The category corresponding to a 
firm was obtained from SIEM, a government operated database of Mexican businesses. Firms 
not listed in SIEM were categorized through manual inspection. 
 
RESULTS 
Construct validation 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was used for construct validation. Distinct factors 
corresponding to each construct were produced with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, accounting for 
72% of the total variance. All items loaded significantly on their respective constructs with factor 
loadings ranging from 0.63 to 0.89, and there were no significant cross loadings (all were less 
than 0.15 in magnitude). This indicates that the multi-item scales measure independent 
constructs, in support of their discriminant validity. Each construct is also shown to be internally 
consistent, with composite reliability values being greater than 0.80 (Nunnally & Bernstein, 
1994). Furthermore, the recommended AVE (average variance extracted) benchmark of 0.50 was 
surpassed for each construct (Formell & Larcker, 1981). The measures, their individual item 
loadings, as well as the composite reliabilities and AVE statistics, are reported in Appendix 1e. 
39 
 
Discriminant validity can be further assessed by observing the correlation between 
constructs and comparing the square root of the AVEs to those correlations that are considered 
high (Formell & Larcker, 1981). As shown in Appendix 1b, correlations between all constructs, 
except control variables, are relatively low, with none being greater than 0.30. The largest of the 
correlations between key constructs is between law-abiding climate and use of code of ethics 
(r=0.293), which is less than the square root of the AVE for law-abiding climate (√0.72 = 0.85) 
and less than the square root of the AVE for use of code of ethics (√0.63=0.79), providing 
evidence of discriminant validity. As a final test of discriminant validity, HTMT (Heterotrait-
monotrait) ratio of correlations were calculated for each construct (Henseler, Ringle, and 
Sarstedt, 2015). HTMT correlations are based on Partial Least Squares (PLS) estimations, and 
thus a PLS model was estimated to compute HTMT correlations (results are not reported due to 
space limitations). The maximum HTMT value was found to be 0.34, well below the 
recommended threshold of 0.85, providing further evidence of discriminant validity (Kline, 
2011). 
 
Tests for sources of bias 
We conducted multiple statistical tests to rule out common method bias (CMB). CMB 
represents the risk that results can be biased in an unpredictable manner when data on both the 
independent and dependent variable are collected from the same source, such as a survey. The 
first test was conducted through our initial confirmatory factory analysis (CFA) which 
demonstrated the validity of our constructs, as explained previously. The CFA produced distinct 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, with the first factor accounting for 31% of the variance, 
demonstrating that a common factor was not present in the data (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).  
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Two iterations of Harman’s single factor test were conducted to test for CMB. Firstly, we 
used another CFA to compare our model to a model constrained to a single factor (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). A significantly worse fit for the single factor model 
provided evidence against CMB. Secondly, we used a procedure recommended by Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, & Podsakoff (2012) based on adding another common methods factor to the original 
measurement model. The factor accounted for only 4.58% of the model variance. Furthermore, 
the factor loadings of all items were below 0.31 with the exception of a single item. The common 
methods factor also did not exhibit internal reliability or discriminate validity, producing a 
composite reliability of 0.58 and an AVE of 0.003, which provides further support that our 
results do not suffer from CMB.  
Next, we conducted correlational marker technique as outlined by Lindell & Whitney 
(2001) in order to test for CMB. The technique uses a marker variable, which is a variable that is 
theoretically unrelated to the subject variables in the study and has a low level of correlation with 
those variables. The marker variable is used to estimate potential CMB and then attenuates the 
correlation between subject variables by adjusting them for the effect of the bias. While our 
survey did not include an intended marker variable, a specific item that asked whether managers 
of a firm are tolerant about the ambiguity of a firm's situation was identified post-hoc as meeting 
the criteria for a marker variable. Tolerance of ambiguity is theoretically unrelated to the subject 
variables since the "situation" in question is left open-ended and does not refer specifically to a 
firm's institutional context, use of code of ethics, or law-abiding climate. The correlation 
between the marker variable and the dependent variable (r= -0.13) lacks statistical significance, 
unlike the correlations between the independent variables contained in the survey (regulatory 
burden, lack of industry munificence, and use of code of ethics) and the dependent variable, 
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which are all significant at p=0.05. Furthermore, the correlations between the marker variable 
and the independent variables are all low, ranging from -0.048 to 0.060, in support of its 
discriminant validity. After performing the partial correlation adjustment of the independent 
variables with the dependent variable, all bivariate correlations remained statistically significant, 
suggesting that the results cannot be attributed to CMB.  
Finally, it is worthwhile noting that our research design inherently alleviates some 
concern for common method bias (CMB) in light of our survey-based approach. As mentioned 
before, data for some variables, namely CSR certification, number of employees, and sales were 
obtained from sources external to the survey. Furthermore, since CMB has been shown to 
decrease when additional independent variables suffering from CMB are included in a regression 
equation (Siemsen, Roth, & Oliveira, 2010), our multivariate approach to hypothesis testing as 
outlined in the next section of this paper helps to alleviate concern. Finally, since interaction 
terms can be severely deflated due to CMB and thus more difficult to detect (Siemsen et al., 
2010), significant interaction effects associated with our moderating hypotheses indicate that 
issues pertaining to CMB are not biasing results.  
We also attempted to detect various response biases. Results of chi-square tests 
demonstrated no significant differences between respondents and non-respondents based on 
geographic location or firm size. A series of ANOVA tests were also conducted to test for 
differences between early respondents (those who answered the survey within the first three 
email mailings) and late respondents (those who answered the survey after the first three email 
mailings) to responses on all survey items, revealing no significant differences. Lastly, similar 
ANOVA tests were also conducted to test for differences between email respondents and the ten 
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responses received through physical mail, again, revealing no significant differences across all 
survey items. 
Hypothesis testing 
Hypotheses were tested using OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the city 
level, the results of which are featured in Appendix 1c 
To alleviate concerns that the relatively small number of clusters in our data (15) is 
underestimating standard errors and thus biasing our results (Cameron, Gelbach, & Miller, 
2008), we ran our regressions using the wild bootstrap method of clustering that is recommended 
for more accurate standard errors when a small number of clusters are used. Model 1 shows the 
results pertaining to the main effect hypothesis pertaining to institutional factors while Models 2 
and 3 show the results pertaining to the moderation hypotheses of organizational practices.  
From model 1, it can be seen that perceived regulatory burden had a significant negative 
effect on law-abiding climate (β = -0.30, p < 0.01), confirming hypothesis 1. Also from model 1, 
perceived lack of industry munificence had a negative effect on law-abiding climate as predicted 
(β = -0.21, p < 0.05). Furthermore, the main effect of perceived lack of industry munificence 
loses its significance in Models 2 and 3. Thus, hypothesis 2 is only partially supported. 
Next, Model 2 investigated the moderating effects of the organizational practices on the 
relationship between perceived regulatory burden and law-abiding climate. To facilitate 
interpretation of these relationships, the significant interactions are plotted in figures contained in 
Appendix 1d. In these plots, the convention of +/- 1 standard deviation was used to characterize 
high and low levels of perceived regulatory burden for firms that differ on each organizational 
practice. Scores were standardized for the purpose of comparability across variables and 
relationships. In Hypothesis 3a, we predicted that perceived regulatory burden would affect the 
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presence of a law-abiding climate differently based on whether a firm was certified to a CSR 
standard. The main effect of CSR certification is significant at the 1% level and has a negative 
coefficient (β = -0.35, p < 0.01), providing support that adoption of such a standard alone has a 
negative impact on law-abiding climate. The associated interaction term is significant and 
negative (β = -0.47, p < 0.01), indicating that CSR certification amplifies the negative effect of 
perceived regulatory burden on law-abiding climate, contrary to our prediction. This can be seen 
in the figure in Appendix 1d by comparing the steeper slope for firms that hold a CSR 
certification to the flatter slope for firms that do not hold a CSR certification. 
In Hypothesis 4a, we predicted that the extent to which a code of ethics is used at a firm 
moderates the relationship between perceived regulatory burden and the presence of law-abiding 
climate. First, the main effect of code-of-ethics use is both significant and positive (β = 0.39, p < 
0.01), indicating that greater use of a code of ethics by a firm increases the extent to which it has 
a law-abiding climate. Since code-of-ethics use is a continuous variable, to facilitate the 
interpretation of its moderating influence, we present both the main interaction term as well as 
the conditional interaction terms. While the main interaction term evaluates the overall 
significance of code-of-ethics use, the conditional interaction terms examine the range of values 
at which it has a significant moderating influence. Although the main interaction term is not 
significant, the conditional interaction terms evaluated at the value of the mean of code-of-ethics 
use as well as one standard deviation below the mean and its maximum value are more telling of 
the exact nature of the moderating effect.
1
 Whereas the interaction term at the maximum value of 
code of ethics use is not significant, the interaction terms at both one standard deviation below 
the mean and at the mean are both significant (p<0.01). Furthermore, the magnitude of the 
                                                          
1
 The conditional interaction was evaluated at the maximum value of use of code of ethics rather than one standard 
deviation above the mean because the latter is outside the range of values for the variable. 
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coefficient of the conditional interaction terms rises going from one standard deviation below the 
mean (β = -0.34) to the mean (β = -0.25), indicating that an increase in the use of code of ethics 
has a positive moderating influence at this range of values. The plot in the figure in Appendix 1d 
shows that the effect of regulatory burden on law-abiding climate is weaker for firms with code 
of ethics use at the mean relative to one standard deviation below the mean. Taken together, the 
results provide support for Hypothesis 4a, and moreover, for the importance of extensively using 
codes-of-ethics within firms. The extent to which an ethics code is used weakens the negative 
effect of regulatory burden on law-abiding climate, with the added caveat that the moderation 
effect applies only when code-of-ethics use is increased from an initially low level.  
 
Next, Model 3 investigates the moderating effects of the organizational practices on the 
relationship between perceived lack of industry munificence and law-abiding climate. Due to the 
overall lack of significance of the model, neither hypothesis 3b or 4b can be supported.  
 
DISCUSSION 
Theoretical implications 
 Our study investigated whether some socially responsible organization practices can 
attenuate the adverse impact that certain institutional factors have on a law-abiding climate. We 
identified and provided support for the effect two institutional factors, regulatory burden and lack 
of industry munificence. In doing so, we help fill the void in the literature on the influence of 
contextual factors on ethical climates (Simha & Cullen, 2012; Newman et al., 2017), focusing on 
those particularly salient to developing countries. Consistent with our prediction, a manager’s 
perception of regulatory burden is found to reduce the extent to which the firm has a law-abiding 
climate. This result corroborates findings in the extant literature that harmful regulation, which 
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hinders economic activity, is associated with higher levels of national corruption (Friedman et 
al., 2000) and a larger share of the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP (Schnieder, 2005). 
Furthermore, it suggests that firms in developing countries, in which regulation is both common 
and considered unpredictable, adapt to their institutional context by placing less emphasis on 
norms and ethical decision criteria that promote adherence to the rules of the regulatory process. 
Partial support was found for the hypothesis that a manager’s perception of the lack of industry 
munificence reduces the extent to which the firm has a law-abiding climate, which supports the 
conventional wisdom in the literature that a lack of munificence in a firm's environment is 
positively related to illegal behaviours (e.g. Vaughn, 1983; Clinard et al., 1979). This finding 
points to the inclination of firms to adapt to their institutional context by straying away from law-
abiding climates when faced with bleak prospects for growth. 
Our primary contribution comes from examining the moderating effects of socially 
responsible organizational practices designed to promote internal ethics on the relationships 
described above. Significant moderating effects were found pertaining to perceived regulatory 
burden, but not perceived lack of industry munificence. Our findings shed light on the ability of 
such practices to foster law-abiding climates in light of adverse contextual influences, helping to 
fill the void in the literature on how organizational practices can foster law-abiding climates 
(Martin & Cullen, 2006; Newman et al., 2017). 
Surprisingly, we found that certification to a CSR standard enhances the negative 
relationship between perceived regulatory burden and the extent to which a firm has a law-
abiding climate, contrary to our prediction. This finding may be due to the lack of enforcement 
associated with the ESR certification in Mexico. King & Lenox (2000), in a study of a self-
regulatory program in the chemical industry without explicit sanctions, discovered that the 
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program was ineffective in reducing the emissions of participants. The authors reason that this 
may have occurred because participation in the program served as a signal of good intentions 
that was trusted by stakeholders without the program having the necessary sanctions to influence 
behaviour. As a result, stakeholders may have been paying less attention to the behaviour of 
firms with the certification, enabling those firms to maintain their level of emissions without any 
repercussions. While the certification process for ESR includes a self-report survey and 
supporting documentation subject to external review (Cemefi, 2016), it is similar to the program 
examined in King & Lenox (2000) in its lack of explicit sanctions against undesired behaviour.  
This situation may be underlying the surprising effect in which certification exacerbates 
(rather than inhibits) tendencies of firms to stray away from law-abiding climates when faced 
with regulatory burden. Firms are provided the signalling benefits of certification that are 
independent of its actual implementation, effectively causing a disconnect between the positive 
image projected to stakeholders from the certification and a firm's actual internal practices 
(Boiral, Heras‐Saizarbitoria, & Testa, 2017). This finding contributes to our understanding of 
anomie theory by suggesting that firms that experience anomie due to perceived obstacles in 
their institutional context may be induced to deceptively signal desired behaviour through 
initiatives that allow them to emit false signals.  
False signalling through means such as CSR certifications can thus be considered a type 
of unethical behaviour that firms may exhibit as a result of feeling pressured to break the law due 
to experiencing anomie. The use of CSR certification in this manner indicates that anomie has a 
pernicious influence on a firm's ethical conduct that can manifest itself widely across a firms’ 
behaviours beyond what may be observed as explicitly unlawful.  
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Our results also show that codes of ethics that are used more extensively to guide 
strategic decisions reduce the inclination of firms to stray away from law-abiding climates 
caused by perceived regulatory burden. This supports the fundamental idea in the literature that 
actual use of a code of ethics as opposed to its symbolic possession determines whether it 
significantly influences firm behaviour (Stevens et al., 2005; Erwin, 2011). But interestingly, this 
moderating relationship only holds when the use of codes of ethics increases from an initially 
low level. This finding may be due to the mutually enforcing relationship that exists between the 
use and content of a code of ethics that results in its use having a limited effect when it lacks the 
content required to influence a firm's conduct (Kaptein, 2011). The upper bound to the 
effectiveness of code-of-ethics use may be due to a systematic deficiency in code-of-ethics 
content of the firms in our sample that can be attributed to the cultural preference in Mexico for 
intuitive (as opposed to rational) reasoning, which results in organizational policies, such as 
those that would typically be included in a code of ethics, being less formalized (Hood and 
Logsdon, 2002). That being said, our conjecture cannot be made certain since the content of the 
codes of ethics was unobservable. Overall, we contribute to the understanding of anomie theory 
by demonstrating that code-of-ethics use is able to, at least to some extent, offset the effects of 
anomie in firms by ensuring they remain lawful when pressured to break the law in light of 
adverse institutional factors.  
Practical implications 
 Our findings pertaining to the adverse effect of institutional factors on a law-abiding 
climate have implications for public policy. They re-enforce for policy makers of developing-
country governments the importance of ensuring that the regulatory process is not perceived as 
burdensome, but rather predictable and fair, in order to encourage law-abiding climates. 
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Furthermore, these results also suggest that governments should maintain strong regulatory 
enforcement efforts that encourage firms to adopt law-abiding climates even in industries that 
may not be considered as vital to economic development due to their lack of growth, such as 
declining industries.  
 Our findings also have implications for managers. Managers thinking of adopting private 
CSR certifications without sanctions should be leery of their ability to prevent firms from 
straying from law-abiding climates. Furthermore, the ability of such certifications to signal 
desired behaviour may be tarnished if they are not only ineffective, but also exacerbate the type 
of conduct they are intended to deter, confirming stakeholders’ suspicions that self-serving 
motivations drive CSR which raises doubts on whether the firm is ethical or socially responsible 
(Hur & Kim, 2017). Managers should therefore seek out more stringent certifications intended to 
foster ethical behaviour to ensure they fulfill their intended purpose and do not compromise the 
long-term reputation of the firm, since repeated violations of behavior across firms that possess a 
particular certification can diminish its ability to act as signal of positive behaviour.  
On the other hand, our finding pertaining to the attenuating effect of a code of ethics 
bodes well for managers in developing countries who aim to foster law-abiding ethical climates 
given that the decision to use a code of ethics is under their direct control. As such, there is merit 
in spending time and effort to ensure its extensive use through initiatives such as training 
programs that educate employees on its value as a decision-making tool and on-going 
refinements that maintain its relevance as the ethical scenarios employees encounter change over 
time. However, the diminishing value of codes of ethics in nurturing such an ethical climate in 
light of perceived regulatory burden implies that firms cannot depend too heavily on them. Firms 
should be aware of the limitation of codes of ethics and use them with other socially responsible 
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organizational practices that can further foster their adherence to the law, if deemed necessary. 
One possibility is to ensure that a firm, alongside its code of ethics, has a formal system of 
sanctions against unlawful employees that is routinely enforced to ensure its code of ethics has 
the necessary "teeth" to align behaviour to a normative legal framework (Laczniak and 
Inderrieden, 1987). Given the unintended consequence of CSR certification and limited 
effectiveness of codes of ethics in moderating the relationship between perceived regulatory 
burden and law-abiding climate, which we uncovered in our study, managers of firms in 
developing countries wanting to combat the adverse effect of a difficult institutional context on 
law-abiding climate are faced with a dilemma.  
Managers in developing countries looking to foster a law-abiding climate in light of an 
adverse institutional context may need to look for other solutions, such as configurations of 
corporate governance mechanisms suited for non-Anglo-Saxon countries, which developing 
countries tend to be. The literature comparing corporate governance in Anglo-Saxon and non-
Anglo-Saxon countries has uncovered combinations of corporate governance mechanisms that 
are effective in the latter for improving the social performance of firms in light of the differences 
between firms in these contexts (e.g. Samara, Jamali, Sierra, & Parada, 2017; Garcia-Castro, 
Aguilera, & Ariño, 2013). Managers in developing countries may consider adopting 
configurations of corporate governance mechanisms thought to improve social performance such 
as the presence of outside directors when a company is 100% family owned (Samara et al., 2017) 
to foster a law-abiding climate amidst an adverse institutional context. 
Limitations and future research directions 
There are other institutional factors common to developing countries not considered in 
our study, such as limited access to financing or an inadequately trained workforce, which may 
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serve as obstacles for a firm, and in-turn, have an adverse effect on their law-abiding climate. 
Since there may well be different configurations of organizational practices and institutional 
contexts that will foster law-abiding conduct (e.g., Samara et al., 2017), it is worthwhile to study 
the effect of other adverse institutional factors common in developing countries on law-abiding 
climate and whether organizational practices can negate their influence.  
While we speculate that our study's finding that CSR certification strengthens the 
negative relationship between perceived regulatory burden and law-abiding climate is due to the 
lack of enforcement associated with the ESR certification, our claim cannot be considered 
conclusive since we tested only one type of certification program. Providing evidence to 
conclusively support this claim would require varying CSR certification in terms of whether it 
has features that effectively govern behaviour, or its signalling accuracy (Darnall & Carmin, 
2005). As such, a future research opportunity lies in investigating this finding further by 
incorporating CSR certifications that vary in the strength of their enforcement efforts to see 
whether they differ in how they moderate the relationship between institutional factors in 
developing countries and desirable ethical climates of firms. 
Another possible avenue for research derives from our finding that socially responsible 
organizational practices do not have a moderating effect on the relationship between perceived 
lack of industry munificence and law-abiding climate. Possibly, specific unlawful behaviours 
that result from perceived lack of industry munificence differ from those that result from 
perceived regulatory burden in a manner that they cannot be inhibited by CSR certification and 
code-of-ethics use. This is a worthwhile direction for future research because it can potentially 
establish a boundary condition on the effectiveness of socially responsible organizational 
practices in maintaining a law-abiding climate amidst adverse contextual factors. 
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Socially desirable responses are an inherent challenge in ethics studies such as ours that 
involve self-reports from corporate managers. While significant measures were taken to limit the 
chance of socially desirable responses affecting our data, this risk cannot be ruled out entirely. 
Another limitation of our study is that data for most key variables came from the same survey, 
opening the possibility that our results suffer from CMB. Although several tests were conducted 
to alleviate concerns of CMB, our results would possess greater robustness if data from 
secondary sources on all our key variables was available. 
The sample of 118 firms raises questions about the generalizability of the findings. By 
including firms across industries and the three cities in Mexico with the greatest amount of 
economic activity, the industrial and geographic variability incorporated in our study 
compensates for the small number of responses in assuring our results are representative of the 
experience of firms in Mexico. However, the fact that our sample consists of firms from one 
country limits its ability to be representative of developing countries more broadly. That being 
said, we feel that Mexico is an appropriate choice of context to study unlawful conduct given the 
prevalence of the issue in the country as discussed earlier in the paper. 
Furthermore, obtaining data from firms in a single country provided the benefit of a 
homogenous sample in which unobservable, country-level factors are inherently controlled. This 
is an appropriate approach for our study since we focus our analysis on managerial perceptions 
of institutional factors, which are likely to vary across firms within a country as opposed to a 
more objective measure. The benefit of a cross-national sample is that it can incorporate socio-
cultural variables since they are more likely to differ across countries than within countries (e.g. 
Martin et al., 2007, Cullen et al., 2004). Future studies can be enriched by incorporating socio-
cultural variables, another key aspect of anomie theory, which likely influences the mindset of 
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actors to consider illegitimate means as acceptable. Accordingly, future ethical climate research 
examining the influence of contextual factors can use a cross-national sample of firms to 
conjointly examine the influence of not only contextual factors, but also cultural values.  
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Theorizing Reputational Spillover: Contingent 
Organizational Categorization and the Spread of Scandals 
 
Abstract: A reputational spillover occurs when a scandal by a firm affects the reputation 
of other firms that were not involved in the original incident. To date, our theoretical 
understanding of such reputational spillovers in the context of scandals has been limited and 
potentially mis-specified. Drawing from the categorization literature, we provide an enriched 
theoretical understanding of reputational spillover that offers a contingent conceptualization of 
the spread of scandals. The model explains spillover in terms of two distinct phases of origin and 
spread which provides new insight into the antecedents of spillover. Contingency depends on the 
degree of moral intensity of the scandal which precipitates either motivated or automatic 
categorization, which we show lead to two different bases for comparing firms. This shift in the 
theoretical approach to categorization allows for a more complete conceptual understanding of 
spillover that better reflects empirical reality, including the analysis of cross-industry spillover. 
 
Keywords: categorization, scandal, social evaluations, reputation, reputational spillover 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate reputation acts as a normative control of business behaviour through which 
firms are rewarded and punished based on their ability to meet public expectations (Fomburn & 
Shanley, 1990). Therefore, when firms are viewed as causing a scandal, defined as an action or 
event that is considered morally wrong and elicits outrage amongst the public, they can suffer 
severe reputational repercussions. However, a scandal may at times also affect the reputation of 
other firms that were not involved in the original incident (King et al., 2002; Zavyalova et al., 
2012). This is exemplified by the recent Volkswagen diesel-engine emission scandal whereby 
other car manufacturers including Renault, Peugeot, Nissan, and BMW experienced a drop in 
share price of between two to four percent in the months following the scandal, owing to 
widespread loss in confidence in the European auto industry (The Centre for Research on 
Globalization, 2016). 
While the reputational implications for scandal-perpetrating firms have been thoroughly 
explored in the literature, both in terms of the consequent reputational effect and how firms can 
manage crises to restore their reputation (Coombs, 2007; Pearson & Clair, 1988; Pfarrer et al., 
2008), less explored is the effect on the reputation of other firms (Yu et al., 2008). Such a 
‘reputational spillover’ occurs when a scandal caused by the actions of a single firm, the 
‘perpetrator firm’, affects the reputation of other ‘by-stander firms’ that are not involved (Barnett 
& Hoffman, 2008; King et al., 2002).  
The existence of reputational spillovers has been well established empirically, for 
example, through layoff announcements in the oil and gas industry (Goins & Gruca, 2008), 
bankruptcies (Lang & Stulz, 1992), drug withdrawals (Ahmed et al., 2002), automobile recalls 
(Jarell & Peltzman, 1985) and accidents in the chemical industry (Barnett & King, 2008), all of 
which were found to result in broader reputational repercussions to firms in the industry of the 
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perpetrating firm. 
On the other hand, our theoretical explanation of reputational spillover is still relatively 
underdeveloped. Important work has established that such spillovers can be explained in terms of 
the social categorization of firms by observers (Barnett & King, 2008; Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et 
al., 2008). That is, individuals, in an attempt to reduce the cognitive complexity involved in 
inter-organizational comparison (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), group firms into categories subject to 
common social and cultural expectations (Hsu & Hannan, 2005). As a result, researchers have 
shown how firms that fall in the same category as the perpetrator firm are “tarred by the same 
brush” and suffer a similar negative reputational evaluation (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2014; 
Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015).  
To date though, the process of categorization in relation to reputational spillovers has 
remained something of a black box. Lacking from such accounts, for example, is a theoretical 
explanation of the conditions under which categorization is activated, as well as a thorough 
explanation of how exactly categorization will be applied by an audience. Likewise, researchers 
have tended to examine a single type of scandal such as financial misconduct (Kang, 2008; 
Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015) or chemical accidents (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2015) but have not 
developed a theoretical account of categorization which recognizes that spillovers can result 
from different origin events and actors and the different manifestations of categorization they 
give rise to.  
In this paper, we provide an enriched theoretical understanding of reputational spillover 
in the face of scandals. To do so, we build an overarching theoretical framework rooted in a 
contingency view of categorization. This framework brings new insight in two main ways. First, 
we theoretically explain spillover in terms of two distinct phases of spillover initiation and 
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spillover spread. Spillover is initiated when the public relies on the perceptual shortcut of 
categorization as a sense-making process in response to a scandal, putting by-stander firms at 
risk of experiencing reputational consequences. The severity to which by-stander firms absorb 
the effects of a spillover, on the other hand, is determined by spillover spread, namely the extent 
to which a particular by-stander firm is categorized with the perpetrator firm. By delineating the 
process of reputational spillover into these two distinct phases of the categorization process, we 
enable researchers to understand better why and when categorization will operate in the context 
of a scandal.  
Answering recent calls to explicate the causal mechanisms that determine which 
attributes drive categorization (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Kennedy & Fiss, 2013), our second 
contribution to the literature is a more accurate account of how categorization operates in 
reputational spillover. Distinct categorization schemes have been discussed in the literature on 
reputational spillover without explanation of the conditions under which a particular category 
would be employed by an observer. Some scholars have assumed that observers categorize firms 
on the sole basis of industry similarity to determine which by-stander firms are capable of 
committing the scandal (Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015; Barnett & King, 2008; Desai, 2011), while 
others have conceptualized a category that incorporates more specific firm attributes as a basis 
for category membership (Jonsson et al., 2009; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2014).  
We argue that the relevant category actually used by the public is contingent on the 
scandal's level of moral intensity (Jones, 1991) and that this level of moral intensity determines 
whether a motivated or automatic form of categorization will be used. Moral intensity is a 
measure of the scandal’s perceived significance that determines the public's level of concern 
towards the scandal. Audiences are faced with a plethora of stimuli that compete for limited 
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attention and interest (Smith & Zarate, 1992), so that not all scandals that occur in the public’s 
social space will receive the same level of attention and sense-making effort. Low intensity 
scandals will prompt automatic categorization which is likely to result in the application of a 
simple industry-based category. Scandals of higher moral intensity however will provoke a 
motivated form of categorization because the public has greater concern to accurately identify 
other category members. This motivated process will result in the public utilizing a more 
sophisticated, scandal-specific category that is conceived at the point in which the scandal 
occurs. Such a "scandal-specific" category is comprised of attributes of the perpetrator firm that 
are considered salient specifically because they are viewed as causes of the scandal, as opposed 
to the industry category, which is comprised of attributes of a typical firm in the industry.  
This novel theoretical perspective on categorization provides a more accurate 
understanding of which firm attributes will determine category membership, allowing for better 
prediction of which by-stander firms will be affected by spillover. Our theoretical approach also 
opens new conceptual space for understanding the scope of reputational spillover, including 
analysis of cross-industry spillover. Such possibilities have been acknowledged in the literature 
(Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015; Yu et al., 2008) but have yet to be 
systematically embedded into an integrated theoretical model of reputational spillover.  
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on reputational spillover 
and the social categorization of firms to identify the limitations of the current theoretical 
approach in the literature. We then present our new model of the reputational spillover process to 
address these limitations. We then discuss the implications that our theorization has for the study 
of reputational spillover as well as for managerial practice. We conclude with recommendations 
for future research. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Reputational Spillover 
Corporate reputation can be broadly understood as a type of social approval (Barnett & 
King, 2008; Zavyalova et al., 2012). In the case of reputational spillover, the actions of a single 
firm affect the perceived congruence to social norms and standards of a population of firms 
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Suchman, 1995). This broad judgement of firms is rendered by 
the general public who share a common thought world in which firms can be valued in terms of 
their broader societal impact (Haack et al., 2014). Such an aggregation of individuals to the level 
of the ‘general public’ aligns with the dominant conceptualization of reputation in the literature 
as an aggregation of individual perceptions (Barnett et al., 2006). The general public is, in 
aggregate, concerned with social issues, and therefore acts as a key evaluator of firms in light of 
actions that create social harm. In particular, a scandal committed by a particular firm, as a single 
act of corporate deviance, is perceived by the public as the instantiation of a problem in which 
other firms could act in a similar manner to cause social harm.  
While the reputation construct has been conceptualized in multiple, different ways across 
the management literature (Lange et al., 2011), including "being known" in general terms and 
having a generally favorable perception, we conceptualize reputation as "being known for 
something" since it is best suited to explain reputational spillover. From this perspective, firm 
reputation consists of the subjective perception of a particular audience of the likelihood of a 
firm exhibiting a particular behaviour (Deutsch & Ross, 2003). In the context of a spillover, the 
reputation of by-stander firms is affected because the public perceives that they have potential to 
cause the scandal committed by the perpetrator firm. 
The consequences to the reputation of firms play out through the various avenues in 
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which the general public and firms exchange. The public as a transacting partner imposes costs 
on both the perpetrator firm and by-stander firms that share some form of collective identity with 
the perpetrator so that actions perceived as undesirable or illegitimate are not repeated 
(Friedman, 1971; Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986). Most empirical studies on reputational spillover 
have examined reductions in stock price of by-stander firms (e.g. Barnett & King, 2008; Diestre 
& Rajagopalan, 2014; Kang, 2008; Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015). Other outcomes include 
reduced customer exchanges with firms (Jonsson et al., 2009), and negative attitudes and beliefs 
about firms (Roehm & Tybout, 2006), including adverse brand evaluations (Lei et al., 2008). 
Such reactions by stakeholders help to form an overall public sentiment even across members of 
the public without direct exchange relationships with firms since public condemnation 
encourages others to maintain their distance and similarly condemn firms (Jonsson et al., 2009).  
It is worthwhile to note that while positive spillovers from reputation enhancing events 
are also a possibility, we choose to focus our analysis on negative spillovers produced by 
scandals. There exists a negativity bias in affective responses to strong stimuli in contrast to a 
positivity bias in affective responses to weak stimuli, such that it can be expected that negative 
spillovers create comparatively stronger effects than positive spillovers (Haack et al., 2014). Past 
research has also confirmed that negative spillovers have a stronger effect on reputation than 
positive spillovers (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), suggesting that a focus 
on negative spillovers is justified. 
Social Categorization of Firms 
Reputational spillover is rooted in the cognitive limitations of individuals. Due to the 
cognitive complexity involved in perfectly distinguishing objects and actors on the basis of all 
their respective characteristics (Tirole, 1996), categories are used by individuals to make sense of 
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the world around them. Human limitations render observers unable to perfectly distinguish firms 
on the bases of their individual attributes, with some firm-specific information being 
unobservable and additional information search proving too costly (Tirole, 1996). For this 
reason, firms are assigned to categories associated with prototypical behaviours that define what 
is typical, legitimate, or normal for members of the category (Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015).  
An organizational category, as a cognitive representation, sets expectations about the 
future behaviour of its members on the basis of observations of a single category member or a 
small sub-set of members (Kennedy, 2008; Wry et al., 2011). Accordingly, the categorization 
process is elicited as an uncertainty reduction mechanism among the general public after 
observing a scandal. Concerned by the observed violation, the public uses its knowledge of the 
organizational category of the perpetrator firm to resolve its uncertainty as to which other firms 
pose the risk of committing a similar scandal. Other firms can be expected to behave like the 
perpetrator firm to the extent that they fall within the same organizational category (Jonsson et 
al., 2009), which is assessed by the match between the attributes of by-stander firms and the 
perpetrator firm. By-stander firms therefore experience negative reputational consequences if 
they are categorized with the perpetrator firm. 
The social categorization of firms has thus been the central theoretical lens used to 
conceptualize reputational spillover. This has led to important insights regarding the cognitive 
basis for how an isolated scandal by a firm can affect the reputation of other firms in its industry 
(Yu et al., 2008) and the commonalities between the perpetrator firm and by-stander firms that 
underlie the spread of spillover (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2014; Jonsson et al., 2009; Kang, 2008). 
Research on the latter has revealed that differences exist in the extent to which by-stander firms 
are categorized with the perpetrator, and that heterogeneity in the strength to which spillover 
61 
 
effects are experienced across firms can be attributed to these differences (Diestre & 
Rajagopalan, 2014; Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015). 
However, the relatively shallow depth at which categorization has been employed in the 
literature to date has resulted in an incomplete and arguably inaccurate set of assumptions 
regarding the process and outcomes of reputational spillover. Our approach is premised on 
addressing the current inability to distinguish the different types of scandals causing reputational 
spillover, with one product recall being assumed in the extant literature to be much the same as 
another, and product recalls as a whole being assumed to be conceptually equivalent to other 
reputation-impacting scandals such as oil spills. By addressing two key omissions in the 
literature, we explain how scandals can differ in their effect on the public’s use of categorization, 
and moreover, how acknowledgement of these differences enhance our ability to accurately 
predict reputational spillover. 
The first key omission is that the factors that determine whether a scandal induces 
reputational spillover are largely ignored, with the starting assumption being that a scandal 
results in spillover by spurring categorization on the part of the observer. This assumption 
overlooks that scandals differ in their likelihood of prompting the public’s use of categorization 
and thus, initiating reputational spillover. Despite acknowledgement in the literature that 
perceived uncertainty surrounding a scandal is required to elicit the audiences use of 
categorization as a sense-making shortcut (Yu et al., 2008), this prerequisite factor underlying 
reputational spillover tends to be overlooked, either being left out or assumed but not explicitly 
theorized (c.f. Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015).  
Categorization is a means of sense-making that is used when it supports the perceiver's 
comprehension goal. For example, previous research on stereotyping, a type of categorization 
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process, suggests that a perceiver suppresses the use of stereotypes when individuating 
information about an actor is more diagnostic for the perceiver’s comprehension goal than is an 
inference based on a stereotype (Zacks & Hasher, 1994; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Given 
that the public, after observing a scandal, seeks to ascertain whether other firms pose the risk of 
committing the scandal, we argue that the public relies on categorization as a sense-making 
mechanism only if the answer to this question is unclear. A firm-specific cause of a scandal, by 
precluding the possibility that the scandal could be committed by other firms (Yu et al., 2008, 
Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015), eliminates the necessary uncertainty that prompts categorization 
by making it clear that a scandal occurred to due idiosyncratic characteristics of a perpetrator 
firm.  
The uncertainty surrounding a scandal that we refer to in this paper causes the public to 
be unable to identify firm-specific causes connected to the perpetrator. Based on the conditions 
that raise the uncertainty surrounding the causes of a scandal, a set of spillover initiation factors 
are posited to explain why some scandals are more likely than others to trigger the public’s 
categorization process, and thereby result in spillover. This gives rise to a new, two-stage model 
of reputational spillover which theoretically distinguishes between spillover initiation and 
spillover spread. Since the use of categorization by the public is a prerequisite to reputational 
spillover, spillover initiation factors are effectively the antecedents of spillover, and thus, critical 
to our understanding of the phenomenon. 
The second omission is that existing research has largely failed to account for how the 
spread of reputational spillover can differ across scandals. Typically, an audience's cognitive 
process in reaction to a particular type of scandal (e.g. financial misconduct (Parachuri & 
Misangi, 2015) or an industrial accident (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2014)), or scandals more 
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generally (e.g. Jonsson et al., 2009, Yu et al., 2008) is the basis through which the categorization 
scheme underlying a spillover is understood. This rather simplified approach to understanding 
categorization is prevalent despite agreement by scholars that there is a need to account for how 
scandals differ since their characteristics influence the perception of an audience (Parachuri & 
Misangyi, 2015), and subsequently, the categorization process they use which determines the 
spread of reputational spillover (Haack et al., 2014, Yu et al., 2008). 
Moral intensity is one such characteristic that varies across scandals which influences the 
perception of the public. Scandals can be thought of as moral issues because they involve 
volition on part of the perpetrating firm and have negative social and ethical ramifications. As 
moral issues, it is appropriate to measure scandals in terms of their moral imperative from the 
perspective of the public, or moral intensity (Jones, 1991). We reason that due to cognitive 
limitations, as well as the multitude of potential scandals that exist in the public sphere across 
firms, industries, and geographies, the public prioritizes their cognitive resources and focuses 
most attention and effort in thinking about scandals they perceive as most significant, as 
determined by their level of moral intensity.  
Some scholars have tended to use the industry of the perpetrator firm that commits a 
scandal as the basis for category membership, either directly (Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015; 
Barnett & King, 2008) or by having product-market similarity as a key determinant of category 
membership (Desai, 2011). The implication of this approach is that by-stander firms are 
considered susceptible to receiving negative reputational evaluations merely by virtue of being in 
the same industry category of the perpetrator firm. Others have incorporated specific similarities 
to the perpetrator that are relevant to the context of a scandal as a basis for category membership 
(Jonsson et al., 2009, Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2014), where the cause-effect relationship of firm 
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attributes to the scandal are a key consideration. Despite these differences in what is considered 
to constitute category membership, the literature has had little to say thus far about the conditions 
that determine which firm attributes are central to the categorization process underlying 
reputational spillover.  
The critical insight we introduce is that an actor selectively attends to dimensions in 
social judgement formation according to their current motivations. This is widely accepted in 
both social (McGuire et al., 1978; Tajfel, 1978; Wilder, 1981) and cognitive psychology 
(Barsalou, 1987; Roth & Shoben, 1983) but has yet to be meaningfully applied to theorizing 
about reputational spillover. We thus distinguish the categorization process in terms of the 
motivation underlying its use in order to more accurately identify the cognitive category 
employed in reaction to a scandal. 
Automatic categorization involves the relatively spontaneous or unconscious assessment 
of an organization based on easily accessible information, such as schemas defining chronically 
employed categories whose frequent usage makes them easy to access and retrieve from memory 
(Elsbach & Breitsohl, 2016; Van Dyck et al., 2005). It is best suited for when information 
encountered does not instill a particular motive in the perceiver (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). 
Without a strong motive underlying the use of categorization, easily accessible, pre-existing 
categories such as the industry of a firm can suffice in making sense of newly encountered 
information (despite the broad nature of such categories rendering them uninformative of 
specific behaviours). Furthermore, observers are naturally inclined to use cognitively accessible 
categories when categorizing firms owing to the fact that individuals tend to rely upon easily 
accessible information in social cognition processes (Hogg et al., 1995). As such, automatic 
categories are a first resort for the public after observing a scandal by the perpetrator firm in 
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order to ascertain which other firms pose the risk of committing a similar scandal.  
 Motivated categorization, on the other hand, involves classifying newly encountered 
information in ways consistent with the perceiver’s current motives (Fiske et al., 1999), which 
includes an assessment of the relevance of pre-existing categories to support this motive (Fiske 
& Neuberg, 1990). Rather than automatically relying on a pre-existing category, the perceiver 
evaluates the automatic category’s suitability for use in the current situation to decide whether an 
alternative category would better support its motive. Observers of a scandal committed by a 
perpetrator firm that have a specific motivation can be thought of as following a motivated 
categorization process. Thus, automatic categories such as preconceived industry blueprints may 
be deemed not suitable by the public if they are not attuned to their current motivation after 
observing a scandal. In these circumstances, the public’s category choice can be informed by the 
goal-based approach of categorization (Durand & Paolella, 2013). From the goal-based 
perspective, the public who are motivated by a specific goal when employing mental categories 
would form them on an ad-hoc basis to support the aim of achieving their current goal, a process 
that requires greater cognitive effort than employing a pre-existing category.  
We incorporate the moral intensity of scandals in the analysis of reputational spillover to 
explain when motivated categorization would be used over automatic categorization. This 
distinguishes situations when the public would overcome their inclination to search for a rapid, 
adequate solution in favor of a slow, accurate solution (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). The key way in 
which a scandal-specific category differs from the industry category of the perpetrator firm is 
that it is more diagnostically accurate for assessing the likelihood of a scandal being repeated. 
Scandals of higher moral intensity, by eliciting a greater level of concern in the public, motivate 
a more critical assessment by the public of which by-stander firms pose the risk of committing 
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the scandal observed of the perpetrator firm. Despite the cognitive ease at which a pre-existing 
category could be applied, this creates the possibility that the public would deem the industry 
category of the perpetrator firm insufficient to support its current motivation and employ a 
scandal-specific category instead. Therefore, we consider two distinct scenarios of categorization 
used by the public following a scandal: 1) an automatic categorization process in which the 
industry category of the perpetrator firm is applied, which is more likely when scandals are of 
lower moral intensity, and 2) a motivated categorization process in which a scandal-specific 
category is conceived at the point in which the scandal occurs, which is more likely when 
scandals are of higher moral intensity. These distinct categorization schemes provide insight into 
the differences in the firm attributes considered by the public when evaluating the similarity 
between the perpetrator and by-stander firms that underlie reputational assessments. 
A cognitive category can be understood as the perceiver’s summary concept of firms that 
belong to a category (Porac & Thomas, 1990). The perceiver conceives a prototype as a mental 
representation of category members, comprised of the most commonly observed attributes across 
members of a category (Mervis & Rosch, 1981). Thus, an organizational category, as a cognitive 
structure, takes the form of the perceiver’s conception of a firm that is typical of the category 
(Kennedy, 2008; Rosa et al., 1999). It is the degree of similarity between this typical category 
firm and by-stander firms that is used as a cognitive shortcut for predicting whether a firm should 
be classified as a member of a category (Kostava & Zaheer, 1999;Duran & Paolella, 2013; Hsu 
& Hannan, 2005).  
Under the industry categorization scheme, membership in the industry category of the 
perpetrator firm is therefore based on the public’s perception of the extent to which by-stander 
firms are similar to a typical industry firm, based on the attributes possessed by by-stander firms 
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that are common to a typical industry firm. Under the scandal-specific categorization scheme, 
because a category emerges around the scandal at the perpetrator firm rather than being fixed a 
priori, the perpetrator firm functions as the category’s prototype (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2014, 
Jonsson et al., 2009). Accordingly, we reason that membership in a scandal-specific category is 
based on the public’s perception of the extent to which by-stander firms are similar to the 
perpetrator firm in ways salient to the scandal, based on attributes they have in common that are 
perceived as causes of the scandal.  
While the literature in some instances has simultaneously theorized both general 
organizational attributes and organizational attributes with relevance to the scandal (Jonsson et 
al., 2009, Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015) as factors determining spillover, it has not provided 
insight on which dimension is most relevant for an audience in a given situation, a future area of 
research that has been called for by scholars (Jonsson et al., 2009). By explaining two possible 
paths of categorization contingent on the moral intensity of a scandal, we contribute to the 
literature by providing insight on when general, industry-based similarities or similarities that are 
specific to the context of a scandal would be the dominant consideration of the public in their 
judgement formation.  
Moreover, this insight is important since the basis of similarity evaluated by the public 
has implications on the scope of reputational spillover, an aspect of the phenomenon that has 
received little consideration to date. This includes the potential for spillovers to cross industry 
boundaries, a phenomenon that has been well documented in practice but poorly explained in 
theory. For instance, the Union Carbide Bhopal incident had reputational affects on firms well 
beyond the chemical industry and the Indian context (Bowman & Kunreuther, 1988; Shrivastava, 
1987). Likewise, the Enron scandal extended beyond energy trading to affect a broader scope of 
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publicly traded companies (Hamilton & Francis, 2003). Although the literature has 
acknowledged that spillovers can cross industry boundaries (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008; Yu et al., 
2008), they have yet to be satisfactorily incorporated into theoretical and empirical work. To 
some extent, the sole focus on within-industry spillover has been justified because it provides a 
clearly defined social system boundary (Carroll & Hannan, 2000) that allows for a clearer 
articulation of propositions. Moreover, cross-industry spillovers have been dismissed as 
unproblematic within existing models because researchers have assumed that they are based on 
simplistic vertical resource linkages between firms (Yu et al., 2008). However, as the examples 
above illustrate, narrowly defining a system boundary to within an industry is limiting in light of 
the existence of spillovers that occur across industries, and spillovers across industries need not 
be based on clear and direct linkages between firms.  
A new model is therefore required to conceptualize cross-industry spillover. Such a 
model needs to account for the possibility that categories fixed to industries do not suffice for the 
public's judgement formation and engage theoretically with the idea of emergent, scandal-
specific categories, whereby common attributes between firms in different industries can be 
perceived as salient causes of a scandal. In the next section, we will set out such a new 
framework for theorizing reputational spillover that can address these omissions in the literature 
and that provides a more comprehensive and theoretically-integrated explanation for why 
spillover happens and which firms are most likely to be impacted.  
 
RE-CONCEPTUALIZING THE REPUTATIONAL SPILLOVER PROCESS 
We examine reputational spillover through a comprehensive analysis of the underlying 
process of categorization (see Appendix 2a). The process comprises two stages – spillover 
69 
 
initiation and spillover spread – which respectively capture the origin and diffusion of the 
phenomenon. Whether a spillover initiates is dependent on factors that affect whether a scandal 
prompts the categorization process of the public. The spread of spillover, including the scope of 
affected firms, is determined by the moral intensity of the scandal through its influence on 
whether the industry category of the perpetrator firm or a scandal-specific category is employed 
by the public. 
 
Spillover Initiation  
Not all scandals are equally likely to cause the public to rely on the categorization 
process, and thus, to induce reputational spillover. Since the purpose of the categorization 
process that underlies spillover is to ascertain which other firms could commit the scandal, the 
public first needs to perceive the possibility that the scandal could be repeated by other firms in 
order to trigger their intuitive response to use categorization as a sense-making shortcut. Under 
conditions of uncertainty, individuals are provided with limited criteria to make sense of the 
stimuli they encounter (Festinger, 1954). In the context of a scandal committed by a perpetrator 
firm, perceived uncertainty surrounding the scandal may cause the public to be unsure of 
whether by-stander firms also have the potential of committing the scandal.  
We argue that beliefs that bystander firms have the potential to commit the same actions 
as those causing the scandal can happen due to either 1) the absence of an agentic attribution of 
the scandal, or 2) the lack of transparency of the perpetrator firm. These factors make it less 
likely that the public can connect a scandal to idiosyncratic attributes of the perpetrator firm, 
which would cause the scandal to be perceived as firm-specific in nature and preclude the 
possibility of spillover (Yu et al., 2008). Furthermore, the absence of a clear cause-effect linkage 
to the perpetrator’s firm-specific attributes leaves open the possibility that attributes of the 
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perpetrator firm that it has in common with other firms had a role in the scandals occurrence, 
causing the public to perceive the possibility that it can be repeated by other firms.  
Accordingly, the public would initiate a categorization process to compare by-stander 
firms to the perpetrator firm to evaluate this risk, and potentially subject them to common 
behavioural expectations. The centrality of the perpetrator firm as well as the information 
uncertainty inherent in the environment in which the scandal occurs moderate the likelihood of 
spillover inducement through their effect on the public’s perception of an agentic attribution of 
the scandal and the transparency of the perpetrator firm, respectively. 
Agentic attribution. Agentic attributions – by which we mean attributions that a 
particular individual or group of individuals within an organization caused the scandal – reduce 
the public’s uncertainty as to the reasons for a scandal by ascribing the blame to specific actor(s) 
connected with the perpetrator firm (Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015). Such an attribution 
establishes a firm-specific attribute as the cause of the scandal. Agentic attributions can be put 
forth by the perpetrator firm itself through an admission of guilt or by external actors such as 
courts, NGOs, or the media. They include employee firings, investigations into specific business 
units or functions, trials against a firm in which a specific employee is questioned and becomes 
the “face” of the scandal, and investigative reports in which a thorough account of the actors 
involved in a scandal is provided to the public.  
Individual actors within organizations are a significant source of variation that 
differentiate firms amidst conformity to such organizational prescriptions as product markets, 
organizational structure and governance systems. Differences in individuals’ motivations and 
tendencies to act opportunistically help to individuate the firms to which they belong in light of 
prototypical attributes common across firms that cause them to be seen as more homogenous. 
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This provides a plausible account of why the occurrence of a scandal is specific to a firm. For 
example, the firing of four executives by Wells Fargo for improper sales practices (Fortune, 
2017) can be thought of as an agentic attribution of a scandal. The firings signalled that the 
scandal occurred due to the behaviour of specific organizational actors, as opposed to an 
organizational attribute that is common to other firms in the banking industry or corporations 
more generally. Actions taken to alter the incentive programs that motivated the behaviour of 
these executives, on the other hand, would make focal a common firm-level attribute that could 
be perceived as a cause of the scandal. Furthermore, attributions to individual actors deflect the 
focus away from categories (Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015), enabling the public to act on their 
propensity to attribute firm actions and outcomes to individual rather than structural forces 
(Meindl et al., 1985). This ultimately prevents the inducement of reputational spillover. 
Accordingly, we propose: 
Proposition 1a. The presence of an agentic attribution that links the scandal to individual 
actors in the perpetrator firm is negatively related to the likelihood of spillover to by-
stander firms. 
 
Centrality of perpetrator firm. Although the centrality of a perpetrator firm within its 
network has been explored as a basis of spillover (Yu & Lester, 2008), it has not been carefully 
connected with the public’s categorization process in explaining its effect. As a result, the 
centrality of the perpetrator firm has been mis-specified as affecting the severity at which by-
stander firms experience spillover effects. A closer consideration of the categorization process 
reveals that the specific ties held by the perpetrator firm and by-stander firms (and not centrality) 
determine the severity of spillover effects, which we discuss in the spillover spread section of our 
paper. Our approach to examining centrality, in line with explanations in the network literature 
(Bell, 2005; Rowley, 1997; Tsai, 2001), considers at an aggregate level the ties held by a 
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perpetrator firm to explain how centrality acts as a spillover inducement factor. We argue that if 
a perpetrator firm holds a central position in its network, the negative effect of an agentic 
attribution on the likelihood of spillover to by-stander firms is weakened. When a perpetrator 
firm possesses centrality, a scandal is more likely to be perceived as the instantiation of a 
broader, structural issue, causing the public to question whether the scandal could be repeated by 
other firms despite an agentic cause being traceable to the perpetrator firm. 
The centrality of a firm is determined by the content of its network ties, which can be 
characterized through the network concepts of closeness and betweeness centrality (Phillips, 
2010). Closeness centrality is a measure of the shortest path from the central firm to other firms 
in its network, while betweeness centrality is the extent to which the central firm is on the 
shortest path between other firms (Rowley, 1997). Closeness, with the ability it provides to 
bypass intermediate firms, and betweeness, by allowing it to broker exchanges within its 
network, provides a central firm the ability to avoid and impose control, respectively (Brass & 
Burkhardt, 1992). This results in greater influence over the economic relationships the firm has 
with other firms in its network. The central firm’s powerful position allows it to dictate which 
norms are created, diffused, and enforced throughout the network (Phillips, 2010).  
As its most influential actor, the central firm is seen as representative of its network, 
causing its behaviour to be generalized to the entire group (Paruchuri & Misangyi, 2015). A 
scandal committed by a centrally positioned perpetrator firm is therefore perceived as a more 
systematic problem since it is seen as exemplary of the conduct of its network. When the public 
holds this perception of a scandal, it negates the individuating effect of an agentic attribution to 
the perpetrator firm that makes it less likely that a firm initiates a categorization process. 
Proposition 1b: The centrality of the perpetrator firm that commits a scandal moderates 
the relationship between the presence of an agentic attribution of the scandal and the likelihood 
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that reputational spillover will occur to by-stander firms; the negative effect of agentic 
attribution on the likelihood of spillover is weakened when the perpetrator firm holds a more 
central position within its network. 
 
Transparency of perpetrator firm. The transparency of the perpetrator is another factor 
that contributes to the uncertainty surrounding a scandal that causes the public to rely on 
categorization as a sense-making process. A lack of transparency of a firm is caused by limited 
disclosure of information, and a lack of clarity and accuracy of the information that is disclosed 
(Schankenberg & Tomlinson, 2014). Inaccessible information limits an observer’s ability to gain 
a complete understanding of the firm (Zhu, 2004). Without access to a broad set of relevant 
information of an entity, an observer’s ability to affirm a cause to an effect produced by that 
entity is diminished since it does not have sufficient information to form a reasonable causal 
inference (Kelley, 1972). In the context of a scandal, inaccessible information about the 
perpetrator results in an inability to connect its idiosyncratic attributes to the scandal, since 
making such attributions requires the public to possess detailed information of a firm beyond 
broad features that tend to be easily perceptible. Transparency increases the awareness, 
coherence, and comprehensibility of information about a firm by external actors (Pagano & 
Roell, 1996). In being transparent, a firm discloses idiosyncratic information about itself in a 
clear and accurate manner, which allows the public to overcome its limits to comprehension 
when a scandal occurs and make plausible firm-specific cause and effect attributions.  
Firms vary in their level of transparency, making it a relevant factor in predicting which 
scandals will induce categorization. For instance, publicly traded firms are legally obliged to 
disclose operating and financial information through annual reports that private firms are not. 
Firms also differ in pressure from stakeholders they face to be transparent (Cambell, 2006; 
Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero & Ruiz, 2014). For example, firms in industries that produce 
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externalities that harm the environment, such as those in polluting industries, tend to face greater 
stakeholder pressure to disclose information about their operations (Aerts & Cormier, 2009). 
Apart from legal obligations and pressure from stakeholders, firms also have the capacity to 
present information in ways that increase or decrease their transparency (Schnackenberg & 
Tomlinson, 2014), often strategically withholding or releasing information as a tactic to achieve 
competitive advantage (Ndofor & Levitas, 2004).  
Transparency is an especially significant firm attribute in the context of scandals due to 
the common practice of firms to manage stakeholder perceptions of their behaviour after 
committing a transgression (Coombs, 2007; Dukerich & Carter, 2000). If the information 
provided as part of a firm’s explanation of its actions is perceived as clear and accurate, the 
transparency of the firm is increased. When firms seek to manage impressions by disclosing 
information that lacks clarity and accuracy, such actions may be viewed as suspicious and 
transparency-reducing (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Elsbach et al., 1998; Suchman, 1995).  
Proposition 2a: The transparency of the perpetrator firm that commits a scandal is 
negatively related to the likelihood that reputational spillover will occur to by-stander 
firms. 
 
Information uncertainty. The transparency of a firm is diminished when information 
uncertainty is characteristic of the environment in which it operates. In some environments, 
information about firms that could increase their transparency is either withheld or inherently 
uncertain, causing reported information to be perceived as unreliable. For example, the absence 
of stringent reporting standards common in developing countries results in differing, often 
subjective metrics and varying reporting standards being used across firms, causing information 
to be both incomparable across time and between firms. The public as a result is skeptical of 
whether reported information is a true reflection of firm behaviour due to the perceived lack of 
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transparency of firms under the jurisdiction of these regulations.  
Another relevant source of information uncertainty in the environment is a lack of 
independence of the media, with the level of media independence known to vary across countries 
(Jensen et al., 2010). The media serves as a reliable source of objective information if its 
interests remain independent, since the capturing of its interests by third parties can result in it 
being used to manipulate public opinion in their favor (Corneo, 2006). In environments where 
the public finds the independence of the media questionable, they may believe that news 
pertaining to a firm can be biased in favor of or against a firm, which would cause reported 
information about firms to be perceived as unreliable. This can occur, for example, when it is 
common for firms to have ownership stakes in media outlets, or when media outlets fall on one 
side of a polarized issue, such as climate change, that causes them to naturally favor some firms 
over others. 
Such information uncertainty in the environment diminishes the effect of transparency on 
the public’s ability to determine firm-specific cause and effect relationships regarding the 
scandal. Therefore, we propose that information uncertainty in the environment negatively 
moderates the relationship between the transparency of a perpetrator firm and the likelihood that 
reputational spillover will occur to by-stander firms. 
Proposition 2b: Information uncertainty in the environment in which a scandal occurs 
moderates the relationship between the transparency of a perpetrator firm and the likelihood 
that reputational spillover will occur to by-stander firms; the negative effect of perpetrator firm 
transparency on the likelihood of spillover is weakened in environments with greater information 
uncertainty.  
 
Spillover spread 
 Once a scandal induces spillover by initiating the public’s categorization process, by-
stander firms are susceptible to the risk of receiving spillover effects that negatively affect their 
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reputation. We propose that the category used by the public to support its goal of ascertaining 
which other firms could act akin to the perpetrator firm and commit similar acts to those 
prompting the scandal is determined by the scandal’s level of moral intensity. The public’s 
category choice, either the industry of the perpetrator firm or a scandal-specific category, 
determines the basis of similarity that is used to evaluate category membership, which 
subsequently affects the scope of firms that receive spillover effects emanating from a scandal.  
Moral intensity. Decision-making in regards to moral issues requires time and energy 
associated with gathering information and applying moral principles (Velasquez, 1982), 
occupying the scarce cognitive resources available to the public. While the literature commonly 
bases the reasoning process associated with moral issues on the level of moral development an 
actor exhibits when forming their judgement in regards to a specific issue (Jones, 1991; Rest, 
1986), it is an underlying assumption that advanced moral reasoning is underpinned by advanced 
logical reasoning (Kohlberg, 1976). Indeed, evidence of a rational decision process has been 
found for judgements pertaining to moral infractions that require deliberation to resolve 
(Tenbrunsel & Smith-Krowe, 2008). It is from this core assumption that we derive our paper's 
central premise regarding the perception of scandals as moral issues; the public engages in a 
more thoughtful and critical reasoning process after observing scandals of higher moral intensity, 
acting on the inclination of individuals to devote greater effort to social understanding when they 
perceive more to be at stake (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
Due to the need to ascertain which other firms pose the risk of committing the scandal, the 
categorization process in cases of reputation spillover response functions as a means of 
deliberation for a specific problem the public wishes to resolve.  
While the concept of moral intensity is constituted of several dimensions (see Jones, 
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1991), empirical evidence points to the magnitude of consequences and social consensus 
dimensions being the most influential in both the recognition and evaluation of moral issues 
(May & Pauly, 2002). The magnitude of consequences of a scandal is the full scope of its harm 
to victims. Prominent firms with considerable size and resources have the potential to commit 
scandals of greater magnitude because their actions tend to have larger consequences and affect a 
wider range of stakeholders. Scandals with a high level of social consensus are unambiguously 
considered socially unacceptable (Jones, 1991). For instance, scandals with negative 
consequences on health, safety, or security elicit strong, uniform reactions across members of the 
public since human welfare is considered a universal right. On the other hand, there is greater 
variability in the interpretation of the consequences of an event across members of the public 
when consensus of its moral nature is weaker or altogether absent, due to political, religious, or 
other societal divides. This can result in a scandal that the public as a whole considers less 
severe. 
The moral intensity of a scandal, by affecting the public's motivation underlying their use 
of categorization, has implications for the categorization scheme employed after a scandal is 
observed. Automatic categorization is more likely to be used when an actor's decision-making is 
impersonal (Elsbach & Breitsohl, 2016), much like it is when the public reacts to a scandal that 
possesses low moral intensity since it instills in them relatively little concern. Categories that are 
chronically applied by perceivers to make sense of new information, and thus, central to their 
sense-making efforts, are automatically accessible within seconds due to their frequent usage 
(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). For the public, industries serve as automatic categories that facilitate 
the instantaneous processing of new information encountered of firms. The convention to 
understand firms through industry classifications makes industry categories frequently used and 
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thus easily accessible in memory.  
On the contrary, scandals with a high level of moral intensity, by instilling a greater level 
of concern in the public, motivate a more thoughtful assessment of which other firms could act 
akin to the perpetrator firm and commit similar acts to those prompting the scandal. The level of 
moral intensity of a scandal determines whether members of the public act on their inclination to 
automatically accept a categorization process that uses membership in the industry of the 
perpetrator firm as a means to categorize by-stander firms, or whether it is rejected in favor of a 
motivated categorization process (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Fiske et al., 1999).  
The public is more likely to assess the suitability of the use of the industry categorization 
scheme if a scandal possesses greater moral intensity, questioning its diagnostic accuracy that is 
compromised at the expense of the cognitive ease at which the pre-existing category can be 
applied to make sense of the scandal. Thinking more critically regarding the causes of a scandal, 
the public may deem the industry category of the perpetrator firm insufficient for predicting the 
likelihood of the scandal being committed by other firms. In these cases, the public would 
instead favor the use of a scandal-specific category that is conceived at the point when the 
scandal occurs, based on attributes of the perpetrator firm that are considered salient specifically 
because they are viewed as causes of the scandal.  
It may be that the scandal-specific category is effectively an amendment to the industry 
category of the perpetrator firm if some firm attributes typical of an industry firm are perceived 
as causes of a scandal, along with few other considerations. In other cases, it may represent a 
substantially different category if attributes of a typical industry firm are largely irrelevant to 
causing the scandal. In either case, the use of this ad-hoc category represents a more deliberate, 
reasoned cognitive process that members of the public willingly engage in when their concern 
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about the scandal issue renders the more intuitive, unconscious, and unquestioned use of an 
industry category insufficient to match their level of motivation to understand the cause(s) of a 
scandal.  
Proposition 3a: Scandals of lower moral intensity are more likely to cause the public to 
categorize by-stander firms using the industry category of the perpetrator firm. 
 
Proposition 3b: Scandals of higher moral intensity are more likely to cause the public to 
categorize by-stander firms using a scandal-specific category. 
 
Similarity. The likelihood that firms will be infected with the stigma associated with a 
category varies in accordance with the strength of their membership to a category (Vergne, 2012; 
Yu et al., 2008). Similarity between the perpetrator firm and by-stander firms has been 
considered the key influence on the spread of spillover following scandals (Jonsson et al., 2009; 
Desai, 2011), with greater perceived similarity making it more likely that a by-stander firm 
becomes categorized with the perpetrator firm, and consequently, receives a negative 
reputational evaluation. There are two complimentary approaches used in the literature to 
describe the shared attributes that determine how similar by-stander firms are perceived to be 
with the perpetrator firm– common organizational features and common associations. Across 
these approaches, the specific attributes evaluated by the public is determined by whether the 
industry category of the perpetrator firm or a scandal-specific category is employed as part of 
their categorization process. The attributes considered under the industry category scheme are 
those perceived as typical of a firm in the industry, while those considered under the scandal-
specific category scheme are those considered salient because they contribute to the occurrence 
of the scandal.  
The attributes considered under each categorization scheme, as we will describe, has 
consequences for the scope of firms affected by spillover. The use of the industry categorization 
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scheme is more likely to result in a wider scope of firms within the perpetrator firm’s industry 
being affected by spillover, while the use of a scandal-specific category is more likely to result in 
comparatively fewer firms within the industry of the perpetrator firm being affected. Prototypical 
firm attributes that define category membership in an industry category, because they represent 
the central tendency of firms in an industry (Mervis & Rosch, 1981), are likely to be more 
prevalent across industry firms than are firm attributes perceived as causes of a scandal, since 
such attributes may not necessarily be typical of firms in the industry. Furthermore, the use of a 
scandal-specific category makes it possible that spillover can cross over and affect firms in other 
industries. Given the many attributes that by-stander firms have in common to the perpetrator, 
the public is selectively attentive only to those with greater causal power in explaining the 
scandal when determining category membership using a scandal-specific category. Taking into 
consideration firm attributes based on their salience to the scandal is conducive for 
understanding how firms in other industries, although seemingly less similar to the perpetrator 
compared to other firms in its industry, become targets of spillover when the minimal common 
attributes they share are central to category membership in a scandal-specific category.  
Common organizational features. Similarity of organizational features has been 
recognized as a primary basis by which firms are categorized in the process of reputational 
spillover. In accordance with the tendency of authors to conceptualize the industry of the 
perpetrator firm as the category guiding the spillover process, most prior studies have used 
product similarity, as defined by membership in the same industry, as the basis for category 
membership (Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2013). In conceptualizing reputational spillover, products 
have therefore been considered synonymous to specific industries and thus central to determining 
membership into industry categories. While products, as core and enduring attributes of firms, 
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may indeed be highly salient for how the public categorizes firms (Barnett & King, 2008; Desai, 
2011), similarities in other organizational features, which may be salient to the scandal and form 
the basis of membership in a scandal-specific category, have been overlooked. 
The population ecology literature, for example, conceptualizes categories based on 
organizational forms, namely, externally imposed social identities based on a set of attributes 
that prescribe common behavioral expectations to firms (Hannan et al., 2007). Organizational 
features outside of a firm’s core products have featured prominently in descriptions of such 
organizational forms. For instance, Hannan & Freeman (1986: 51) argue that four dimensions – 
organizational mission, forms of authority, core technology, and marketing strategy – are useful 
bases for classifying organizations because an organization’s initial configuration on these 
dimensions “commits it to a set of environmental dependencies and thus to a long-term strategy”. 
Institutional dimensions of organizational design have also been classified as part of a firm’s 
core features, including vertical and horizontal structures of roles and responsibilities, policy and 
resource allocation mechanisms, and human resource practices (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993). 
Widening the scope of similarities taken into consideration by the public in their 
categorization process to encompass both product and non-product features provides a basis for 
explaining categorization that is more conducive for conceptualizing cross-industry spillover. 
Unlike products, which tend to be ubiquitous to firms in an industry, non-product organizational 
features represent general organizational practices such as production methodologies, structural 
arrangements, and labour policies that are more likely to be common to firms across industries. 
The greater level of ubiquity of a product to firms in a given industry, compared to non-product 
features, makes it more likely that a broader scope of firms in the industry of the perpetrator is 
affected by spillover if the industry category is employed by the public compared to a scandal-
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specific category. On the other hand, cross-industry spillover is more likely when the public 
employs a scandal-specific category, since non-product similarities between by-stander firms and 
the perpetrator firm that are salient to a scandal may be evaluated if they are perceived as a 
causes of a scandal. This is illustrated by Diestre & Rajagopalan’s (2014) finding that a 
commonality in the core technology of by-stander firms and the perpetrator firm, in the use of a 
toxic chemical involved in an industrial accident, resulted in a decline in the market value of by-
stander firms across manufacturing industries in-line with their relative usage of the input.  
Common associations. We previously postulated that the centrality of the perpetrator 
firm, by causing its actions to be perceived as representative of its broader network, affects the 
likelihood that a spillover will be induced. A separate issue is how severely by-stander firms 
within that network are actually affected by a spillover. This is dependent on the extent to which 
they will be cognitively associated with the perpetrator firm by the public within the same 
category. As a basis through which firms are categorized together, it has been theorized that 
indirect ties between by-stander firms and the perpetrator firm through common associations to 
third parties can result in repercussions of a scandal to spread to by-stander firms (Yu & Lester, 
2008; Haack et al., 2014). Such categorization can be described using the concept of structural 
equivalence (Burt, 1992; DiMaggio, 1986), where structurally equivalent firms are classified as 
those that hold similar patterns of ties to and from actors (Burt, 1980). Firms with equivalent 
structural positions in a network can be perceived by the public as sharing similar core attributes 
(Holland et al., 1986) and adopting similar attitudes and behaviours (Brass & Burkhardt, 1992). 
Common associations of firms to third parties – which include regulatory ties to government 
actors, membership in trade associations or self-regulatory bodies, and relationships with other 
firms – create structural equivalence by establishing patterns of common ties across firms. A 
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common association is central to defining category membership in an industry category, when on 
average, an industry firm is perceived to have a relationship with the third party. On the other 
hand, a common association is central to defining category membership in a scandal-specific 
category when the relationship between the perpetrator firm and the third party is perceived as a 
cause of the scandal, and an equivalent relationship between by-stander firms and the same third 
party exists, thereby creating a perception that the bystander could also commit the scandal in 
question.  
The categorization scheme employed by the public influences whether third parties that 
operate within the industry of the perpetrator firm or those with a wider span across industries 
determine category membership. The Enron scandal is an example of when a common 
association that spanned across industries resulted in the categorization of by-stander firms. After 
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Anderson, was found complicit in the firm’s corporate fraud, the 
auditor’s other clients, including those outside of the energy industry, experienced adverse 
effects to their stock market returns (Krishnamurthy et al., 2006). The common association with 
Arthur Anderson was salient in categorizing by-stander firms with Enron since the auditor’s 
perceived lack of independence was considered a key cause of the scandal that could enable 
corporate fraud of its other clients, irrespective of their industry. Had an industry self-regulatory 
body been a basis for categorization (in the context of industry categorization), firm spillover 
effects could have been expected to be concentrated to a wider scope of firms within the energy 
industry since the typical industry firm would have an established relationship to the regulator.  
The moral intensity of a scandal, by influencing whether the public reacts to a scandal by 
categorizing by-stander firms based on the industry category of the perpetrator firm or a scandal-
specific category, determines the firm attributes that are taken into consideration to determine 
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category membership. Scandals of lower moral intensity are more likely to cause the public to 
employ an industry categorization scheme that is bounded to the consideration of firm attributes 
typical of an industry firm, while scandals of higher moral intensity cause the public to employ a 
scandal-specific category that can potentially encompass a broader array of firm attributes if they 
are salient as causes of the scandal, including those that are common to firms across industries. 
Moral intensity therefore affects the scope of firms affected by a spillover through its influence 
on the firm attributes that are evaluated as part of the categorization process. 
Proposition 4a: Scandals of lower moral intensity are more likely to affect a wider span of firms 
in the industry of the perpetrator firm relative to scandals of higher moral intensity. 
Proposition 4b: Scandals of higher moral intensity are more likely to affect firms outside of the 
industry of the perpetrator firm relative to scandals of lower moral intensity. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 In light of the general dearth of literature on negative social evaluations and the risk of 
reputation loss they create for firms (George et al., 2016), this paper contributes to knowledge of 
a specific and understudied type of social evaluation, reputational spillover, which occurs when 
an isolated scandal committed by a perpetrator firm causes reputational damage to a wider scope 
of by-stander firms.  
 Our main contribution is two-fold. First, we offer a new, two-stage model of reputational 
spillover. By theoretically delineating spillover based on the core dimensions of initiation and 
spread, the model organizes and extends the literature in important ways. The elaboration on 
spillover initiation factors, which are effectively antecedents of the public’s use of 
categorization, focuses attention on an understudied yet critical aspect of the phenomenon. Our 
examination of spillover spread, in which the category employed by the public is contingent on 
the moral intensity of a scandal, provides a theoretical rationale for the firm attributes that 
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determine which by-stander firms are categorized with the perpetrator firm.  
Second, we offer a theory of reputational spillover that broadens its conceptual scope 
beyond industry spillovers. Drawing from the recent literature on category formation (Durand & 
Paolella, 2013; Kennedy & Fiss, 2013) that aims to reinvigorate what it criticizes as a stale 
treatment of categories in organizational theory (Durand & Paolella, 2013), we argue that rather 
than there being a single possible categorization scheme used by the public after observing a 
scandal to serve their goal of determining which other firms are likely to commit it, the public 
chooses a category contingent on its level of motivation to understand the scandal, as determined 
by the scandal's moral intensity. Our contingent view of the categorization process provides a 
stronger basis to understand the scope of reputational spillover by: 1) refuting the prevailing but 
limiting assumption that spillover effects are contained within an industry (e.g. Barnett & King, 
2008; Jonsson et al., 2009; Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015; Yu et al., 2008); and 2) theorizing that 
attributes that define category membership can be common to firms across different industries. 
As a result, our model provides a more complete conceptual understanding of spillover by 
providing sound theoretical explanation for spillovers that cross industry boundaries.  
 Our research better incorporates the range of cognitive processes involved in reputational 
spillover. Existing research has presented opposing views of the cognitive processes underlying 
social judgement formation. One perspective paints these processes as deliberate, effortful, and 
conscious, relying on analytical reasoning (Bazerman, 2006; Stanovich & West, 2000), while the 
other paints them as automatic, effortless, and non-conscious, relying on intuition and heuristics 
(Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Where the cognitive processes underlying the 
phenomenon have been explicated, research on reputational spillover has favored the latter 
perspective, reasoning that the audience’s categorization process after witnessing a scandal is 
86 
 
driven by intuition (Haack et al., 2014; Jonsson et al., 2009; Yu et al., 2008). The possible role of 
analytical reasoning has either not been acknowledged or even dismissed outright (Haack et al., 
2014). As a result, theoretical accounts of reputational spillover are unable to capture the true 
complexity of social judgement formation in which analytical and more intuitive cognitive 
processes are both available means of sense-making for perceivers and that certain evaluations 
emphasize one form of processing over the other (Bundy & Pfarrer, 2015). 
 In recognizing that the public’s categorization process in the face of a scandal is 
determined by its level of moral intensity, through its effect on the public's motivation to 
understand the causes and consequences of the scandal, our model captures the possibility that 
either type of cognitive process can be at play. Future research can use our theory as a starting 
point to consider the range of possible cognitive processes underlying reputational spillovers in 
order to further our understanding of the phenomenon. 
 Our new theoretical framework also has implications for the self-regulation of firms. 
Industry self-regulation is a common context through which reputational spillover is examined 
(e.g. Barnett & King, 2008, King et al., 2002, Yu et al., 2008). The threat of reputational 
spillover is reasoned to incentivize firms to collectively manage what can be considered a 
common reputational good (or ‘reputational commons’) that affects the fate of all industry firms 
(Barnett & King, 2008). Our research reshapes the theoretical understanding of what constitutes 
a reputational commons. By revealing that spillover can spread past industry boundaries, we 
widen the scope of firms that can be considered part of a reputational commons. Furthermore, by 
acknowledging that the public may create categories in response to specific scandals rather than 
relying on fixed industry structures to categorize firms, we offer a more dynamic depiction of 
reputational commons, one in which the shared reputations that intertwine the fate of firms 
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emerge might be defined at the point in which scandals occur.  
Implications for the design of self-regulatory initiatives follow from this broadened 
theoretical understanding of reputational commons. That is, the possibility of cross-industry 
spillover reveals the importance, in certain contexts, of forming self-regulatory initiatives that 
span across industries. Our findings indicate that it is in the best interest of firms across 
industries that are connected through attributes salient to a particular scandal to organize self-
regulatory initiatives that aim to strategically disassociate from these attributes. This is 
particularly important if a scandal has potential to be of high moral intensity. For instance, in 
developing countries, geographic location is a common organizational feature that connects firms 
across industries due to the institutional deficiencies in these contexts that enable corruption. 
Accordingly, to protect the reputation of its members, the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), a regulatory initiative across oil, gas, and mining industries in developing 
countries, attempts to dissociate member firms from their institutional environment by promoting 
transparency and accountability around the governance of revenues.  
 Our insights can also be used to inform the tactics that self-regulatory associations use to 
protect their members from spillover effects. Efforts of regulatory associations to create a 
collective reputation that is distinguished from non-members, and thus, protected from spillovers 
caused by their actions, have been well established (King et al., 2002). However, our analysis of 
spillover inducement factors reveals that altogether different types of tactics can also be used to 
protect against spillover - those which pre-empt the public from forming and applying categories. 
Since an antecedent of categorization is insufficient information to attribute a firm specific cause 
to a scandal, initiatives to better inform the public about the risks associated with an industry or 
collective of firms could prevent the inducement of categorization in response to a scandal. This 
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would enable the public to follow a more reasoned decision-making approach, making them less 
likely to a) falsely perceive that the risk of a scandal exists widely across firms, and b) have the 
subsequent motivation to ascertain this risk, which would cause them to initiate a categorization 
process. For instance, Diestre & Rajagopalan (2014) empirically demonstrated that reductions in 
the market value of by-stander firms caused by their use of an input connected with a scandal by 
a perpetrator firm were lower when an association of users of that input existed. This negative 
moderating effect was attributed to the efforts of dedicated ‘input associations’ that educated 
consumers and investors on the actual risks of the input, so that an incident was more likely to be 
perceived as firm specific rather than due to the use of the input itself. 
 Our theoretical model also has implications for reputation management of firms. Given 
that reputation can be an important source of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), managers 
should be wary of how reputational spillovers can spread to their firms. This is especially true of 
firms for which spillover is more likely, such as those in industries and competitive 
environments in which institutional pressures towards isomorphism exist. The strength of 
institutional forces in these contexts orient firms towards common strategic responses (Oliver, 
1991), rendering similarity a condition for success. In such circumstances, it is important for 
managers to weigh the need for their firms to resemble organizational archetypes that are 
positioned effectively within their context against the risk that their resemblance to other firms 
can result in greater susceptibility to absorbing spillover. Accepting the resemblance to ‘safe’ 
firms with predictable behaviour but crafting an opposing identity against likely perpetrator firms 
through differentiating attributes can allow firms to simultaneously conform to requirements for 
success in the environment and protect them from spillover. This may entail more than just 
disassociating from firms within the same industry given cross-industry spillovers are possible, 
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adding an additional layer of complexity to how managers should position their firms. Since 
reputational spillover can only occur to firms that are in the public’s purview, managers may 
consider keeping a low profile when the risk of reputational spillover is high. While this is likely 
not a sustainable long-term strategy, it may be effective as a temporary strategy in times of crisis 
when industries, or the broader environment in which a firm operates, is under public scrutiny. 
 Our insights present a number of opportunities for future areas of research. Researchers 
have recognized the importance of considering the audience when conceptualizing the 
categorization process, reasoning that audiences differ in the criteria they use to categorize firms 
based on the various purposes they have (Durand & Paolella, 2013; Hsu & Hannan, 2005). By 
locating the motivation of the actor that engages in categorization as a focal point of our model, 
we more explicitly incorporate this consideration into research on reputational spillover. 
Although the audience considered in our paper is the general public, and the key influence of 
their motivation is a scandal's moral intensity, our theoretical framework can be extended to 
contextualize that categorization process of various audiences by taking into account factors that 
influence their motivations after observing a scandal and how these motivations affect their 
categorization process. Furthermore, our research is an important step towards empirically 
testing reputational spillover using laboratory experiments. Experiments are commonly used in 
research on social evaluations (e.g. Elsbach, 1994; Zucker, 1977) because of their suitability for 
examining social judgement formation (Suddaby et al., 2017), but have been thus far absent in 
studies of spillover. By better explicating the theoretical basis for the initiation and spread of 
reputational spillover using the socio-cognitive theory of categorization, our model can aid 
researchers in designing experiments to test theoretical predictions, including the propositions 
advanced in this paper. 
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 Finally, the extant literature has paid limited attention to the possibility of positive 
spillovers that stem from reputation-enhancing actions of firms that are viewed favorably by the 
public. These have been acknowledged (e.g. Haack et al., 2014; Parachuri & Misangyi, 2015) 
without yet being subjected to explicit theorizing. Although our framework is also designed to 
explain negative spillovers in the form of scandals, future research should explore its 
applicability to positive spillovers. Our model reflects that categorization emerges in response to 
a specific need – which, in the case of a positive spillover, would be the need to determine which 
other firms should be evaluated positively as a result of an origin firm receiving public acclaim. 
We envisage that a similar initiation and spread phase would come into play but the assumptions 
underlying our theory need further theoretical and empirical refinement given that the motivation 
to reward firms is likely to differ in important ways from the motivation to punish (Haack et al., 
2014; Mishina et al., 2012). For instance, human nature dictates that negative stimuli have a 
more pervasive impact on judgements than positive stimuli of equal intensity (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 2000; Peeters & Czapinski, 1990), and that negative information is processed more 
thoroughly and has a stronger impact on perceptions than positive information (Baumeister et al., 
2001). Accordingly, events that are morally intense because they are considered righteous may 
not instill in the public the same level of thoughtfulness in understanding their causes as would 
morally intense scandals. As a result, it may be that positive spillovers result from a different 
categorization process than the one described in this paper. Nonetheless, our hope is that the 
theoretical framework we provide can at the very least be used as a new, theoretically robust 
conceptualization of the process of categorization that underlies their origin and spread. 
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How Firms Adapt Their Innovation Approach When Faced with 
the Threat of Corruption: An Examination of the Effect of 
Corruption on Product and Marketing Innovation  
 
Abstract: This study explores how firms adapt their innovation approach when faced with the 
threat of corruption, a problem characteristic of developing countries thought to 
undermine economic growth. I examine how perceived corruption affects both a 
firm's product and marketing innovation. Furthermore, the role of IP protection in 
influencing the relationship between perceived corruption and each respective form 
of innovation in also taken into consideration. Data from the World Bank on firms 
from ten South Asian and African countries was used to test the study's hypotheses. 
Results from bivariate probit estimation with country and industry fixed effects 
support my key argument that perceived corruption causes firms to shift their focus 
away from product innovation towards marketing innovation, as well as the role of 
patenting in mediating the relationship between perceived corruption and product 
innovation. 
Keywords: Product innovation, marketing innovation, corruption, patenting, trademarking, 
exploration-exploitation 
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1. Introduction 
 Corruption is a systemic issue facing developing countries that has long been considered 
a key contributor to underdevelopment due to its negative impact on economic growth (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1993; Mauro, 1995). Defined as the abuse of power by those in public office for 
private benefit (Rodriquez, Siegel, Hillman, and Eden, 2006), where abuse constitutes a breach 
of legal norms (Johnston, 1986), the corruption examined in this paper takes place between firms 
and government officials or representatives. It includes practices such as kickbacks in public 
procurement, bribery, and embezzlement of property by government officials (Jensen, Li, and 
Rahman, 2010). By acting as an additional tax on firms, corruption disincentives firms from 
pursuing economic activities that would otherwise be profitable (Bardhan, 1997; Rose-
Ackerman, 1999).  
 Innovation is considered widely to be a pivotal driver of economic growth (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991), having the ability to raise the productivity of 
firms (Schumpeter, 1934) in both developed and developing countries (Chudnovsky, López, and 
Pupato, 2006; Crespi and Zuniga, 2011). As such, innovation has been recognized as a key 
channel through which corruption can undermine economic growth (Habiyaremye and 
Raymond, 2017), yet little attention has been paid to the relationship between corruption and 
firm innovation (Xu and Yano, 2017; Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2010). 
 Of the research that has examined this relationship, the dominant view in the literature is 
that corruption deters innovation by creating the risk that rents generated from economic 
activities will be expropriated by corrupt actors (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1993), raising 
the uncertainty as to the economic viability of an innovation project (Anokhin and Schulze, 
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2008). This view is based on a narrow conceptualization of innovation that has been adopted in 
the literature in which the outcomes examined pertain to technological innovation. Accordingly, 
empirical evidence has shown that corruption has a negative effect on the capacity to produce 
technological innovation (Chadee and Roxas, 2013), investments in capital equipment necessary 
for innovation (Paunov, 2016), R&D (Xu and Yano, 2017), and patenting (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009; Xu and Yano, 2017). Based on its broader definition as the adoption of an idea or 
behaviour new to an organization (Hage, 1999), innovation can be thought of as a typology that 
is more widely encompassing of the variety of innovation activities a firm can pursue - product, 
process, organizational, and marketing innovation (Schumpeter, 1934, 2010). By not taking into 
account the diversity of types of firm innovation, the literature fails to examine the effect that 
corruption has on a firm's broader innovation strategy, and as a result, overlooks potential 
insights that can be uncovered by using a broader conceptualization of innovation.  
 In this paper, I take into account a wider scope of firm innovation, examining how the 
perceived severity of corruption by a firm's managers affects both product and marketing 
innovation. Production innovation, a technological form of innovation, is defined as the 
introduction or significant improvement of a product or service in terms of its characteristics or 
intended use (OECD, 2005; Barasa, Knoben, Vermeulen et al., 2017). Marketing innovation, 
which is non-technological in nature, is defined as the implementation of new marketing 
techniques that entail significant changes in product design, placement, pricing, or promotion 
(OECD, 2005; Tavasolli and Karlsson, 2015). Through my examination, I develop the novel 
theoretical insight that firms respond to corruption by shifting their resources and efforts away 
from product innovation towards marketing innovation in order to reduce their level of risk, 
favoring the latter's more immediate and assured returns relative to the former's more distant and 
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uncertain returns. In doing so, I extend the literature's understanding of the consequences of 
corruption which has little to say regarding how firms minimize the impact of corruption on their 
operations (Galang, 2012). I make two central points to develop this insight. Firstly, I 
conceptualize product and marketing innovation using the exploration-exploitation framework 
(March, 1991), as forms of exploration and exploitation, respectively, to explicate their key 
differences and explain that they are interdependent activities which firms attempt to strike an 
optimal balance between. Second, using threat rigidity theory (Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton, 
1981), I argue that perceived corruption causes firms to adopt a risk averse and short-term 
strategic focus that is conducive to marketing innovation but not product innovation. 
 The role of intellectual property (IP) protection is also incorporated into this study in 
order to delve deeper into the process of innovation, which is necessary to better understand the 
forces that drive it (Gallouj and Weinstien, 1997). IP protection is often an integral component of 
a firm's innovation efforts, being sought after to protect its innovation outputs from infringement 
to ensure they generate the most value for a firm (Barney, 1991). Both patenting and 
trademarking are examined since they are used in conjunction by firms to offer more complete 
protection of their innovation outputs (Thomä and Bizer, 2013), being employed respectively as 
means of protection for product and marketing innovations. A firm is considered to engage in 
patenting and trademarking, respectively, when it applies for a patent or trademark. By 
accounting for the susceptibility of patenting and trademarking to corruption, I dive deeper into a 
firm's innovation process to better understand how perceived corruption impacts its balance of 
product and marketing innovation. 
 The dearth of research on the relationship between corruption and firm innovation can be 
attributed in part to a lack of innovation data on firms in developing countries (Ayyagari, 
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Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2011; Goedhuys and Veugelers, 2012), since explicit 
corruption is most prevalent and salient in the developing context. To overcome this challenge, I 
consolidate two data sources from the World Bank to form a rich dataset consisting of over 6000 
firms from ten African and South Asian countries that is used to test the hypotheses put forth in 
this study.  
 My paper makes two key contributions. Firstly, it provides a more nuanced understanding 
of corruption's impact on innovation that better captures how developing country firms adapt 
their innovation strategy to the institutional context. The extant literature's near exclusive focus 
on the determinants of innovation in developed countries (Intarakumnerd, Chairatana, and 
Tangchitpiboon, 2002 ) has resulted in little insight on the unique challenges facing innovating 
firms in the developing context (Bradley, McMullen, Artz, and Simiyu, 2012; Barasa et al., 
2017). Included in this void of knowledge is how innovating firms in developing countries adapt 
to their institutional environment. This represents a significant omission considering that such 
knowledge is imperative for providing strategic recommendations to managers on how to 
effectively respond to the institutional pressures that affect their firms (Oliver, 1991). By 
explaining that firms respond to corruption by shifting their effort and resources across types of 
innovation activities in order to reduce their level of risk, as well as accounting for the role that 
IP protection plays in this shift, my paper sheds light on how innovating firms in developing 
countries adapt their innovation strategy to their institutional environment.  
 Secondly, my paper contributes to the literature on exploration and exploitation by 
deepening the understanding of how a firm's environment affects their tendency to engage in one 
activity over the other, a key area of inquiry in the exploration-exploitation literature (e.g. 
Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004; Posen and Levinthal, 2012). While it has been asserted that 
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environments with weak appropriability conditions that reduce the benefit accruable from 
exploratory activities cause firms to shift their investments towards exploitive activities (Lavie, 
Stettner, and Tushman, 2010), the argument has not received sufficient theoretical development 
or empirical validation. The scope of a firm's innovation activities is commonly understood 
through the exploration-exploitation framework (e.g. Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009; Guan and 
Liu, 2016). Through the context of how corruption affects a firm’s balance of product and 
marketing innovation, I develop a theoretical explanation for the appropriation argument, using 
threat-rigidity as the theoretical mechanism to explain why a firm shifts its emphasis from 
exploration to exploitation. Furthermore, the findings of this paper provide empirical validation 
for the argument. 
  The paper proceeds with a review of the relevant literature, followed by the development 
of testable hypotheses on the relationship between corruption and firm innovation. The section 
that follows describes the data and empirical approach, which is then followed by a summary and 
discussion of results. The final section discusses implications of my research and concludes. 
2. Theoretical background  
2.1. Conceptualizing product and marketing innovation using the exploration-exploitation 
framework 
 Exploration consists of activities undertaken by firms for the purpose of discovering 
something new, with returns from these activities being uncertain, distant, and often negative 
(March, 1991; Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Exploitation, on the other hand, consists of 
activities that build on an existing set of resources, assets, or capabilities, with returns that are 
predictable and proximate (March, 1991, Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). While the exploration-
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exploitation framework is commonly applied to differentiate activities of firms that fall within 
the same operational domain, it can be used to conceptualize activities on separate operational 
domains when they differ in the certainty and proximity of their outcomes relative to one another 
(He and Wong, 2004; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Activities that fall in the domains of product 
development and product marketing have previously received such treatment in the literature. 
For example, relative to product innovation, which has been considered a form of exploration, 
the continued marketing and commercialization of existing products (Voss, Sirdeshmukh, and 
Voss, 2008; Rotharemel and Deeds, 2004) has been considered a form of exploitation. By 
explaining the differences in the underlying characteristics of product and marketing innovation, 
I follow a similar approach in conceptualizing the respective activities as forms of exploration 
and exploitation. 
Product innovations entail a shift in the technology employed by a firm for the purpose of 
producing new or significantly improved products. This technological shift is achieved through 
expenditures in new R&D resources and/or production processes (Garcia and Calantone, 2002), 
which include the establishment and support of R&D facilities, training of specialized staff, and 
implementation of operating information systems for organizing and reporting on the innovation 
process (Manez, Rochina-Barrachina, Sanchis, and Sanchis, 2009).  
The complexity involved in product innovation creates uncertainty as to whether it will 
reap sufficient returns to justify its cost of investment. Product innovation requires technology 
and production techniques never-before used in the industry when a firm attempts to release a 
product new to the market. In instances when the product being developed is new to the firm but 
an imitation, which is more likely the case for developing country firms (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1991; Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2006), product innovation remains an 
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inherently complex activity. It is unlikely that firms will be able to observe all required factors of 
production and their marginal contribution to the innovation output (Rumelt, 1984). Furthermore, 
the idiosyncratic features of a firm's context will have implications for how technologies and 
processes are adapted (Tyre and von Hippel, 1995). Even if the infrastructure required for a 
product innovation can be observed from competitors, uncertainty regarding how it should be 
used to produce desired outputs causes the product innovation process to be causally ambiguous 
(Szulanksi, 1996). As a result of its complexity, product innovation is experimental in nature, 
characterized by failed attempts and multiple iterations where development activities are 
repeated until innovation outputs achieve a suitable level of quality or cost. 
 Product innovation can also be a long term initiative that requires firms to make 
irreversible commitments. The R&D expenditures required in product innovation are "sunk 
costs" (Ganter and Hecker, 2013), investments that are unrecoverable by a firm once incurred. 
They are recouped only upon the completion of successful product innovation initiatives, which 
can span a considerable length of time because of a) the multiple iterations required to complete 
a successful product innovation and b) heavy fixed costs of investment may precipitate that 
successive product innovations be developed in order for these costs to be recouped (Tavassoli 
and Karlsson, 2015).  
 Marketing innovation consists of the adoption of new marketing techniques used by a 
firm to alter its "marketing mix" (Tavassoli and Karlsson, 2015; OECD, 2005). Also known by 
the "four p's" (Kotler, Armstrong, Saunders, and Wong, 1999), the marketing mix is a set of tools 
that a firm uses to increase demand for its product, conceptualized across four dimensions: 
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product
2
, pricing, promotion, and placement (ie. distribution methods and sales channels). 
Accordingly, marketing innovations have been equated to low risk modifications to product 
design (Bennett and Cooper, 1981), price-setting strategies, advertising promotions, and the 
opening of sales channels (Lin, Chen, and Chiu, 2010). Unlike product innovation, marketing 
innovation is not driven by R&D and thus does not necessitate fixed investment costs to the same 
degree (Tavassoli and Karlsson, 2015).  
The returns of marketing innovation are both more certain and immediate relative to 
those of product innovation. While marketing initiatives taken on by a firm are new to the firm 
itself, they are based on well-established marketing practices, such that their novelty lies in how 
they are adapted to a firm's particular context (O'Dwyer, Gilmore, and Carson, 2009). This 
makes the relationship between the means and ends of marketing innovations explicit, allowing 
firms to execute them with relative ease and assurance of success. Comprised of initiatives aimed 
to increase the sale of a firm's products, marketing innovation is integral to overall product 
development efforts (Sood and Tellis, 2009; Adams, Bessant, and Phelps, 2006) since it allows a 
firm to engage in continual commercialization required to make its products a commercial 
success (Crossan and Apaydin, 2010). Marketing innovation can therefore be thought of as 
means for firms to generate predictable returns by leveraging their existing product base. 
Compared to product innovation, marketing innovation also has a shorter-term orientation. The 
relative simplicity of marketing innovation allows it to be executed both quickly (Naidoo, 2010) 
and spontaneously (Levitt, 1960), such that it generates immediate, short-term returns for a firm 
(Rust, Ambler, Carpenter, Kumar et al., 2004).  
                                                          
2
 Product changes that fall under the category of marketing innovation typically entail changes to the branding or 
appearance of existing products, and thus, are distinct from new or significantly improved products that would be 
classified under product innovations. 
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2.2. Interdependency and balance between exploration and exploitation 
The literature suggests that a firm must strike a balance between explorative and 
exploitive activities to ensure long-term success (March, 1991; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). A 
mix of both activities is required as they enable and reinforce one another, with exploration being 
pivotal for achieving long-term performance outcomes and exploitation for short-term outcomes 
(Lin, Yang, and Demirkan, 2007). Exploitation provides a low-risk stream of capital that can be 
used to fund future exploratory activities and mitigate against the risk of the latter’s distant and 
uncertain returns (Garcia, Calantone, and Levine, 2003). An over-abundance of exploration 
causes firms to suffer the costs of experimentation without reaping the rewards from exploiting 
the opportunities that it generates. Exploitation in the absence of exploration, on the other hand, 
compromises the long-term profitability of a firm by failing to produce a steady stream of new 
opportunities that can be exploited (March, 1991). 
 Faced with resource constraints, firms must make resource allocation decisions to 
achieve an optimal mix of exploration and exploitation (Lavie et al., 2010). Based on their 
expected outcomes, the trade-off between the two activities is akin to deciding whether to 
prioritize immediate, short-term outcomes that are assured or farther off or long-term outcomes 
that are unpredictable (March, 1991). A threatening environment is one factor that affects the 
optimal balance of exploration and exploitation in a firm (Lavie et al., 2010, Voss et al., 2008). 
In the next section, I employ threat rigidity theory to explain how perceived corruption affects a 
firm's balance of exploration and exploitation, in the form of their product and marketing 
innovation efforts, respectively. I argue that a firm adopts a short term and risk adverse strategic 
focus that favors exploitation when it's managers perceive corruption to be a severe obstacle. 
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This shift in focus causes the firm to reduce their product innovation and increase their efforts on 
activities with assured and proximal returns, such as marketing innovation. 
3. Hypotheses  
3.1. The effect of corruption on innovation 
 Corruption creates a threatening environment due to the harmful consequences it has for 
firms. Under corrupt regimes, the self-interested actions of public actors are manifested as 
official, authoritative decisions in order to shroud their illegality and opportunistic motives, 
which can make corruption arbitrary (Hoffman, 2002; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, and Eden, 2005). 
As a result, corruption becomes difficult and costly to strategize against (Anokhin and Schulze, 
2009), raising the uncertainty of economic exchanges due to the risk of unanticipated additional 
costs that can occur without notice or reason. By reducing the value from economic activities a 
firm is able to capture, corruption makes it possible that otherwise promising opportunities will 
cause a firm to suffer losses. Innovating firms are especially susceptible to expropriation by 
public actors due to their need for irreplaceable government services such as licenses and permits 
(Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1993). 
 Threat rigidity theory posits that a firm's behaviour becomes more rigid and inflexible 
when it faces probable losses due to an environmental threat (Staw et al., 1981). This occurs for 
two reasons. Firstly, a threatening environment causes firms to consult fewer sources of 
information and instead rely on familiar knowledge, experiences, and ways of understanding to 
guide decision making (Smart and Vertinsky, 1977). Such restriction in information occurs due 
to information overload resulting from the effort and attention devoted to managing the looming 
threat, which reduces the information processing capacity available to a firm's decision makers. 
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Corruption has this effect on a firm, causing senior management's time and attention that could 
otherwise be devoted to value-adding activities such as innovation (Barasa et al., 2017) to be 
occupied with managing unpredictable regulation and government relationships (Tybout, 2000). 
Secondly, a threat causes a firm to increase their centralization of authority, formalize more 
extensively, and rely more heavily on standardized procedures (Staw et al., 1981, Yasai-
Ardekani, 1989). In light the possibility of substantial error or loss being magnified by a threat, 
this rigid form of organizing is chosen by a firm in order to enhance organizational coordination 
and control (Katz and Kahn, 1978). Due to the risk of unanticipated additional costs that could 
result in innovation projects suffering losses, firms facing corruption could be expected to 
exercise caution through a more rigid organizational structure. As a result of these consequences, 
an environmental threat causes firms to adopt a short term and risk-averse strategic focus which 
restricts genuinely novel opportunities with uncertain returns and favors familiar courses of 
action with predictable returns (Voss et al., 2008). 
 Corruption thus results in a strategic focus that is not conducive to product innovation. It 
makes it less likely that firms engage in the experimentation required of product innovation, 
which requires an openness to new and varied sources of information and operational flexibility 
that can accommodate the trial of never-before tried means-ends combinations. On the other 
hand, the short-term and risk averse strategic focus of a firm whose managers perceive 
corruption to be severe is compatible with marketing innovation. Consisting of the adaptation of 
marketing techniques that are new to the firm but are well-established practices, marketing 
innovation requires little search effort by a firm. Similarly, firms would be able execute 
marketing innovations despite rigid operating structures and reliance on standard procedures due 
to their ease of adoption which entails little experimentation.  
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 Exploration and exploitation represent opposing priorities of a firm, with the former 
being pursued to achieve longer-term returns that may be uncertain and the latter for shorter-term 
and predictable returns. As such, there is an opposite reciprocal causality between exploration 
and exploitation in which a decrease in one corresponds to an increase in the other (Voss et al., 
2008). When the perceived threat of corruption causes a firm to shift its strategic focus, the firm 
reduces their product innovation efforts in pursuit of activities with more assured returns. 
Marketing innovation is one such activity that a firm can shift their efforts towards since it is 
compatible with a risk averse and short-term strategic focus. Accordingly, I hypothesize that 
perceived corruption results in a reduction to product innovation and an increase in marketing 
innovation, causing a firm to effectively trade off the more uncertain and distant returns of 
exploration for the assured and near-term returns of exploitation. 
H1: Perceptions of the severity of corruption by a firm's managers decreases the firm's 
product innovation. 
 
H2: Perceptions of the severity of corruption by a firm's managers increases the firm's 
marketing innovation. 
 
3.2. The influence of IP protection on the effect of corruption on innovation 
 In this section, I examine the role that IP protection plays in determining how perceived 
corruption affects a firm's product and marketing innovation. By protecting a firm against 
infringement of its innovation output by other firms, IP protection incentivizes innovation by 
allowing firms to appropriate greater economic returns from its innovation efforts. Patents and 
trademarks are forms of IP protection applied to product and marketing innovations, 
respectively, that provide firms the exclusive right to utilize their innovation outputs (Greenhalgh 
and Rogers, 2010). Patents are granted for inventions such as newly developed products while 
104 
 
trademarks are granted for a firm's marketing assets (e.g. Srinivasan, Lilien, and Rangaswamy, 
2008; Jensen, Webster, and Buddelmeyer, 2008). Namely, the marketing assets protected by 
trademarks are identifiable markers such as symbols and names that distinguish a firm's products 
from those of its competitors (Block, Fisch, Hahn, and Sander, 2015), which can be an integral 
part of new marketing initiatives that are undertaken as a means of strengthening a firm's brand. I 
explain how perceptions of corruption by a firm's managers deter it from patenting but not 
trademarking by comparing the two forms of IP protection in terms of their susceptibility to 
corruption. Following from this line of reasoning, I hypothesize that patenting and trademarking 
have a different influence on the relationship between corruption and the type of innovation they 
are intended to protect. Specifically, I argue that patenting mediates the effect of perceived 
corruption on product innovation while trademarking strengthens the effect of perceived 
corruption on marketing innovation.  
3.3. The mediating role of patenting   
 Patents incentivize firms to engage in the complex and experimental process of product 
innovation. Without a patent to protect their product innovation, competitors could imitate a 
firm's product and release their own version to the market without bearing the same costs 
associated with exploration, allowing them to even under price the firm. Patent protection thus 
assures a firm greater economic return for their innovation efforts, increasing their willingness to 
accept the inherent risks associated with product innovation attributable to its sunk costs and 
unpredictable, long-term outcomes. Accordingly, patenting is positively associated with product 
innovation. 
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 Firms wanting to obtain patent protection for their product innovations must obtain 
approval from public actors since the patenting process is governed by national institutions. 
Patent offices are responsible for evaluating whether a product innovation should be granted a 
patent based on whether it meets the necessary criteria of being sufficiently novel and non-
obvious (Reitzig and Puranam, 2009). Corruption results from situations that present 
opportunities for gain by public actors that are appropriated by their use of discretionary power 
(Kaufman, 1997). Given the subjective nature of the criteria on which patent proposals are 
assessed, public actors hold considerable discretionary power in determining whether a firm is 
granted a patent, leaving firms susceptible to corruption in which additional costs are imposed on 
firms. Public actors may demand bribes for dealing favorably with patent proposals, raising the 
overall cost of a product innovation (Paunov, 2016). Even if a firm is able to bear the additional 
costs, the time-lag involved in being granted a patent after negotiating with a public actor can 
delay a product's introduction to the market, reducing the attractiveness of a patent. As a result, a 
firm whose managers perceive corruption to be a severe obstacle will be deterred from engaging 
in the patenting process. 
 Based on my hypothesis that perceived corruption reduces a firm's product innovation 
(Hypothesis 1) and that patenting is positively associated with product innovation, I posit that 
patenting is a mechanism through which perceived corruption negatively affects product 
innovation. Given that the propensity to patent is contingent on factors including industry(Hall, 
2007; Mairesse and Mohnen, 2010) and firm size (Siegel and Wright, 2007), and because a firm 
can only be granted a patent for a product innovation that is sufficiently novel, a patent would 
not be sought after in all instances of product innovation. Therefore, I hypothesize that patenting 
partially mediates the relationship between perceived corruption and product innovation. 
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Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between perceptions of the severity of corruption 
by a firm's managers and the firm's product innovation is partially mediated by 
patenting. 
 
3.4.. The moderating role of trademarking 
 Trademarks provide a firm the legal basis for the exclusive right to use their brand (Block 
et al., 2015). By protecting a firm's recognizable designations against infringement, trademarks 
prevent competitors from free-riding on the use of the brand, ensuring it greater economic 
returns from its products (Mendonça, Pereira, and Godinho, 2004). Although trademarks are 
similar to patents in that they require approval from public actors on account of the trademarking 
process being governed by national institutions, I reason that a firm will not be deterred from 
trademarking when its managers perceive corruption to be a severe obstacle. Firstly, the criteria 
on which trademark proposals are assessed, distinctiveness, is easier for firms to demonstrate 
than the criteria on which patent proposals are assessed, novelty and non-obviousness (Jensen et 
al., 2008). As a result, the approval process for trademarks is less subjective. This causes public 
actors to hold little discretionary power in the granting process, reducing the chances of 
corruption. Secondly, trademarks require less prior investment than patents. A substantial 
investment in time and capital must be made before a patent can be granted (Sander and Block, 
2011), with the product innovation process needing to be at least partly underway in order to 
have a tangible output on which a patent can be granted. This is less true for trademarks. The 
majority of the investment associated with a trademark, the costs pertaining to leveraging the 
trademark to promote a brand, is incurred after a trademark is registered (Block et al., 2015). 
Any perceived threat of corruption that may exist is unlikely to deter a firm trademarking since 
the limited investment required to obtain a trademark means that a firm is able to absorb 
additional incremental costs that result from corruption. 
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 Trademarks are imperative for a firm not only due to their protection function but their 
ability to establish a firm's brand, since strong brands are associated with benefits such as 
reduced consumer search costs and increased consumer loyalty (Hoeffler and Keller, 2003). 
Trademarks contribute to a firms brand-building efforts (Krasnikov, Mishra, and Orozco, 2009) 
by attracting the public's scarce attention (Mendonça et al., 2004) and differentiating a firm's 
products by serving as explicit signals of quality (Ramello and Silva, 2006; Sander and Block, 
2011). Accordingly, trademarks can be a key component of new marketing initiatives that fall 
under the product category of a firm's marketing mix, accompanying branding and design 
changes aimed at strengthening a firm's brand. Since perceived corruption does not have a 
significant direct influence on trademarking, I argue that firms are able to utilize trademarks as 
part of their increased marketing innovation efforts that occurs as a response to perceived 
corruption. Accordingly, I hypothesize that trademarking strengthens the positive relationship 
between perceived corruption and marketing innovation. 
 Hypothesis 4: The positive relationship between perceptions of the severity of corruption 
by a firm's managers and the firm's marketing innovation is strengthened by 
trademarking. 
 
The conceptual model of this paper which depicts the hypotheses is presented in Appendix 3a. 
 
 
4. Methods 
4.1.Data and sample 
 To test the hypotheses in this paper, I obtained firm-level data from two World Bank 
sources, the World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES), and the innovation follow-up survey (IFS) 
(www.enterprisesurveys.org). The WBES consists of multiple sections covering various 
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elements of a firm's business environment, including corruption and other issues that are 
prominent in developing countries. The IFS focuses specifically on innovation, inquiring on a 
range of activities including product and marketing innovation. Both of the surveys were issued 
to owners or top managers of firms across countries and industries within the manufacturing, 
service, and retail sectors in either 2013 or 2014. The surveys stratify respondents based on their 
2-digit ISIC industry classification, sub-national geographic region, and firm size. Standardized 
instruments are also used, ensuring that data is comparable across countries. The respondents of 
the IFS are a subset of respondents of the WBES (75% of WBES respondents are selected to 
complete the IFS), such that both sources consist of the same firms. This allowed me to merge 
the two data sources into a single data set that offers a rich set of firm-level measures. My final 
dataset encompasses firms from 10 African and South Asian countries (Bangladesh, India, 
Nepal, Pakistan, Kenya, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Democratic Republic of 
Congo); the number of observations used in the empirical models tested in this study range from 
6206 to 6537 after accounting for dropped observations. 
4.2. Dependent variables 
 Data on the two dependent variables examined in this study, product and marketing 
innovation, was collected from the IFS. To measure product innovation, a dummy variable was 
used that takes the value of 1 if a firm has introduced any new or significantly improved products 
or services in the last three years, and 0 otherwise. This measure has been used in previous 
studies (Barasa et al., 2017; Krammer, 2017; Chadee and Roxas, 2013). Marketing innovation is 
also measured using a dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 if a firm introduced or 
significantly changed packaging, branding, logo, name, trademark, or product appearance in the 
last three years, and 0 otherwise. The measure of marketing innovation relates to product related 
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marketing activities as opposed to activities that would fall under the other p's of a firms 
marketing mix - promotion, pricing, and placement. A similar measure of marketing innovation 
has been used in prior literature (Tavassoli and Karlson, 2015). Both the product and marketing 
innovation measures align with conventions set by the OECD for collecting and interpreting 
innovation data, including definitions of product and marketing innovation (OECD, 2005). 
4.3. Independent variable 
 To measure perceived corruption, I used a survey item from the ES data that asked 
respondents how severe an obstacle they perceive corruption to be for the current operations of 
their firm, referring to government corruption specifically. It was measured on a 4 point scale 
(0= no obstacle, 4= very severe obstacle), and has been used in prior literature (Jensen et al., 
2010). A perception-based measure of corruption is appropriate since managers' perceptions and 
interpretations of their environment influence their decision-making and thus are reflective of 
their behaviour (Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed, 1993). Furthermore, the respondents influential 
position within the organizational hierarchy as either the owner or top manager allows them to 
provide opinions and perceptions that are reflective of other key decision-makers when 
answering about the experience of the firm as a whole (Li and Atuahene- Gima, 2002; Phillips, 
1981). 
 A challenge of conducting firm-level corruption research is that responses can be subject 
to social desirability bias. Since illegal activities tend to underlie corruption, firms may 
underreport corruption if they feel that responding honestly would cause them to be perceived as 
complicit in such acts. This is especially true for cross-national firm-level surveys such as the 
WBES since they are often administered with the help of governments, which could cause firms 
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to fear government reprisal for responding in a certain way despite assurances of anonymity 
(Jensen et al., 2010). Some concern of social desirability bias is alleviated in this study due to 
how the question measuring perceived corruption is framed in the ES survey. Since corruption is 
framed as an obstacle facing firms rather than an activity they partake in, firms should be less 
influenced to answer in a socially desirable manner than they would be when answering 
questions regarding their participation in specific acts, such as bribery or making informal 
payments. Relatedly, my measure also provides an advantage over those based on survey 
questions that are indirectly phrased in order to address the risk of social desirability, in which 
respondents answer regarding their perception of the experience that a typical firm has with 
corruption rather than that of their own firm (e.g. Krammer, 2017). While perceptual measures 
are criticized for their inherent subjectivity, the measure of perceived corruption from WBES has 
been shown to have a high correlation with the more objective measure of bribes paid as a 
proportion of sales available in other iterations of the survey (Fries, Lysenko, and Polanec, 
2003). More generally, perceptual data on governance-related measures have been shown to be 
consistent with more objective measures based on formal rules (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi, 2007).  
4.4. Mediator and moderator 
 Data on patenting and trademarking, the mediator and moderator, respectively, was 
obtained from the IFS. To measure patenting, a dummy variable was used that takes the value of 
1 if a firm has applied for a patent concerning a product innovation in the last three years, and 0 
otherwise. To measure trademarking, a dummy variable was used that takes the value of 1 if a 
firm has applied for a trademark in the last three years, and 0 otherwise. While applications for 
patents and trademarks alone are not necessarily telling of innovation outcomes, they can be used 
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to reach reliable conclusions when combined with complimentary data (Mendonça et al., 2004). 
Since patent and trademark applications are examined in conjunction with the measures of 
product and marketing innovation, they are indicative of a firm's attempt to obtain protection as 
part of their innovation process, and thus, appropriate for use in this study. 
4.5.Control variables 
 Industry and country fixed effects were used to control for idiosyncratic differences that 
may exist in the corruption facing firms, as well as product and marketing innovation, across 
both industries and countries. A set of firm-specific variables were also included as controls. 
 R&D has been well documented in the literature as a key input required for innovation, 
encompassing a firm's investment and effort in the broad range of technology and knowledge 
accumulation activities required to produce novel outputs. To measure R&D, a dummy variable 
was used that takes the value of 1 if a firm answered yes to conducting internal R&D in the last 
three years, and 0 if they answered no. This measure has been used in prior literature (Krammer, 
2017; Barasa et al., 2017). 
 Governments provide support for innovation in order to circumvent institutional voids 
common to developing countries (e.g. lack of access to financial capital, lack of educated 
workforce) that would prevent a firm from innovating. This support can consist of formal 
initiatives intended to foster firm innovation such as the provision of technical services and R&D 
support (Szczygielski, Grabowski, and Pamukcu, 2017). Accordingly, I control for whether a 
firm received government support for innovation using a binary variable that takes the value of 1 
if a firm received non-financial support for its innovation activities in the last three years from 
government, and 0 otherwise (support includes training in the use of innovation equipment, 
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assistance in research and product development, and assistance and training for marketing 
innovations). 
 Prior literature has reasoned that ownership structure plays a role in firm innovation, with 
firms that are organized as shareholding companies thought to engage in a greater amount of 
innovation activity (Ayyagari et al., 2011, Barasa et al., 2017). In line with previous research 
(Barasa et al., 2017), I control for whether a firm is organized as a shareholding company using a 
binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a firm is either publicly traded company or a privately 
held, limited liability company, and 0 if it is another type of legal entity (sole proprietorship, 
partnership, limited partnership, or another form). 
 A complimentary relationship between exporting activities of firms and innovation has 
been uncovered and empirically demonstrated in prior research (Krammer, 2017; Golovko and 
Valentini, 2011). For this reason, international orientation was measured as a binary variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the respondent answered that the primary market for the sale of a firm's 
main product line or main line of services was international, as opposed to local or national, 
which take the value of 0. 
 Relevant differences are thought to exist in the ability and propensity of foreign owned 
firms to innovate as compared to domestic owned firms (Ayyagari et al., 2011; Girma, Gong, 
and Görg, 2000). Accordingly, foreign ownership was included as a control through the use of a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if a firm is majority foreign owned (ie. greater than 50% foreign 
ownership), and 0 otherwise.  
 Firms with a stronger base of human capital are more innovative. A highly educated and 
skilled workforce better allows a firm to innovate because they have a greater ability to 
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assimilate and exploit knowledge from their environment (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989) and are 
more effective in leveraging the existing technology and resources available to a firm (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Un, 2010). An inadequately educated workforce is thus an impediment to 
innovation, and is a particular challenge in developing countries which tend to be characterized 
by a low-level of human capital. The percentage of a firm's employees who have completed 
secondary school was used as a measure of workforce education, as has been done in prior 
literature (Cuervo-Cazurra and Un, 2010; Barasa et al., 2017). 
 Experience allows a manager to obtain tacit skills that allow for more extensively and 
thoughtfully engaging in the exploration of innovation projects (Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos, 
2017). Furthermore, experience is a key asset in low institutional quality environments because it 
gives managers a breadth of knowledge on how to navigate the obstacles of their environment 
(Austin, 2002), including corruption. In line with prior studies, managerial experience is 
measured using a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a manager has more than 10 years 
of experience working in the sector of their firm, and 0 otherwise (Barasa et al., 2017; Ayyagari 
et al., 2011).  
 Firm size is widely considered to be a predictor of innovation, albeit the exact nature of 
the relationship is ambiguous. While one perspective reasons that larger firms are more 
innovative due to having greater resources and more opportunities to innovate, the opposing 
perspective says that they are less innovative as a result of greater bureaucracy and diminished 
agility (Ahuja, Lampert, and Tandon, 2008). Size is measured using the natural logarithm of the 
number of full time employees a firm employed at the end of the previous year. 
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 Similarly, age is also considered a relevant determinant of firm innovation but it is 
debated whether older firms are more innovative on account of their experience and accumulated 
knowledge or less likely to innovate due to being more resistant to change (Coad, Segarra, and 
Teruel, 2016). Age was measured by taking the natural logarithm of the difference between the 
year the survey was answered and the year a firm was registered. Appendix 3b shows the 
correlations between the variables used in this study as well as their means and standard 
deviations. 
 
4.6. Estimation method 
 The two dependent variables of interest in this study, product and marketing innovation, 
are both binary outcomes. Underlying the key hypotheses in this study is that the decisions to 
engage in product and marketing innovation are interdependent, with the firm taking into account 
the relative differences between product and marketing innovation when balancing its efforts 
across the two activities in response to corruption. Given the binary nature of the dependent 
variables and their interdependence, a bivariate probit model was chosen to test the relationships 
in this study. A bivariate probit model allows for the possibility that two binary outcomes are 
jointly determined rather than the result of independent processes (Greene, 2007). It does so by 
assuming that their error terms may be correlated across equations, allowing for the correction of 
overestimated standard errors. Both of the outcomes in this study are explained by the same set 
of variables, with the exception that patenting is used only to explain the likelihood of product 
innovation while trademarking is used only to explain the likelihood of marketing innovation. 
Accordingly, the empirical model is specified as follows: 
y
*
PROD, f = βPROD + β'COR,PROD • CORf + β'PAT,PROD •PATf + β'X,PROD • Xf + λi + ηc +  PROD,f 
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y
*
MKT, f = βMKT + β'COR,MKT • CORf + β'PAT,MKT •PATf + β'COR,MKT • CORf x β'PAT,MKT •PATf + 
β'X,MKT • Xf + λi + ηc +  MKT, f 
ρ = Cov ( PROD, f,  MKT, f), 
 
where f, i, and c, index firms, industries, and countries, respectively ; y
*
PROD and y
*
MKT are 
dummies that equal to 1 if a firm has released a new or significantly improved product or service 
or has performed a marketing innovation in the last three years, respectively; COR denotes a 
firm's perception of corruption; PROD and PAT denote whether a firm has applied for a patent or 
trademark in the last three years, respectively; X denotes the set of control variables previously 
described; λi and ηc denote industry and country fixed effects; and  PROD and  MKT are the 
respective error terms for the equations estimating product and marketing innovation. 
5. Results 
 A series of models with robust standard errors were used to test the hypotheses in this 
study (Table 2). Model 1 presents the baseline model with only controls. Models 1-4 each have 
product and marketing innovation as the outcome variable in their equations in order to test the 
main effect hypotheses of the effect of corruption on product (H1) and marketing innovation 
(H2), as well as the moderating role of trademarking (H4). Model 5, on the other hand, uses 
product innovation and patenting as the dependent variables in its equations in order to test the 
mediating role of patenting (H3). As can be seen in the last row of the table in Appendix 3c, the 
Wald test of the interdependence between equations is consistent across models. This result 
indicates that the error terms of the equations in each model are significantly correlated, 
supporting the use of bivariate probit as the appropriate estimation technique. 
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 The results of Model 1 affirm the predicted effects of many of the controls, with R&D, 
government support, and size each having a positive effect on both product and marketing 
innovation. International orientation only had a significant effect on marketing innovation, which 
was surprisingly negative. Majority foreign owned firms were found to be more likely to engage 
in marketing innovation. 
 Model 2 differs from Model 1 by including corruption as a predictor, which allows for 
evaluating Hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 predicted that perceived corruption has a negative 
effect on product innovation while Hypothesis 2 predicted it has a positive effect on marketing 
innovation. In Model 2, the coefficient of perceived corruption is negative and significant (β = 
−0.0327, p<0.05) for the equation predicting product innovation while it is positive and 
significant (β = 0.0456, p<0.001) for the equation predicting marketing innovation. This result, 
along with consistent findings of the coefficients of perceived corruption in Models 3 and 4, 
provide support for Hypothesis 1 and 2.  
 Model 3 adds patenting and trademarking to the equations predicting product and 
marketing innovation, respectively. Both the coefficients of patenting (β = 0.602, p<0.001) and 
trademarking (β = 0.849, p<0.001) were found to be significant and positive in their respective 
equations, confirming the prediction that patenting positively affects product innovation while 
trademarking positively affects marketing innovation. In order to test Hypothesis 4, which 
predicted that trademarking strengthens the positive effect of perceived corruption on marketing 
innovation, the interaction between trademarking and perceived corruption was included as a 
variable in the equation predicting marketing innovation in Model 4. While the coefficient of the 
interaction term is positive as predicted (β = 0.602), it is only marginally significant (P<0.1). 
Thus, this result provides only minimal support for Hypothesis 4. 
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 In order to test Hypothesis 3, a bootstrapping procedure was used to assess whether 
patenting partially mediates the relationship between perceived corruption and product 
innovation. The bootstrapping procedure reduces the likelihood of type 1 error and has a higher 
level of statistical power than the traditional Baron and Kenney procedure for testing mediation 
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008; Hayes, 2013: 116), making it the appropriate choice. The results of 
the bootstrapping procedure (conducted on Model 5,with 5000 iterations) produced a 
standardized indirect effect of -0.093 (p < 0.01). Additionally, I conducted a Sobel test (Sobel, 
1982) with bootstrapped standard errors to further confirm mediation. After 5000 iterations, the 
results of the Sobel test show an indirect effect of perceived corruption on product innovation 
(Sobel z-statistic = −3.922, p < 0.001). After computing the ratio of the indirect to total effect, 
the proportion of the total effect of perceived corruption on product innovation mediated by 
patenting was found to be 14%. Thus, these results provide support for Hypothesis 3. 
5.1. Robustness tests  
5.1.1. Instrumental variable (IV) estimation 
 I conducted IV estimation to address the possible endogeniety between the perceived 
corruption measure and both product and marketing innovation. Prior literature has 
acknowledged reverse causality between corruption and measures of innovation (Krammer, 
2017,Vial and Hanoteau, 2010). Corrupt public actors impose additional costs on firms 
commensurate with their ability to pay them (Svensson, 2003). Accordingly, innovating firms 
face a more severe threat of corruption to the extent that their innovation outputs, such as new 
products or branding initiatives, are perceived as signals of financial success by corrupt actors 
(Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2014). Furthermore, as alluded to in this paper, 
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innovation activities can also leave firms more susceptible to corruption if they require forms of 
government permission, such as patent protection for product innovations. Corruption and 
innovation are thought to be jointly influenced by a variety country (e.g. GDP) and industry (e.g. 
growth) level factors, which also raises endogeniety concerns. 
 I instrumented firm-level perceived corruption with the average perception of corruption 
at the country-region-industry level, following the approach of previous scholars that have 
corrected for endogeniety when using firm-level corruption measures from the WBES (Fisman 
and Svensson, 2007; Krammer, 2017). Regions are sub-national geographic areas in a country 
which can encompass single or multiple cities, provinces, and states. I conducted both two-
staged least squares (2SLS) and instrumental variable probit (IV probit) estimations with robust 
standard errors. Despite the dependent variables being binary, I present only the results of the 
linear, 2SLS estimations due to space limitations and because the discrete nature of the 
endogenous variable violates the IV probit assumption that the endogenous variable should be 
continuous. Nonetheless, the results from both 2SLS and IV probit were consistent in terms of 
the sign and significance of the coefficients of interest. A second set of IV probit regressions 
were also conducted using the log of perceived corruption in order to transform the endogenous 
variable into one that is continuous, which also produced consistent results. 
 The assumptions underlying the use of the instrument are confirmed by the data, with 
country-region-industry perceived corruption being highly correlated with perceived corruption 
at the firm-level (correlation= 0.3930) but having a low correlation with product innovation 
(correlation = 0.0192) and comparatively lower correlation with marketing innovation 
(correlation =0.1024). The instrument is also found to be a valid determinant of both measures of 
innovation, having joint F statistics that surpass the suggested threshold of 10 (Stock, Wring, and 
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Yogo, 2002) in the regressions explaining product innovation (785.93, p<0.001) and marketing 
innovation (774.55, p<0.001). As a test of instrument strength, I report the Kleibergen-Paap 
Walk rk F-statistic since the Cragg-Donald statistic that is commonly reported is not valid when 
robust standard errors are computed. The F statistic is greater than 20 and significant (p<0.001) 
for both the regressions predicting product and marketing innovation, indicating that the 
instrument is strong and relevant. The Woolridge endogeniety statistics (Woolridge, 1995) 
reported in the last row of Table 4 indicate that the null hypothesis that firm-level perceived 
corruption is exogenous is rejected across models at adequate levels of statistical significance 
(5% or less), except for those predicting product innovation and trademarking, in which there is a 
lack of significance, and model 10 (which tests the moderating effect of trademarking), in which 
there is significance at only the 10% level. While instrumenting in cases where endogeniety may 
not be an issue can result in overestimated standard errors, I choose to present the 2SLS 
estimations for these models because (1) endogeniety issues that are uncorrected pose the risk of 
producing biased estimates, and (2) the 2SLS results can be compared with the main bivariate 
probit results to ascertain whether standard errors might be overestimated. Consistency between 
the bivariate probit and 2SLS results indicates that overestimation of standard errors is not an 
issue. 
 
 The results of the 2SLS estimations are presented in the table in Appendix 3d. In Model 
9, which predicts product innovation, the coefficient of perceived corruption is negative and 
significant (β = -0.0270, p<0.05), providing support for Hypothesis 1. In Models 13-15, which 
predict marketing innovation, the coefficients of perceived corruption are positive and significant 
(β = 0.0408-0.0471, p<0.01), providing support for Hypothesis 2. Model 7 confirms that 
perceived corruption does not have a significant direct effect on trademarking, which is a key 
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distinction made from its effect on patenting that is the basis for my argument of its moderating 
effect. Model 14 confirms that trademarking is positively related to marketing innovation since 
the coefficient of trademarking is positive and significant (β = 0.241, p<0.001), but Hypothesis 4 
cannot be supported by the results since the inclusion of the trademarking and perceived 
corruption interaction in Model 15 is not statistically significant. 
 Estimation using 2SLS provides an advantage over bivariate probit in testing for 
mediation, allowing for the Baron and Kenney (1986) procedure to be implemented since 
equations are not estimated simultaneously. While its limitations compared to the bootstrapping 
method have been previously highlighted, I decided to present the results of this procedure in 
order to provide an alternative test of mediation than those in the main results. The conditions 
required for the Baron and Kenney procedure to establish the partial mediation suggested by 
Hypothesis 3 are met. Firstly, corruption (the independent variable) is negatively associated with 
patenting (the mediator), as established in Model 6 (β = -0.0576, p<0.001). Secondly, perceived 
corruption is negatively associated with product innovation (the dependent variable), as 
established in Model 9 and previously discussed. Thirdly, patenting has a positive association 
with product innovation, as established in Model 10 (β = 0.209, p<0.001). Lastly, when 
comparing Model 9 to Model 11, the coefficient of perceived corruption loses its significance 
and reduces in magnitude when patenting is included in the regression (β = -0.0135, p>0.1). 
5.1.2. Alternative measures of marketing innovation 
 While I conceptualized marketing innovation broadly to encompass new initiatives taken 
on by a firm across the marketing mix, the measure of marketing innovation used in the primary 
specification was specific to the product dimension of the four p's, pertaining to initiatives that 
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entail branding and design changes. To test whether corruption has a positive effect on a broader 
set of marketing innovation initiatives, binary measures pertaining to promotion, pricing, and 
placement
3
 were incorporated alongside the main product innovation measure in a series of 
bivariate probit models. The moderating role of trademarking was not tested since trademarks 
would not be expected to be sought after for these forms of marketing innovation. As can be seen 
from Models 16-18 on the table in Appendix 3e, perceived corruption has a significant and 
negative effect on product innovation and a significant and positive effect on the promotion (β = 
0.0271, p<0.05), pricing (β = 0.0608, p<0.001), and placement (β = 0.0368, p<0.01) types of 
marketing innovations. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
5.1.3. Removal of responses perceived as untruthful 
To alleviate concerns that the perceived corruption measure is being biased by socially 
desirable responding, the primary estimation was re-ran after dropping respondents that were 
perceived as being untruthful when answering questions regarding opinions and perceptions. The 
results, which are not reported here due to space limitations, remained consistent. 
 
6. Discussion 
  In this paper, I examined how perceived corruption affects both product and marketing 
innovation. The influence that IP protection has on the relationship between perceived corruption 
                                                          
3
 The promotion variable takes the value of 1 if a firm has introduced or significantly changed advertising methods 
or promotion of the product or service in the last three years, and 0 otherwise. The pricing variable takes the value 
of 1 if a firm has introduced or significantly changed pricing strategies, discount schemes, payment schemes, or 
customer loyalty rewards in the last three years, and 0 otherwise. The placement variable takes the value of 1 if a 
firm has introduced or significantly changed sales channels or sales points in the last three years, and 0 otherwise. 
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and innovation was also taken into consideration, with patenting and trademarking being 
incorporated into the analysis for their role in protecting product and marketing innovations, 
respectively. Product and marketing innovation were conceptualized, respectively, as forms of 
exploration and exploitation in order to explain that they are interdependent activities that a firm 
strives to achieve an optimal balance between. Threat rigidity theory was used to explain how 
perceived corruption causes a firm to adopt a risk-averse and short term strategic focus that 
results in a shift of emphasis from exploration to exploitation, and thus, from product to 
marketing innovation.  
   I find that perceived corruption causes a reduction in product innovation and an increase 
in marketing innovation, consistent with my key argument that firms respond to perceived 
corruption by shifting their efforts away from the latter, due to its uncertain and distant returns, 
towards the former, for its assured and near-term returns. As for the influence of IP protection on 
these relationships, my results vary. I find strong evidence to support the hypothesis that 
patenting partially mediates the relationship between perceived corruption and product 
innovation, indicating that the negative effect of perceived corruption on patenting is a possible 
pathway to its detrimental consequence to product innovation. On the other hand, I find weak 
evidence (significance at the 10% level in the main results and a lack of significance in the 2SLS 
estimation) to support the hypothesis that trademarking strengthens the relationship between 
perceived corruption and marketing innovation. This indicates that firms are not likely to use 
trademarks as a part of their increased emphasis on marketing innovation that results from 
perceived corruption, as I argued. A possible explanation for this finding may be that the creation 
and use of trademarks is contingent on product innovation. The development or significant 
modification of products may be necessary to create the opportunity for a firm to introduce novel 
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branding elements such as logos and brand names that require trademark protection.  
6.1. Theoretical contribution 
This research makes a number of contributions. Firstly, it contributes to the literature on 
innovation in developing countries with the novel theoretical insight that firms respond to 
perceived corruption by adapting their broader innovation strategy to reduce their level of risk, 
shifting their emphasis to a form of innovation that is attuned with a risk averse and short-term 
strategic focus. By conceptualizing a broad scope of innovation and focusing on how firms adapt 
to corruption, my research adds a layer of depth to the dominant understanding in the literature 
that corruption deters innovation by reducing the rents appropriable by a firm, in which a narrow, 
technological based conceptualization of innovation is considered. This insight provides a deeper 
understanding of the consequences that the institutional context of developing countries has on 
firm innovation that can inform future research on the topic. For example, the national 
innovation systems literature can benefit from the more nuanced view on the relationship 
between corruption and innovation in light of its focus on how the institutional environment of 
developing countries impacts the types of innovations that firms produce (Nelson, 1993; Porter, 
1990). The prevalence of the kinds of innovation that are more typical in developing countries 
compared to developed countries, such as those that rely on existing knowledge and technologies 
rather than technological breakthroughs (Govindarajan and Ramamurti, 2011) or utilize new 
processes and business models that alter the way products are sold and distributed (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2005), can be better explained with the knowledge of how corruption, a part of the 
constellation salient institutional factors of the developing context, causes firms to favor 
innovations with more assured and near-term returns. 
My study also contributes to the literature on exploration and exploitation, answering 
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calls for further research on how organizations respond to their environmental context by shifting 
their balance of exploration and exploitation (Lavie et al., 2010). I provide validation for the 
argument that weak appropriability conditions that reduce the benefits accruable from 
exploration cause firms to shift their focus from exploration to exploitation. To do so, I elucidate 
a theoretical mechanism that explains this shift and provide supporting empirical evidence, both 
of which have been absent from the literature. Future research can use the knowledge that an 
environmental threat reduces a firm's ability to engage in the experimentation that underlies 
exploratory activities, by reducing a firm's information search and causing them to adopt a rigid 
operating structure, to explore how other environmental factors that create weak appropriability 
conditions affect a firms balance of exploration and exploitation. This line of reasoning has 
extensive applicability to studies on innovation since the exploration-exploitation framework in 
general is able to distinguish the activities of firms that differ in the certainty and proximity of 
their returns. As such, this line of reasoning can be applied to studies that employ other 
distinctions of innovation that are common in literature, such as radical vs. incremental 
innovation and innovation that is new to the market vs. innovation that is new to the firm. 
6.2. Practical implications 
My research is insightful for managers of firms in developing countries that need to cope 
with the challenges that corruption poses for innovation. When severe corruption causes the 
exploratory effort required to produce successful product innovations to be infeasible, my 
findings indicate that marketing innovation is a possible activity that managers can shift their 
focus towards. Marketing innovation allows firms to exploit previous exploratory efforts devoted 
to the development of new products through new ways of commercializing its existing base of 
products to generate predictable returns. While likely not an ideal long-term strategy for firms 
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dependent on new products to drive performance, a focus on marketing innovation can provide 
relief in the form of immediate returns while a firm learns to better execute innovation amidst the 
threat of corruption, which can entail building competencies to manage government relationships 
and expertise in securing and enforcing patent rights in light of a deficient IP system. 
 The insights from this paper can inform policy creation that better supports innovation in 
the institutional context of developing countries. Firstly, my findings reinforce the importance of 
improving governance through efforts aimed at fighting corruption. While firms are likely to 
conduct marketing innovation when faced with corruption, they are less likely to engage in 
product innovation, a form of the technologically-oriented type of innovation that is of primary 
concern to policy-makers due to its association with economic prosperity. Secondly, policy-
makers will benefit from understanding the theoretical mechanism that causes a firm to reduce its 
product innovation. With the knowledge that organizational processes such as experimentation 
and information search that foster product innovation are being inhibited by corruption, policies 
aimed specifically at aiding and bolstering these organizational functions, such as subsidized 
R&D assistance programs, may be effective in promoting product innovation. 
6.3. Limitations and future research directions 
 This study is not without limitations. Firstly, a perceptual measure of corruption was used 
in this study. While having the key advantage over other commonly used measures of corruption 
of being framed in a manner that lowers the risk of socially desirable response, it's inherent 
subjectivity as a perceptual measure compromises it's comparability across firms. Although the 
use of country and industry fixed effects partially addresses this issue in the empirical analysis, 
more ideal would be the use of a firm-level measure of corruption that is both free from socially 
desirability bias and more objective in nature to ensure greater comparability across the 
126 
 
experience of firms with corruption. That being said, finding or creating such a measure is no 
easy task given that objective measures are likely to more explicitly tie firms to illicit or illegal 
activities. 
 Secondly, corruption in this study is reasoned as being disadvantageous to firms by acting 
as an obstacle to innovation. While this perspective aligns with the dominant view in the 
literature that corruption "sands" the wheels of economic progress by imposing additional costs 
on firms, it does not take the opposing perspective into account that corruption can "grease" the 
wheels of economic progress, which has also received empirical support (Egger and Winner, 
2005; Méon & Weill, 2010). From the perspective of the greasing hypothesis, corruption 
increases economic activity by facilitating transactions, allowing firms to overcome government 
ineffectiveness and excessive bureaucracy (Lien, 1990). This advantage is likely only 
experienced by a minority of firms given that corruption provides advantages to particular firms 
while blocking access to others, and because benefiting from corruption requires the capability 
and motivation on the part of a firm to make political deficiencies work in their favor (Galang, 
2012). Nonetheless, a fruitful direction for future research is to take into consideration both the 
sanding and greasing perspectives in examining how corruption affects a firm's broader 
innovation strategy. For example, it would be interesting to explore if corruption has the opposite 
effect when it acts as a grease, causing firms to shift their innovation efforts towards more risky 
and long-term innovation activities. 
 I hope that by providing a more nuanced perspective on how corruption impacts firm 
innovation, my study can help inform the research of scholars that study this topic of upmost 
importance for developing countries. 
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Discussion 
 Having provided a discussion of each paper's specific contributions, directions for future 
research, and practical implications, I focus this section on how the papers fit together in the 
broader study of organizational corruption. Specifically, I contrast the findings of the respective  
papers to reveal novel insights and discuss future research questions that can be explored to 
delve further into these insights. I begin first with a brief overview of the findings of each paper. 
Summary of findings  
 My dissertation consists of three papers that each provide insights on a different aspect of 
organizational corruption. Paper 1, which explores antecedents of corruption, examines how 
some institutional factors typical of a developing country context drive firms to be unlawful, as 
measured by their law-abiding climate, and the ability of socially responsible organizational 
practices to ensure firms remain lawful in spite of these factors. Anomie theory was used as the 
theoretical lens to explain the process by which institutional factors and organizational practices 
influence law-abiding climate. To test the hypotheses of this study, primary survey data was 
collected on 118 Mexican firms. The results of this study re-affirm that perceptions of regulatory 
burden and a lack of industry munificence drive firms to be unlawful. Furthermore, they produce 
the novel insight that codes-of-ethics that are used more extensively to guide strategic decisions 
reduce the inclination of firms to engage in illegal and corrupt acts caused by perceived 
regulatory burden, although their ability to do so diminishes after a moderate level of use. 
Surprisingly, CSR certification was found to exacerbate the effect that perceived regulatory 
burden has on a firms unlawfulness, contrary to the paper's prediction. 
 Paper 2 explores the wide-spread consequences of corruption by examining reputational 
128 
 
spillover, when a scandal committed by one firm negatively affects the reputation of other firms 
not involved. The paper advances the theoretical understanding of the phenomenon by better 
capturing the use of categorization by the public after observing a scandal. In doing so, it 
provides a new model of reputational spillover that delineates spillover based on the core 
dimensions of origin and spread, which organizes and extends the literature in important ways. 
Specifically, it uncovers the antecedents of spillover and provides a rationale for the firm 
attributes that determine which by-stander firms are categorized with the perpetrator firm, based 
on the understanding that the category employed by the public is contingent on the scandals level 
of moral intensity. Furthermore, the model provides a stronger basis to understand the scope of 
reputational spillover by theorizing that the attributes that define category membership can be 
common to firms across different industries. This new way of understanding categorization 
refutes the dominant assumption in the literature that spillover effects are contained within an 
industry, providing a theoretical basis by which spillover can cross industry boundaries.  
  Paper 3 explores the strategic implications that corruption has on firm innovation in 
developing countries. Looking specifically at the corruption that takes place in exchanges 
between firms and government officials that is common in the developing country context, and 
conceptualizing corruption as an obstacle facing firms, the effect of corruption on both product 
and marketing innovation was examined. The two types of innovation were conceptualized as 
forms of exploration and exploitation respectively to account for their interdependency and the 
need for a firm to achieve an optimal balance between the two. Using threat-rigidity theory, the 
argument is made that perceived corruption causes a firm to adopt a risk-averse and short term 
strategic focus that results in a shift of emphasis from exploration to exploitation, and thus, from 
product to marketing innovation. Furthermore, the role that IP protection has on the relationship 
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between perceived corruption and each type of innovation was also examined, with patenting and 
trademarking being incorporated into the analysis for their role in protecting product and 
marketing innovations, respectively. Empirical tests were conducted on data from the World 
Bank on over 6000 firms from ten South Asian and African countries. The tests confirm the 
prediction that corruption reduces product innovation while increasing marketing innovation, and 
that patenting mediates the relationship between corruption and product innovation.  
  Next, I provide some commentary on some insights and future directions for research that 
the insights from the respective papers bring to light when considered in conjunction with one 
another. 
Linkages between papers 
Paper 1 and Paper 2  
 Paper 1 sheds light on the influence that the institutional environment of developing 
countries has on the unlawful conduct of firms. A key theoretical tenet of Paper 2 is that the 
public categorizes firms they deem similar on some set of attributes, which results in the spread 
of reputation spillover to by-stander firms after a perpetrator firm commits a scandal. Given the 
overwhelming influence of the institutional environment of developing countries on the conduct 
of firms, it may be possible that the institutional environment can serve as a basis of similarity by 
which developing country firms become categorized after a scandal committed by the perpetrator 
firm.  
 The strength of institutional forces in the context that firms are embedded in dictates a 
common structure in the relationship between firms and their environment that results in similar 
responses across firms (Borgatti & Everett, 1992). It becomes "taken for granted" for firms the 
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modus operandi to survive and prosper in these institutional environments (Starbuck, 1976), and 
as a result the public associates the conduct of firms with the institutional environment they 
reside in. Consider the example of Bangladesh where numerous scandals relating to poor 
working conditions have occurred in the last decade in its garment manufacturing industry. A 
scandal could be reflective of well-established institutional forces that have existed for decades 
in the country, such as public sector corruption in which bribes can allow for deficient working 
conditions to be overlooked, a caste system that enforces the acceptance of low pay and living 
standards, and increasing pressure from western firms to lower prices that can induce firms to 
sacrifice safety for cost savings. These institutional conditions could serve as a basis for 
categorizing the perpetrator firm to by-stander firms both within and outside of the garment 
industry as the underlying cause of a country-wide systemic issue that could enable other firms 
to exploit their labour. Extant literature largely fails to consider the effect of institutional 
conditions on spillover, limiting its analysis to a specific institutional context (Jonsson, Greve, 
and Fujiwara-Greve, 2009) when considering them at all. A future direction for research on 
reputational spillover is to consider whether the institutional context can serve as basis for 
categorization when it is closely linked with the identity of firms in the context and salient to a 
scandal. 
 Paper 1 also brought to light the difference in how corruption can be perceived across 
countries (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Using anomie as a theoretical lens, the paper explained that 
unlawful conduct becomes perceived as an accepted business practice in developing countries 
because institutional conditions render legitimate means of doing business impractical. To the 
extent that the public in developing countries shares a similar view on unlawful conduct, there 
may be significant differences between developed and developing countries in how reputational 
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spillover spreads. If the domestic public in developing countries perceives unlawful conduct to 
be justified, then scandals that involve breaking the law should possess lower moral intensity 
than they would in the developed country context where the domestic public would view them as 
more illicit. Such a difference could mean that scandals that involve breaking the law would 
either not result in spillover in developing countries or would result in the public putting forth 
little cognitive effort in categorizing firms on account of their lack of concern regarding the 
scandal, employing a prototypical industry category as opposed to a scandal-specific category. 
Future research could take into account differences in how the domestic public of developing and 
developed countries perceive scandals and whether this has consequences for the nature of 
reputational spillover. 
 In Paper 1, it was found that firms in the sample that hold a particular CSR certification 
in Mexico conduct themselves more unlawfully when faced with regulatory burden. In line with 
King & Lenox's (2000) rationale pertaining to the ineffectiveness of a self-regulatory program in 
the chemical industry without sanctions, it was conjectured that the absence of explicit sanctions 
is causing the certification to not only be ineffective, but counter-productive for its purpose of 
producing desired behaviour. If the public comes to associate undesired behaviour with such a 
certification, it may be possible that it is used as a basis of similarity by which by-stander firms 
become categorized with the perpetrator firm that commits a scandal. In this case, a certification 
without sanctions may be a liability even for those firms that actually uphold its standards of 
behaviour. Insights from future research that examines this possibility would be beneficial for 
firms contemplating certifying to a standard in order to achieve signalling benefits by explaining 
the potential, counter-intuitive risk to reputation they create. The governing body of certifications 
would also benefit from this research direction because it could explore how perceived similarity 
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due to possession of certification could cause an adverse selection problem where "good" firms 
opt out of a certification due to the reputational risk it creates, leaving only "bad" firms, which 
would degrade the legitimacy of the standard. 
Paper 1 and Paper 3 
 In Paper 1, unlawful conduct is framed as a means of adaption for developing country 
firms that face regulatory burden, which limits their ability to achieve performance goals while 
adhering to the law. Regulatory burden can often amount to corruption when excessive 
bureaucracy and regulative uncertainty is used to veil the discretionary power of public officials 
used for self-serving purposes. In this sense, the finding may reflect that firms are responding to 
public corruption by conducting themselves unlawfully, which most typically takes the form of 
making bribe payments. In Paper 3, firms were observed to adapt to corruption that is perceived 
to be an obstacle by shifting their resources and efforts away from product innovation towards 
marketing innovation. What is unobserved in Paper 3 is whether firms, as they may have been in 
Paper 1, were responding to corruption by acting unlawfully. An interesting avenue for future 
research would be to take into consideration differences in how firms that are faced with 
corruption adapt their innovation approach when they act unlawfully compared to when they 
adhere to the law. In particular, it would be interesting to examine whether unlawful conduct is a 
superior means of adaptation for innovating firms faced with corruption. 
 Government support fosters firm innovation (Bronzini and Piselli, 2016), and is 
especially important determinant of innovation in developing countries due to deficiencies in 
institutional systems such as capital markets that support innovation in the developed country 
context (Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, and Siegel, 2016). It may be the case  that corruption serves as a 
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means of securing government support, allowing firms privileged access to opportunities and 
resources required to innovate, such as contracts, permits, or IP rights, whereas firms that adhere 
to the law are unable to do so. This may translate into differences in how firms allocate their 
resources and efforts across innovation activities. Unlawful firms may not be affected by 
corruption to the same extent as those that adhere to the law, or they may even benefit from the 
exclusive access that it grants them. If this is true, it may be possible that corruption does not 
have a significant effect on product and marketing innovation for unlawful firms, or that it may 
actually cause firms to increase their product innovation efforts by making them better able to 
pursue product innovation.  To shed further light on this possibility, the political connectedness 
of firms can be taken into consideration to determine whether corruption is an obstacle to 
innovation or proactive strategic tacgic that allows for obtaining government support that fosters 
innovation.  By virtue of the influence of government actors that they allow firms to have (Peng 
and Luo, 2000), political connections may enable a proactive non-market strategy in which 
corruption in the institutional environment can be exploited as advantage by firms. 
Paper 2 and Paper 3 
 An implication drawn from Paper 2 is that a firm can protect itself from the threat of 
reputational spillover by distinguishing itself from firms likely to commit a scandal with which it 
may be perceived as similar. In Paper 3, a key finding was that firms in developing countries that 
perceive corruption to be a severe obstacle reduce their product innovation and increase their 
marketing innovation. The reasoning underlying this finding which is presented in the paper is 
that corruption causes firms to adopt a risk-averse and short-term strategic focus that favors the 
shorter-term and more assured returns of the latter. The implication drawn from Paper 2 sheds 
light on a possible alternative explanation for this finding from Paper 3. 
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 Marketing innovation allows a firm to distinguish itself from competitors through efforts 
aimed at bolstering its brand, which can include changes to the presentation of its products using 
logos, names, or trademarks or advertising campaigns that highlight the attributes that make a 
firm's products superior to those if its competitors. A secondary effect of marketing innovation 
by virtue of its ability to distinguish a firm is that it can protect a firm from reputational 
spillover. Accordingly, an alternative reason for why perceived corruption is found to increase 
the likelihood of marketing innovation is that it is an attempt by a firm to distinguish itself from 
other firms in their environment so it can be protected from corruption scandals that would taint 
the reputation of a broad scope of firms. In this case, perceived corruption could be thought of as 
indicator of a manager's concern that corruption in its firm's broader environment could 
indirectly affect the reputation of the firm. 
 The use of marketing initiatives to protect a firm from reputational spillover also helps 
explain the incentive of firms to join self-regulatory associations. Through collective action and 
representation, self-regulatory associations allow for “privatizing” a reputational commons so 
that members have an autonomous reputation that is protected from spillover by the actions of 
non-member firms (King, Lenox, and Barnett, 2002). Firms that are accepted as members of self-
regulatory associations are granted a certification, which acts as a reputational signal, if they 
adhere to a set of requirements outlined by the governing body. An example is the coffee 
industry's fair trade certification, which is intended to protect the reputation of coffee producers 
that hold the certification from possible scandals committed by coffee producers that do not hold 
it. Firms that are certified to a standard are able to signify their membership using tangible 
markers such as labels placed on the packaging of products or by highlighting it as a 
distinguishing feature in their advertising campaigns. Membership in self-regulatory associations 
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can therefore be thought of as a form of marketing innovation that can be used by firms to both 
bolster their brand and protect their reputation from possible spillovers. 
Concluding statement 
 The three papers of my dissertation, as a set, further the understanding of organizational 
corruption in respects that are understudied in the extant literature. By taking an interdisciplinary 
approach both within and across papers, I was able to account for the roles of the various actors 
and variables involved or affected by organizational corruption and its multitude of causes and 
consequences. Furthermore, by considering the dynamics between actors and variables at and 
across different levels of analysis, I uncovered processes that underlie the manifestation of 
organizational corruption and its consequences that cause it to be a systemic issue. By following 
these theoretical directions, my dissertation advanced knowledge on three dimensions of 
organizational corruption I intended to explore - its antecedents, widespread consequences, and 
strategic implications. This dissertation is my initial foray into the study of organizational 
corruption, a topic that I am passionate about and believe is of upmost importance to study for its 
potential to contribute to the betterment of society. I would like to re-iterate my thanks to my 
dissertation committee who have been an immense help in guiding my thinking throughout this 
process which enabled me uncover the interesting insights and findings that I presented before 
you.  
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Appendix 1a 
 Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Control Variables 
 
 Firm size 
 Firm sales 
 Firm age 
 Foreign ownership 
 Industry 
 
 
Law-abiding climate 
 
Socially responsible organizational practices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H4a,b: Code-of-ethics use 
 
H3a,b: CSR certification 
 
 
Institutional factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H2: Perceived lack of industry 
munificence 
 
H1: Perceived regulatory burden 
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Appendix 1d 
Law-abiding climate by perceived regulatory burden for firms with and without CSR  
certification. 
 
 
 
Law-abiding climate by perceived regulatory burden for firms with code-of-ethics use at the 
mean and one standard deviation below the mean.  
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Appendix 1e 
Study measures 
Law and code ethical climate (Victor and Cullen, 1988) 
Construct reliability = 0.809; AVE = 0.63; range of loadings: 0.717- 0.843 
(scale items anchored by 1= “strongly disagree” and 7= “strongly agree”) 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
1.  In our company, people are expected to comply with the law and professional standards   
over and above other considerations. 
2.  In our company, the law or ethical code of their profession is the major consideration. 
3.  In our company, people are expected to strictly follow legal or professional standards. 
4.  In our company, the first consideration is whether a decision violates any law. 
Regulatory burden (EDGE, 2001, reverse coded) 
Construct reliability = 0.852; AVE = 0.67; range of loadings: 0.631- 0.898 
(scale items anchored by 1= “strongly disagree” and 7= “strongly agree”) 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
1. Our company usually has clear and accurate information about the requirements and 
obligations that government authorities have established to participate in business.  
2. During the process of defining new laws, policies or regulations affecting our 
company, the government generally keeps our company informed. 
3. In the event of significant changes in laws, policies or regulations affecting our 
company, the government generally considers our firm's opinions or that of our 
business association 
4. In general, the interpretation of federal laws, policies or regulations affecting our 
company's operations are consistent and predictable. 
Industry munificence (Jambulingam et. al, 2005, reverse coded) 
Construct reliability = 0.871; AVE = 0.72; range of loadings: 0.813-0.877 
(scale items anchored by 1= “strongly disagree” and 7= “strongly agree”) 
Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements. 
1. There are ample opportunities for growth in our company’s industry.  
2. Our company's industry will support continued growth of our company.  
3. Prospects for growth in our current industry environment are good.  
4. Our industry is rich with opportunities for growth. 
 
Code-of-ethics use (Stevens et. al, 2005) 
Construct reliability = 0.902; AVE = 0.72; range of loadings: 0.804-0.891 
(scale items anchored by 1= “strongly disagree” and 7= “strongly agree”  
 How helpful do you feel is your company’s code of ethics in each of the following matters? 
1. Making financial decisions.  
2. Making personnel decisions. 
3. Making decisions about information disclosure.  
4. Responding to questions about company actions.  
5. Aiding your company’s planning processes. 
CSR certification (Cemefi, 2016) 
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Measured according to whether a firm is certified to ESR for the year 2015 (1= yes, 0 = no) 
 
Controls 
 
Firm size (Amcham database): number of employees in the firm’s headquarters (1= 1-100, 
2= 101- 1000, 3 = 1000 or more) 
Foreign ownership (survey question): whether the firm is majority owned by a foreign  
    party (1=yes, 0=no) 
Sales (Amcham database): firm sales (1=0- 94.9 million pesos, 2= 95-249.9 million pesos,  
3=250 million pesos or greater) 
Firm age (survey question) 
Industry (SIEM database or manual inspection): dummy variables representing 
professional service, wholesale and retail, three sub-classifications of manufacturing, and 
other industries 
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 Appendix 3a 
Conceptual Diagram             
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Perceived corruption 
Product innovation 
Marketing innovation 
Patenting 
Trademarking 
+ 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
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 Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3c 
 
 
Bivariate probit with robust standard errors 
 Model 1 
Controls only 
Model 2 
H1 and H2 
Model 3 
Inclusion of patent and 
trademark application 
Dependent variable Product  
Innovation 
Marketing 
 Innovation 
Product 
 Innovation 
Marketing 
 Innovation 
Product  
Innovation 
Marketing  
Innovation 
Constant -0.202+ 0.111 -0.140 0.0242 -0.145 -0.0506 
 (0.121) (0.121) (0.124) (0.123) (0.125) (0.127) 
R & D 0.393*** 0.290*** 0.399*** 0.281*** 0.378*** 0.229*** 
 (0.0398) (0.0403) (0.0399) (0.0404) (0.0405) (0.0415) 
Government support 0.227*** 0.386*** 0.234*** 0.381*** 0.148** 0.380*** 
 (0.0519) (0.0539) (0.0519) (0.0539) (0.0532) (0.0553) 
Shareholding company -0.0789 -0.100+ -0.0833 -0.0929+ -0.0796 -0.117* 
 (0.0542) (0.0545) (0.0543) (0.0546) (0.0546) (0.0558) 
International orientation -0.0804 -0.257** -0.0791 -0.261** -0.0613 -0.227** 
 (0.0768) (0.0798) (0.0769) (0.0798) (0.0767) (0.0801) 
Foreign owned -0.0285 0.181* -0.0346 0.187* -0.0451 0.160+ 
 (0.0884) (0.0882) (0.0886) (0.0883) (0.0895) (0.0906) 
Workforce education 0.000472 0.000508 0.000519 0.000411 0.000749 0.000718 
 (0.000562) (0.000561) (0.000562) (0.000561) (0.000567) (0.000569) 
Managerial experience 0.0796* 0.0336 0.0822* 0.0305 0.0830* 0.0248 
 (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0375) (0.0380) (0.0383) 
Size(log) 0.0421** 0.121*** 0.0428** 0.120*** 0.0299+ 0.103*** 
 (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0160) 
Age(log) -0.0136 -0.0643** -0.0140 -0.0637* -0.0119 -0.0468+ 
 (0.0248) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0251) (0.0254) 
Corruption   -0.0327* 0.0456*** -0.0287* 0.0432** 
   (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0130) (0.0131) 
Patenting     0.602***  
     (0.0633)  
Trademarking      0.849*** 
      (0.0627) 
Trademarking x Corruption       
       
Observations 6,277 6,277 6,206 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Log-pseudolikelihood -7414.9148 -7404.1239 -7166.8649 
Wald chi-square test of 
overall fit 
9172.96*** 8288.65*** 6963.67*** 
Wald chi-square test of 
interdependence (ρ= 0) 
100.643*** 102.959*** 71.0764*** 
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Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Bivariate probit with robust standard errors (continued) 
 Model 4 
H4 
Model 5 
H3 
Dependent variable Product  
Innovation 
Marketing  
Innovation 
Patenting Product 
Innovation 
Constant -0.145 -0.0347 -1.801*** -0.262* 
 (0.125) (0.127) (0.156) (0.121) 
R & D 0.378*** 0.229*** 0.116* 0.378*** 
 (0.0405) (0.0415) (0.0524) (0.0413) 
Government support 0.148** 0.383*** 0.617*** 0.00694 
 (0.0532) (0.0551) (0.0550) (0.0669) 
Shareholding company -0.0795 -0.117* -0.159* -0.0357 
 (0.0546) (0.0558) (0.0715) (0.0537) 
International orientation -0.0613 -0.230** -0.243* -0.0389 
 (0.0767) (0.0801) (0.107) (0.0766) 
Foreign owned -0.0451 0.160+ 0.145 -0.0414 
 (0.0895) (0.0903) (0.128) (0.0860) 
Workforce education 0.000749 0.000749 -0.000731 0.000686 
 (0.000567) (0.000569) (0.000729) (0.000545) 
Managerial experience 0.0830* 0.0245 0.0121 0.0836* 
 (0.0380) (0.0383) (0.0478) (0.0368) 
Size(log) 0.0300+ 0.104*** 0.142*** 0.0199 
 (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0190) (0.0171) 
Age(log) -0.0119 -0.0478+ -0.00141 0.000648 
 (0.0251) (0.0255) (0.0301) (0.0240) 
Corruption -0.0287* 0.0368** -0.0755*** -0.0239+ 
 (0.0130) (0.0136) (0.0178) (0.0131) 
Patenting 0.602***   1.226*** 
 (0.0633)   (0.266) 
Trademarking  0.689***   
  (0.116)   
Trademarking x Corruption  0.0778+   
  (0.0472)   
Observations 6,206 6,537 
Country FE YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES 
Log-pseudolikelihood -7165.4186 -5780.8153 
Wald chi-square test of 
overall fit 
6976.05*** 4852.29*** 
Wald chi-square test of 
interdependence (ρ= 0) 
71.1992*** 3.8828* 
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Robust standrd standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0. 
a
 Models without the endogenous variable (corruption) were estimated using OLS 
  
Appendix 3d 
 
2SLS estimation with robust standard errors 
Dependent 
Variable 
Patenting Trademarking  Product Innovation 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
a
 Model 9 Model 10
a
 Model 11 
 2SLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 
Constant 0.110*** 0.112*** 0.404*** 0.456*** 0.407*** 0.433*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0339) (0.0419) (0.0485) (0.0419) (0.0488) 
R & D 0.0308** 0.0792*** 0.148*** 0.152*** 0.138*** 0.140*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0109) (0.0137) (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0138) 
Government 
support 
0.155*** 0.00384 0.0596*** 0.0642*** 0.0273 0.0302+ 
 (0.0153) (0.0141) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0168) (0.0169) 
Shareholding 
company 
-0.0380** 0.00580 -0.0191 -0.0234 -0.0159 -0.0182 
 (0.0118) (0.0136) (0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0180) (0.0181) 
International 
orientation 
-0.0447* -0.0596** -0.0291 -0.0265 -0.0225 -0.0214 
 (0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0251) (0.0253) (0.0250) (0.0250) 
Foreign owned 0.00420 0.0158 -0.00529 -0.00903 -0.00800 -0.00980 
 (0.0179) (0.0204) (0.0306) (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0304) 
Workforce 
education 
-0.00005 -0.000389** 0.0000793 0.000132 0.000173 0.000201 
 (0.000119) (0.000127) (0.000187) (0.000189) (0.000186) (0.000187) 
Managerial 
experience 
0.00620 -0.00235 0.0294* 0.0317* 0.0288* 0.0299* 
 (0.00812) (0.00884) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0124) 
Size(log) 0.0259*** 0.0287*** 0.0164** 0.0169*** 0.0110* 0.0113* 
 (0.00362) (0.00401) (0.00510) (0.00510) (0.00511) (0.00510) 
Age(log) -0.00144 -0.0154** -0.00159 -0.00229 -0.000401 -0.000728 
 (0.00502) (0.00580) (0.00837) (0.00837) (0.00838) (0.00836) 
Corruption -0.0576*** -0.00986  -0.0270*  -0.0135 
 (0.00892) (0.00951)  (0.0129)  (0.0130) 
Patenting     0.209*** 0.205*** 
     (0.0174) (0.0178) 
Trademarking       
       
Trademarking x 
Corruption 
      
       
Observations 6,550 6,547 6,606 6,606 6,537 6,537 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
F statistic   40.95***  47.25***  
Root MSE 0.30022 .32228 0.45572 0.45417 0.45135 0.44948 
Wald chi-square 
test of overall 
fit 
469.50*** 635.31***  1903.29***  2279.16*** 
Wooldridge test 
of endogeniety 
31.1356*** 1.85284  1.45514  0.077113 
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standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
a
 Models without the endogenous variable (corruption) were estimated using OLS 
 
  
2SLS with robust standard errors (continued) 
Dependent Variable Marketing Innovation 
 Model 12
a
 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Constant 0.545*** 0.468*** 0.437*** 0.428*** 
 (0.0428) (0.0496) (0.0499) (0.0520) 
R & D 0.0999*** 0.0929*** 0.0715*** 0.0714*** 
 (0.0137) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
Government support 0.123*** 0.117*** 0.114*** 0.113*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0163) 
Shareholding company -0.0301+ -0.0239 -0.0288 -0.0284 
 (0.0183) (0.0184) (0.0182) (0.0183) 
International orientation -0.0829** -0.0870*** -0.0709** -0.0702** 
 (0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0258) (0.0259) 
Foreign owned 0.0600+ 0.0664* 0.0567+ 0.0571+ 
 (0.0312) (0.0311) (0.0310) (0.0311) 
Workforce education 0.000175 0.000104 0.000198 0.000182 
 (0.000192) (0.000192) (0.000190) (0.000191) 
Managerial experience 0.0127 0.00916 0.00809 0.00824 
 (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
Size(log) 0.0404*** 0.0396*** 0.0332*** 0.0329*** 
 (0.00514) (0.00513) (0.00507) (0.00510) 
Age(log) -0.0215* -0.0205* -0.0150+ -0.0147+ 
 (0.00841) (0.00840) (0.00837) (0.00838) 
Corruption  0.0408** 0.0431*** 0.0471** 
  (0.0132) (0.0130) (0.0148) 
Patenting     
     
Trademarking   0.241*** 0.290*** 
   (0.0148) (0.0525) 
Trademarking x 
Corruption 
   -0.0228 
    (0.0221) 
Observations 6,286 6,286 6,232 6,232 
Country FE YES YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES 
F statistic 48.99***    
Root MSE 0.45379 0.45281 0.4462 0.44651 
Wald chi-square test of 
overall fit 
 2163.72*** 2514.85*** 2609.30*** 
Wooldridge test of 
endogeniety 
 4.156* 5.27173* 5.58348+ 
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standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
Appendix 3e 
 
Tests of alternative measures of marketing innovation (bivariate probit with robust standard errors) 
 Model 16  
Promotion 
 
Model 17 
Pricing 
Model 18 
Placement 
Dependent 
variable 
Product  
Innovation 
Promotion 
 
Product  
Innovation 
Pricing Patent Placement 
Constant -0.208+ -0.315** -0.218+ 0.0389 -0.244* -0.596*** 
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.123) (0.120) (0.119) 
R & D 0.408*** 0.339*** 0.418*** 0.398*** 0.421*** 0.301*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0395) (0.0392) (0.0401) (0.0389) (0.0380) 
Government 
support 
0.184*** 0.259*** 0.185*** 0.449*** 0.182*** 0.384*** 
 (0.0500) (0.0513) (0.0503) (0.0532) (0.0498) (0.0476) 
Shareholding 
company 
-0.0653 0.0362 -0.0623 -0.116* -0.0626 -0.0620 
 (0.0537) (0.0527) (0.0537) (0.0530) (0.0533) (0.0506) 
International 
orientation 
-0.0771 -0.288*** -0.0733 -0.250** -0.0830 -0.267*** 
 (0.0772) (0.0777) (0.0771) (0.0772) (0.0760) (0.0758) 
Foreign owned -0.0208 0.0799 -0.0278 -0.0924 -0.0249 -0.143 
 (0.0868) (0.0870) (0.0866) (0.0873) (0.0860) (0.0877) 
Workforce 
education 
0.000359 0.00195*** 0.000339 0.00190*** 0.000307 0.00165** 
 (0.000550) (0.000545) (0.000550) (0.000555) (0.000544) (0.000532
) 
Managerial 
experience 
0.0990** -0.0408 0.0948* 0.0658+ 0.0887* 0.0572 
 (0.0368) (0.0366) (0.0369) (0.0371) (0.0365) (0.0355) 
Size(log) 0.0466** 0.0984*** 0.0472** 0.0757*** 0.0495*** 0.0753*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0154) (0.0150) (0.0146) 
Age(log) -0.0108 -0.0858*** -0.00472 -0.0559* -0.00350 -0.0589* 
 (0.0243) (0.0242) (0.0242) (0.0246) (0.0240) (0.0234) 
Corruption -0.0333** 0.0271* -0.0338** 0.0608*** -0.0365** 0.0368** 
 (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0122) 
       
Observations 6,470 6,468 6,606 
Country FE YES YES YES 
Industry FE YES YES YES 
Log-
pseudolikeliho
od 
-7801.0626 -7693.201 -8153.3168 
Wald chi-
square test of 
overall fit 
5717.92*** 4471.66*** 6820.88*** 
Wald chi-
square test of 
interdependenc
e (ρ= 0) 
51.6093*** 48.3011*** 19.7074*** 
